U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region: Strong Foothold or on Thin Ice?

Patrick Kelley, U.S. Coast Guard

By Mihaela David The White House revealed the much anticipated national strategy for the Arctic region less than a week before Secretary of State John Kerry heads to the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Kiruna. The document lays out the administration's strategic priorities for the region with the stated goal of positioning the U.S. "to respond effectively to emerging opportunities – while simultaneously pursuing efforts to protect and conserve this unique environment."[1] 

Why is the strategy important?

Until this document was released, U.S. policy-making in the Arctic was guided by a rather brief and vague presidential directive (NSPD-66) adopted in 2009 in the waning days of the Bush Administration. Arctic policy observers and stakeholders have long called on the U.S. to start thinking strategically about this rapidly changing and increasingly important region. In a July 2012 letter to President Obama, Alaska senators Begich and Murkowski pressed the administration to deliver a formal strategy document that guides future Arctic development and "ties together all the individual agency policies and visions."[2] Articulating such a strategy is also a necessary first step in a much needed process to coordinate and streamline the activities of the more than twenty federal departments and agencies involved in Arctic policy-making.[3] Lastly, the risk of inaction looms large. In the strategy document, the administration acknowledges that an "undisciplined approach to exploring new opportunities in this frontier could result in significant harm to the region, to our national security interests, and to the global good."[4] In other words, this strategy is long overdue.

What are the key priorities and objectives?

In laying out its strategy, the Obama administration has identified and prioritized three lines of effort: "to protect U.S. national and homeland security interests, promote responsible stewardship, and foster international cooperation."[5]  The strategy document also details a series of supporting objectives for each of these priorities.

The U.S. aims to protect and advance national security interests in the Arctic region by:

• enhancing regional infrastructure and strategic capabilities;
• improving "Arctic domain awareness," including sharing maritime information;
• "preserving freedom of the sea" and navigational safety;
• "responsibly developing" Arctic oil and gas resources to ensure energy security.[6]

To pursue responsible stewardship of the Arctic region and protects the fragile environment, the U.S. will prioritize:

• assessing and monitoring ecosystems and environmental challenges;
• adopting an Integrated Arctic Management approach to natural resource management;
• increasing national and international scientific research efforts and use of traditional knowledge; and
• charting and mapping the Arctic ocean, waterways, and coastal areas."[7]

Finally, the administration will seek to strengthen international cooperation by:

• cooperating with other Arctic states based on common interests and shared values;
• utilizing the Arctic Council as a forum to "advance U.S. interests";
• supporting the ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention; and
• cooperating with other interested parties, such as non-Arctic states or the International Maritime Organization (IMO).[8]

In addition to the aforementioned strategic priorities, the document also outlines the guiding principles that will inform Arctic policy-making in the next decade:

• maintaining and sustaining peace and stability in the region;
• basing decisions on the best available scientific information and traditional knowledge;
• pursuing innovative arrangements, including public-private and multinational partnerships;
• developing policies in close consultation and coordination with Alaska Natives.[9]

What is missing?

A robust strategy should, at the very least, identify future capability needs and priority areas, and lay out specific implementation objectives. Ideally, the outlined objectives should be SMART: specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound.

Using these criteria, the U.S. strategy for the Arctic falls short in many regards. First and foremost, it lacks in specificity. While the 13-page document is a clear departure from the notably brief and vague NSPD-66 and other previous articulations of Arctic policy, it does not lay out specific initiatives or projects that might be pursued to achieve the various objectives identified within.

For example, the administration has acknowledged the need to develop regional infrastructure and strategic capabilities in order to adequately exercise sovereignty over this remote region and perform responsibilities such as  search and rescue or oil spill response.[10] However, there is no mention of specific plans to upgrade the inadequate and outdated icebreaker fleet, to build physical infrastructure such as deep-water ports, or to invest in facilities and equipment for the Coast Guard's operations in Alaska's northern region. No budget information is included, nor a timeline for implementation. Similarly, no implementation details are offered for the rather vague objective of improving Arctic domain awareness by "[enhancing] sea, air, and space capabilities."[11]

Furthermore, the majority of objectives set out cannot be considered attainable until adequate funding is allocated to meet the various infrastructure, capabilities, and research needs. Without a clear budgetary plan, this strategy becomes nothing more than a lengthy wish list. In fact, investment decisions and budgetary allocations will be the best indicator of actual policy priorities. One potential pitfall is that long-term budget planning is more appropriate for large investments, but budgetary allocations will most likely be the subject of heated debate each fiscal year as federal agencies and departments scramble to devote their limited resources to a growing number of pressing nation-wide challenges.

Whether specific objectives are attainable also depends on how mutually reinforcing the goals are. One area in which competing objectives might pose a problem is natural resource management. Beyond expressing a commitment to environmentally responsible development of Arctic oil and gas resources, there is no clear indication of the U.S. government's desired pace or extent of natural resource exploration in the Arctic. Instead, the administration committed itself to establish and institutionalize an "Integrated Arctic Management approach" to manage natural resources, following the recommendations provided by the Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska in its April 2013 report to the President.[12] This mechanism seeks to integrate and reconcile key stakeholders' competing interests -- regarding economic development, environmental protection, and cultural values -- and tends to emphasize science-based decision making. However, the inherent uncertainty in using this mechanism makes it difficult to predict the future level of economic development and impedes the government and the private sector from planning and investing resources accordingly.

Another gap in this strategy is the failure to assign tasks and responsibilities to specific federal departments and agencies. For example, the scientific and exploratory research agenda laid out in this strategy could fall under the remit of several federal agencies, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), as well as a number of research institutions such as the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC). Furthermore, the document acknowledges that international scientific collaboration could potentially reduce duplication of efforts and better leverage resources.[13] However, there is no mention of specific international partners or collaboration projects in this respect.

It is clear that what is necessary as a companion to this strategy is a comprehensive implementation plan with specific investment projects, responsible agencies, allocated budgets, detailed timelines, and evaluation criteria. According to White House officials, the administration does have plans to develop such documents in the coming months, after consultation with key stakeholders in Alaska.[14] It remains to be seen if these addendums to the strategy document will provide the specificity and organizational structure required to coordinate and streamline Arctic policy-making. Most importantly, time will also reveal whether the administration is willing to back up its strategy with adequate fiscal resources.

What specific measures and mechanisms were mentioned?

In certain areas, the administration did lay out specific goals or measures that it would pursue to accomplish some of its objectives. For instance, to ensure navigational safety, the government commits itself to developing management regimes for Arctic waterways, including “traffic separation schemes, vessel tracking, and ship routing."[15] Such initiatives would be achieved in partnership with other Arctic states and stakeholders, and this cooperation would presumably result in "innovative, low-cost solutions," though no further specifics are offered.[16]

The administration also plans to advance understanding of environmental changes in the region through scientific exploration and research and use of traditional knowledge. The document specifically identifies several research priorities:

• the role of land ice in changing sea level;
• the role of sea-ice in global climate;
• biodiversity and Arctic peoples; and
• the effects of thawing permafrost on infrastructure and climate.[17]

While specifics are scarce regarding implementation mechanisms, the strategy document emphasizes "collaborative international efforts, coordinated investments, and public-private partnerships" as the means to achieve the objectives set out.[18] It also mentions the federal government's intention to "[leverage] expertise, resources, and cooperation from the State of Alaska, Alaska Natives, and stakeholders across the entire nation and throughout the international community" to achieve successful implementation.[19] The upcoming roundtable discussions in Alaska are an example of high-level Administration officials seeking input for the implementation plan from interested stakeholders such as indigenous groups and industry representatives.

What are the takeaways?

Despite a good faith effort at articulating policy priorities and formulating mutually-reinforcing objectives, the U.S. Arctic strategy remains as elusive as a mirage on the Arctic ice-sheet. The strategy is toothless in the absence of a comprehensive implementation strategy and long-term budgetary plan.

What the strategy does succeed in doing is signaling to U.S. citizens, other Arctic states, and the international community that the U.S. acknowledges its roles and responsibilities in the Arctic, that it thinks strategically about the future of the region, and that the administration intends to make Arctic policymaking more of a priority than it has in the past.

If the administration follows through with necessary future steps --- a more streamlined interagency process, better leadership, adequate funding, evaluation of the policy implementation --- then this strategy document could form the basis for a responsible, principled, and collaborative U.S. engagement in the Arctic that meets both national interests and shared regional goals. The alternative scenario is a fragmented, unfocused, and inadequate policy through which the U.S. cedes leadership in the region and foregoes many of the opportunities that other Arctic states will be prepared to seize.

[1] Cogswell, Patricia, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region Announced," White House, May 10, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/05/10/national-strategy-arctic-region-announced.

[2] Begich, Mark and Lisa Murkowski, “Letter to the President,” July 11, 2012, http://www.begich.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/38b21a0a-28bd-4b93-bd36-f4ae86b65a48/20120711%20AK%20Del%20to%20POTUS%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf.

[3] Conley, Heather, Terry Toland, Mihaela David, and Natalja Jegorova, "The New American Foreign Policy Frontier: U.S. Interests and Actors in the Arctic," Center for Strategic and Internation Studies, March 2013, 14,  http://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Conley_NewForeignPolFrontier_Web_0.pdf.

[4] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 4,  http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.

[5] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 5.

[6] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 6-7. 

[7] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 7-8.

[8] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 9-10.

[9] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 3.

[10] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 6.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Hayes, David. "New National Arctic Strategy Adopts Integrated Arctic Management," Department of the Interior, May 10, 2013, http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/new-national-arctic-strategy-adopts-integrated-arctic-management.cfm.

[13] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 8.

[14] Cogswell, Patricia, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region Announced," White House, May 10, 2013.

[15] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 7.

[16] Ibid.

[17] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 8.

[18] White House, "National Strategy for the Arctic Region," May 10, 2013, 4.

[19] Ibid.

The Arctic Institute Reaction to U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic

In response to the release of the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Mihaela David, Fellow at The Arctic Institute, said:

“The U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic region represents a good faith effort at articulating policy priorities, but without a clear budgetary plan, this strategy becomes nothing more than a lengthy wish list. In the absence of a comprehensive implementation strategy and a long-term plan to invest in Arctic infrastructure and capabilities, a true U.S. Arctic strategy remains as elusive as a mirage on the Arctic ice-sheet.”

“The strategy does not lay out specific initiatives or projects that might be pursued to achieve the various objectives identified within. It remains to be seen if the administration is willing to back up its strategy with adequate fiscal resources.”

“There is no mention of specific plans to upgrade the inadequate and outdated icebreaker fleet; to build physical infrastructure such as deep-water ports; or to invest in facilities and equipment for the Coast Guard's operations in Alaska's northern region. No budget information is included, nor a timeline for implementation.”

“What the strategy does succeed in doing is signal to U.S. citizens, other Arctic states, and the international community that the U.S. acknowledges its roles and responsibilities in the Arctic, that it thinks strategically about the future of the region, and that the administration intends to make Arctic policymaking more of a priority than it has in the past.”

“If in the next decade the administration fails to streamline the implementation process and provide the fiscal resources to support its policy objectives, the result will be a fragmented, unfocused, and inadequate policy through which the U.S. cedes leadership in the region and forgoes many of the opportunities that other Arctic and non-Arctic states will be prepared to seize,” concluded David.  

Contacts: 

Mihaela David, Washington, D.C. mihaela.david@thearcticinstitute.org, +1 518.491.8398 

Malte Humpert, Washington, D.C. malte.humpert@thearcticinstitute.org, +1 202.656.6258

The United States as an Arctic Actor

by Andreas Østhagen The U.S. Arctic territory, defined as the region above the Arctic Circle (66.3 degrees North), is comprised of the northern parts of Alaska and parts of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Compared to the other Arctic states (Norway, Denmark - through Greenland -, Russia and Canada) the U.S. Arctic is both smaller geographically and less populated than its counterparts. The largest communities in Alaska’s Far North have approximately three to four thousand inhabitants, mostly centered around the towns of Kotzebue, Prudhoe Bay and Barrow [1].

In comparison, the largest Russian Arctic community is in the city of Murmansk, located close to the Norwegian border, with approximately 325,000 inhabitants. Of the 4 million people living in the wider definition of the Arctic [2], most are located in the Russian or Norwegian territories. As a natural consequence, the American capabilities, presence and engagement in the Arctic have not matched that of the European Arctic nations.

Whereas the Arctic in Russia, Greenland, Norway and Canada has been extensively used in history to build national identity, the Arctic has not been used to the same extent to define U.S. self-perception and identity. Occupying only a small portion of the Arctic region, with a state that is far from the political and economic centers of the country, the Arctic has arguably been mostly perceived as serving the natural resource needs and the military strategic interests located further south. Especially after the breakup of the U.S.S.R., the Arctic has not been of crucial importance to U.S. foreign policy interests, while in contrast it has defined some of the other Arctic nations’ post-Cold War identity.

Therefore, where the Norwegian and Russian foreign policies in recent years have deemed the Arctic as a main strategic area of interest, the American approach has been hesitant and ad-hoc. As the United States has several geographical focal points and operations in other parts of the world that require extensive involvement, the Arctic has not made the top-priority list. The American military budget is also overstretched and the current financial situation does not imply increased spending in a territory that does not considered of immediate concern [3].

This does not, however, mean that current developments in the Arctic have been neglected in American foreign policy-making. In general, the U.S. has taken part in the international collaboration that has developed in the region with primary focus on the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996. Additionally, late in the presidency of George W. Bush, the administration released National Security Presidential Directive 66, which established a new policy for the Arctic [4]. The directive addresses governance, scientific cooperation, environmental issues, boundaries and continental shelf disputes as well as economic developments. Following this, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Department of Defense have released their own strategic documents on, or assessments of, current and future developments in the Arctic.

One of the main themes in all of the publications is the lack of current U.S. capabilities, especially compared to the ambitious and escalating plans found in the other four Arctic littoral states. The U.S. can therefore be termed a somewhat reluctant Arctic actor. It does participate in the international cooperation and is on the verge of developing a comprehensive national policy for the region. At the same time, the United States has other, more pressing obligations which have encouraged an ad-hoc stance and reluctance in both capability improvement and capacity building for the region. Should there develop a crisis situation in the Arctic, or an environment that suddenly requires closer attention, the U.S. has a strategic interest in dealing with it. But as long as the Arctic states keep emphasizing “high north, low tension”, and the current issues mainly concern search and rescue and small operating challenges, the non-crisis environment does not seem to encourage extra allocation of resources.

However, the United States did show an increased interest at the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Nuuk in May 2011. The U.S. delegation displayed a somewhat renewed commitment to participation in Arctic matters, symbolized with the high level presence of Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton and Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar. The U.S. delegation also took an active stance in the meeting and promoted increased work in the different Arctic Council working groups. The end result was the historical signing of the Search and Rescue agreement by the eight Arctic Council member states, and further commitments to increase cooperation in the region.

In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense has made changes to the command structure for the Arctic. There has been a realignment of responsibilities from a shared system between the Commander for the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), the Commander for the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the Commander for the U.S. Pacific (USPACOM), to a sharing between the USEUCOM and the USNORTHCOM where USNORTHCOM has singular advocacy responsibility for Arctic capabilities [5]. This change is intended to improve the effectiveness of the Command structure as the Arctic issues become increasingly important.

Lastly, President Obama signed an executive order in July 2011, establishing an inter agency working group on the coordination of domestic energy development and permitting in Alaska [6]. The purpose of the order is to improve the cooperation in the American Arctic, as complaints has been made from both officials and industry that the process has been too rigid and has been lacking progress. Based on these developments, it would appear that there has been a realization within the U.S. government and different governmental structures that the Arctic warrants more attention. However, given the current financial situation in the United States and the relatively low level of activity in the American Arctic - in addition to its more pressing obligations elsewhere - the U.S. can still be considered a reluctant Arctic actor and is likely to maintain this posture moving forward.

Sources:

[1] The State of Alaska, “Population and Size”, http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/ded/dev/student_info/learn/population.htm

[2] Drawing the line further south to include Iceland, the whole of Alaska and larger parts of Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Canada.

[3] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Salvaging American defense: the challenge of strategic overstretch”, 2007, Praeger Security International, Westport

[4] National Security Presidential Directive 66 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, (NSPD-66/HSPD-25) “Arctic Region Policy”, 09.01.2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm

[5] U.S. Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage”, May 2011, p. 20.

[6] The White House, Executive Orders, “Executive Order - Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska”, 12.07.2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/12/executive-order-interagency-working-group-coordination-domestic-energy-d

Late to the Party or Premature Investments: The Debate on U.S. Arctic Capabilities

by Andreas Østhagen As the temperature in Washington D.C. rose towards 100° F (38° C) during the summer months, Arctic issues were paradoxically enough frequent agenda items in the nations capital. One topic especially stood out: The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was campaigning for the American government to realize how severe the capability gap in the U.S.'s Arctic region has become.

In Senate hearings and in numerous seminars, 'horror' scenarios containing sinking cruise ships and oil spill disasters were used to portray the direness of the situation. On the one hand budgetary constraints may help to explain why the U.S. has invested less in its Arctic region than its Arctic counterparts. On the other hand, additional reasons may exist to explain the lack of attention devoted the High North. This nuance, however, seems to be lacking in parts of the American Arctic debate.

The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr., stressed that the Coast Guard in its current condition does not have the capacities it needs to respond to an oil spill or a cruise ship in distress in the Arctic.[1] Neither is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) able to collect and provide all the information on weather forecasting, oceanography, and navigational charting as requested by the Coast Guard, industries, and the local communities.[2]

In fact, the National Science Foundation (NSF) has repeatedly made use of Russian, Swedish, and Canadian icebreakers to transport American scientists into and around the U.S. Arctic, since U.S. capabilities were non-existent.[3] At a Senate committee hearing on the July 28, 2011 , titled “Defending U.S. Economic Interests in the Changing Arctic: Is There a Strategy?”, representatives from the U.S. Navy, the State Department and the USCG all made the case that U.S. Arctic capabilities are severely lacking, reducing the the country's ability to assert its Arctic interests.

The American Arctic undoubtedly holds large amounts of valuable resources, in terms of minerals, forestry, and hydrocarbons. The region is becoming significant from both an economic and a strategic point of view, as activities in the region have increased dramatically over the last ten years. Why then have the U.S. capabilities not followed suit? One obvious explanation derives from the Arctic’s rather limited role in American society. Compared to the other Arctic littoral states (Norway, Denmark - through Greenland -, Russia and Canada) the U.S. Arctic is both smaller geographically and less populated than its counterparts. The largest communities in Alaska’s Far North have three to four thousand inhabitants, mostly centered on the towns of Kotzebue, Prudhoe Bay and Barrow.[4]

In comparison, the largest Russian Arctic community is in the city of Murmansk, located close to the Norwegian border, with approximately 325,000 inhabitants. Of the 4 million people living in the wider definition of the Arctic, most are located in the Russian or Norwegian territories.[5] Hence, the American capabilities, presence, and engagement in the Arctic have not matched that of the European Arctic nations.

Whereas the Arctic in Russia, Norway, and Canada has historically been used extensively to build national identity, the region has not been utilized to the same extent to define U.S. self-perception. Occupying only a small portion of the Arctic region, with a state that is far from the political and economic centers of the country, the Arctic has arguably been perceived as serving natural resource needs and military strategic interests located further south.

Especially after the breakup of the USSR, the Arctic has not been of crucial importance to U.S. foreign policy interests, while it has in contrast defined some of the other Arctic nations’ post-Cold War identity. Therefore, where the Norwegian and Russian foreign policies in recent years have deemed the Arctic as a main strategic area of interest, the American approach has been hesitant and ad-hoc. As the United States has several geographical focal points, and operations in other parts of the world that require extensive involvement, the Arctic has not made the top-priority list. The American military budget is also overstretched and the current financial situation does not imply increased spending on a region that does not pose immediate concern.[6]

Does this mean that the American Arctic will inevitably be neglected in the upcoming decades, as the U.S. looks elsewhere? Or is there a need for a refurbishing and expansion of U.S. Arctic capabilities?

One of the strongest arguments for increased U.S. capabilities in the Arctic has been the recent influx of commercial interest, with particular focus on new offshore oil and gas ventures. As Shell is developing its Chukchi and Beaufort Sea leases, fear of oil spills in the harsh and uncontrollable Arctic climate is causing concern. Subsequently, it is often argued that developing public capacities is integral to avoid an “Arctic Macondo”-scenario. Shell, however, maintains that such an assessment is inaccurate.

In the current regulatory environment for Arctic offshore drilling, the responsibility for spill response and preparedness lies with the operator of each specific field, not the government. Shell has a comprehensive response plan for the Arctic; with improvements made following the BP Macondo spill in the spring of 2010. They have provided extensive capabilities with several new vessels and new technology to be used specifically for oil spill response and preparedness in Arctic conditions. These include the ice-class spill response vessel ‘Nanuq’ and the ‘Arctic Endeavour’, an ice strengthened oil spill response barge.[7] Shell therefore claims that the outcry over capabilities is exaggerated, as it is not the Coast Guard but the field's operators that have to provide oil spill capacities should an incident occur.

In addition, the development of international cooperation agreements makes the need for capacity investment less acute. From a U.S. perspective, it seems clear that the development of joint Arctic agreements is of benefit to its Arctic interests. By placing emphasis on the development of frameworks for international assistance, starting with the signed search and rescue agreement from 2011, the US can rely on Canadian or Russian support should an Arctic incident occur. The U.S. is also chairing the task force mandated to develop an oil spill preparedness agreement similar to the search and rescue agreement. With easier means of cooperation, and clear structures for sharing equipment and personnel across borders, the immediate need to develop U.S. Arctic capabilities becomes less imminent.

Combined, the development of international agreements and the noticeable investments made by Shell for its Arctic offshore projects seem to dilute the direness of the Arctic situation. The US Department of Defense also emphasizes this in their latest report to Congress on Arctic operations, as there is a balance between the “risk of being late-to-need with the opportunity cost of making premature Arctic investments”.[8]

However, even with efforts done by other Arctic states and oil and gas companies combined, some matters in U.S. Arctic waters cannot be disregarded. The U.S. Coast Guard is, and should continue to be, the primary provider of human security for Arctic coastal operations. The need for capabilities to deal with cruise ships, fishing vessels, and shipping through the Bering Strait, is crucial for the U.S. to continue to enforce its sovereignty as an Arctic nation.

The Chinese ice-breaker capacity as a non-Arctic state has already surpassed that of the United States, something that should cause concern in Washington DC. In addition, the Congress' refusal to ratify the UNCLOS must be dealt with, through political sensibility and vigor. The UNCLOS is not a vehicle for disclaiming U.S. sovereignty, nor does its ratification place the U.S. at a disadvantages vis-à-vis its Arctic neighbors. On the contrary, it actually aids U.S. territorial claims in the Arctic and assists U.S. shipping and naval interests globally. The ratification should therefore be held above partisan considerations, serving U.S. interests at large.

It seems apparent that some of the American Arctic debate lacks a bit of nuance. Institutions, like the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, or NOAA, are not completely neutral or unbiased actors. As any institution, company or organization, they are inclined to preserving their own importance and survival, pushing for decisions that serve their interests. In the Arctic debate they have, nonetheless, brought attention to some issues of relevance, highlighting the lack of U.S. Arctic investments.

The debate should, however, be put in a larger context, where more views and perceptions are incorporated. The Department of Defense's cautionary approach, suggesting balance, subsequently seems fitting. Only by adopting a nuanced approach, can one understand the situation in the American Arctic, and make policy choices accordingly.

Endnotes:

[1] Renee Schoof, The Seattle Times, “NOAA: US unprepared for changes in Arctic ice”, 20.06.2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/traveloutdoors/2015379098_webarctic21.html

[2] Ibid.

[3] U.S. Coast Guard, “USCG D17 Arctic Brief”, 27.01.2011, http://www.uscg.mil/d17/Arctic%20Overview%20Feb2011.pdf

[4] The State of Alaska, “Population and Size”, http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/ded/dev/student_info/learn/population.htm

[5] Drawing the line further south to include Iceland, the whole of Alaska and larger parts of Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Canada.

[6] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Salvaging American defense: the challenge of strategic overstretch”, 2007, Praeger Security International, Westport

[7] Shell.com, ”Shell Camden Bay and Chukchi Sea Program Update”, March 2011, http://www.static.shell.com/static/usa/downloads/2010/alaska/2011_community_meetings.pdf

[8] U.S. Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage”, May 2011, p. 3