Showing posts with label Ice extent. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ice extent. Show all posts

Greenland’s New Frontier: Oil and Gas Licenses Issued, Though Development Likely Years Off




By Kevin Casey While development of oil and gas in Greenland has historically focused on offshore areas west of Greenland, the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum of the Government of Greenland awarded the first oil and gas exploration and exploitation licenses for eastern Greenland on 20 December, 2013. The initial four licenses were awarded to three consortia of companies that have been involved in seismic exploration in the region since 1989. In addition, a further fifteen leases are under consideration for 2014.[1] While northeastern Greenland’s continental shelf could potentially hold some of the largest undiscovered oil and gas resources in the Arctic, the region presents serious environmental, economic and political challenges to oil and gas exploration. These challenging conditions raise serious questions as to how economically, technically, and environmentally practical significant oil exploration and production can be in the Greenland Sea in the near future.

Greenland Sea oil and gas potential

In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey ranked the East Greenland region 4th out of 25 oil and gas provinces in the Arctic in terms of hydrocarbon potential, estimating that the region contained up to 31,387 million barrels of oil equivalents in oil, gas and natural gas liquids.[2] The region is separated into three distinct geological provinces: the North Danmarkshavn basin, the South Danmarkshavn basin, and the Thetis basin. The North and South Danmarkshavn basins are very similar to petroleum-bearing sequences in the Norwegian Sea with potential source rocks and petroleum traps. As such, these two basins were assessed to have a much higher potential for undiscovered hydrocarbons, though a significant portion of the reserves are projected to be gas and natural gas liquids (see map above).

Previous Oil and Gas Exploration: The Kanumas Project

Interest in Greenland’s oil and gas potential has experienced many ups and downs over the past fifty years. Price spikes in the 1970s spurred exploration, though subsequent price declines and the lack of any significant finds caused international oil companies to lose interest.[3] Additional licenses in western Greenland were offered in the early 2000s, but no major companies applied. In the face of tepid interest from the oil and gas industry, Denmark and Greenland sought to more actively promote the region’s potential and encourage investment by directly funding extensive seismic exploration in promising areas. Rising oil prices in the middle 2000s helped to increase interest in Greenland’s oil again, and in 2006 several major oil companies bid on licenses in Western Greenland, through exploration there to date has not revealed any promising prospects.

Interest and investment in northeastern Greenland has also proceeded through starts and stops over the past decades. Petroleum geologists suspected this region contained oil and gas long before the USGS’s assessment in 2008. In 1989, Denmark granted a prospecting license to a consortium of companies to conduct initial petroleum exploration in areas offshore of western Greenland in the Greenland Sea. The consortium was known as the Kanumas project and consisted of ExxonMobil, Statoil, BP, Japan National Oil Compnay, Texaco, Shell and NUNAOIL.[4] Between 1990 and 1996, the project collected over 7000km of seismic data from extreme northern areas offshore of eastern and western Greenland. As part of the original prospecting licenses, consortium members were granted preferential bidding rights on any future exploration and exploitation licenses in these regions.[5] The Kanumas Group did not exercise this right in western Greenland, but chose to exercise its preference right for leases in the Greenland Sea.

Oil and Gas Licensing in the Greenland Sea

In April, 2011, the Government of Greenland opened the current licensing round for exploration in the Greenland Sea. The process was divided into two rounds. In the first round, the Kanumas Group selected four license units, designated Avinngaq, Amaroq, Umimmak and Nerleq, located in the North and South Danmarkshavn basins (see map below). These leases were divided between three consortia:
- Avinngaq was awarded to Statoil, ConocoPhilips and NUNAOIL
- Amaroq was awarded to ENI, BP, DONG and NUNAOIL
- Umimmak and Nerleq were awarded to Chevron, GreenPex, Shell and NUNAOIL.[6]

Challenging Ice Conditions

While these four licenses represent the greatest potential for oil and gas discoveries, the prevailing ice conditions in these areas will present extreme challenges to exploration activities. The entire region is ice covered for most of the year. Only in exceptional years has open water appeared throughout the license areas in August and September. Coincidentally, several exceptionally low ice years occurred in the early 1990s, facilitating the Kanumas seismic surveys that have been instrumental in describing the resource potential of the region and driving the push for more exploration.

The complex ice conditions in the license areas are due to their geographic location in the Fram Strait between Greenland and Svalbard. The Fram Strait is the deepest gateway between the Arctic and the rest of the world’s oceans and is dominated by two alternating currents. The West Spitsbergen Current carries warm, salty water northward along the western Fram Strait toward the pole from the Norwegian Sea while the East Greenland Current brings cold, low salinity south from the Arctic Ocean along the east coast of Greenland. The East Greenland Current also transports significant amounts of multi-year ice from north of Greenland, where there is a ready supply of old ice, south along Greenland’s coast. Around 10-15% of the Arctic’s total ice mass is transported south through the Fram Strait each year.[7]

Due to the cold East Greenland current and the import of multi-year ice, conditions vary dramatically between the eastern and western sections of the Fram Strait. Western sections of the Fram Strait nearest to Svalbard have witnessed a gradual retreat of ice extents over the preceding decades and see many more ice-free days than the eastern sections of the strait.  While areas of the eastern Fram Strait on the margins of the license areas have seen an increase in the number of ice-free days in the summer since 2000, the northern sections have remained stubbornly ice-bound. An ice conditions report produced by the Danish Meteorological Institute for the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum in 2011 concluded that the northern and western sections of the license area have averaged exactly zero ice free days per year between 2001 and 2010.[8] In 2013, several areas of open water formed in areas covered by the licenses in July and August, though these areas closed quickly in early September (see map above). Extensive ice coverage, the presence of multi-year ice and year-to-year variability in ice conditions will make it difficult and expensive to conduct exploration activities in the region under the current ice regime. Drilling operations will likely require extensive ice management by supporting icebreakers, significantly increasing logistical costs.

Political and Economic Considerations

The Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum initiated the current leasing round in April, 2011, and planned to awarded licenses in the first round by March, 2013. This schedule was complicated by Greenland’s elections in March, 2013, during which the ruling party lost out to a new coalition headed by the Siumut party. The new government of Prime Minister Aleqa Hammond expressed disapproval for the rapid pace of oil and gas exploration in Greenland and hesitated to move forward on new oil and gas leases. Increased oversight of offshore operations was promised, and the Kanumas leases were put on hold.[9] In May, industry and minerals minster Jens-Erik Kirkegaard clarified his government’s position, saying that new oil exploration licenses would be issued as old ones expired.[10] The current government’s hesitancy on oil and gas exploration reflects the divided opinions of Greenlanders in general on the quickening pace of oil and gas development.[11] The new government may also be seeking to prioritize mining development over oil and gas exploration, seeing more potential for revenue in minerals, and also more active interest from mining concerns.[12] That said, the current government is interested in the potential revenues that oil and gas development can bring as a way to develop more financial independence from Denmark. After initial cautiousness, it is likely that the current government will continue to promote oil and gas development in Greenland while simultaneously looking to increase oversight and accountability.

Hammond’s government has also suggested that changes to Greenland’s oil and gas fiscal regime are currently being contemplated. Upon taking office, Hammond stated that she would push to incorporate royalty payments for mineral licenses going forward, a significant change from the previous fiscal regime that relied solely on corporate taxes.[13] A government panel has been formed to reevaluate Greenland’s resource tax structure, and it is possible that the government will decide to assess a royalty on oil and gas production, perhaps along with reductions in the marginal corporate tax rate.[14] It is likely that continued uncertainty will further delay investment in exploration and extraction until fiscal conditions are better defined.[15]

Finally, global petroleum markets may make exploitation of oil and gas deposits in the Greenland Sea unfeasible in the near and mid-term. Due to the remote location, lack of oil and gas support infrastructure and challenging operating conditions, exploration and development of any oil and gas fields in the Greenland Sea will require extensive investment. Statoil has had to delay production of the Johan Castberg field in the Norwegian Barents Sea due to high costs of development. The Castberg field is suspected to contain 600 million barrels of oil, is in an ice-free region of the Barents Sea and is relatively close to oil and gas infrastructure in Norway.[16] The lesson here is that even large proven reserves of oil are not enough to make Arctic oil and gas developments economically feasible, even in less remote regions such as Norway’s Barents Sea. In the near term, other investment opportunities may appear more attractive to international oil companies than pursuing Greenland Sea oil and gas. ExxonMobil withdrew its application for Greenland Sea licenses in early December, 2013, amid speculation that it was refocusing on more promising investments in North American unconventional oil and gas and a burgeoning partnership with Rosneft in Arctic Russia.[17] Additionally, even a slight downward trend in oil prices could have a significant impact on the profitability of such marginal projects.

Conclusion

While this round of licensing has attracted major companies such as Statoil, Chevron, BP and Shell, it is unlikely that oil prospects in the Greenland Sea will allow Greenland to break free of the boom and bust cycle of exploration and investment and finally achieve sustainable oil and gas development anytime in the near future. Significant challenges stand in the way. First, while the USGS assessment is promising, exploratory drilling will need to identify oil in sufficient quantities to warrant the extraordinary investment that will be required to bring it to market. Second, while global warming continues to improve conditions for oil and gas exploration in the Arctic, the peculiar geography of northeast Greenland means that ice conditions will continue to be challenging for the foreseeable future. Operations in northeast Greenland will thus remain expensive, technically challenging and risky. Third, while the political will seems to exist in Greenland to support oil and gas development, significant fiscal and regulatory details remain vague. Until these are resolved, and resolved to the satisfaction of oil and gas companies, this uncertainty will continue to be a barrier to investment.

Finally, there is the issue of economic feasibility. The most recent flood of interest in Greenland’s oil flowered before the unconventional oil and gas revolution began upending global supplies, prices and investment. Was ExxonMobil’s departure from the stage an isolated case, or the canary in the coal mine? The remaining companies with licenses in the Greenland Sea, and those that have submitted applications for the upcoming round, likely see the region as a long term prospect. Licensed companies will devote the subsequent years to additional seismic surveys to better define the prospects, while also developing a better understanding of the region’s ice dynamics that will dictate operations in future years. Eventual production of oil and gas in the Greenland Sea is far from certain at this point, and will depend on the development of these political and economic factors over the coming years.





[1] Government of Greenland, “Three consortiums are granted exploration and exploitation licenses in the Greenland Sea,” Press Release, 20 December 2013. http://www.bmp.gl/index.php/petroleum/exploration-a-exploitation.
[2] Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, U.S. Geological Survey, 2008. http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.
[3] Andreas Østhagen, “Dimensions of Oil and Gas Development in Greenland,” The Arctic Institute, 19 December 2012. http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/12/dimensions-of-oil-and-gas-development.html. Accessed 1/2/2014.
[4] Government of Greenland, “Licensing rounds in the Greenland Sea Area,” April, 2011. http://www.bmp.gl/images/stories/petroleum/exploration_exploitation/2012-13/BMP_Invitation_letter_North_East_Greenland.pdf, accessed 1/2/2014.
[5] Donald L. Gautier, “Oil and gas resources of northeast Greenland,” GEO ExPro, October, 2011.
[6] Government of Greenland, “Three consortiums are granted exploration and exploitation licenses in the Greenland Sea,” Press Release, 20 December 2013.
[7] R. Kwok, G.F. Cunningham, and S.S. Pang, “Fram Strait sea ice outflow,” Journal of Geophysical Research, 109(2004), 1.
[8] KANUMAS MET/ICE/OCEAN Overview Report 2011, Danish Meteorological Institute, 2011. http://www.bmp.gl/images/stories/petroleum/exploration_exploitation/2012-13/EGRL_report_ver05.pdf. Accessed 1/2/2014. ‘Ice free’ is defined as ice concentrations of less than 30%.
[9] Terry Macalister, “Greenland halts new oil drilling licenses,” The Guardian, March 27, 2013.
[10] Clemens Bomsdorf, “Greenland minister: Will issue new oil exploration licenses,” Rigzone, 17 May, 2013.
[11] Philip Reeves, “Greenlanders divided on Arctic oil, gas exploration,” NPR, 17 August 2011. http://www.npr.org/2011/08/17/139696551/greenlanders-divided-on-arctic-oil-gas-exploration, Accessed 1/2/2014.
[12] Peter Stanners, “Premier: Greenland’s future lies underground,” The Copenhagen Post, 18 April 2013. http://cphpost.dk/news/premier-greenlands-future-lies-underground.5002.html, accessed 1/3/2014.
[13] Clemens Bomsdorf, “Greenland to charge exploitation royalties,” The Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2013. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324685104578386631474672010, accessed 1/3/2014.  Ernst and Young, “Greenland – The new frontier,” Oil and Gas Alert,
[14] Ernst and Young, “Greenland announces Parliamentary election on 12 March 2013 and appointment of committee to address taxation of mineral resources,” Global Tax Alert, 12 February 2013. http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_Tax_Alert_Greenland/$FILE/Global_Tax_Alert_Greenland_CM3202.pdf, accessed 1/3/2014.
[15] The Economic Council, “The Economy of Greenland 2013,” September, 2013.
[16] “Statoil recommends Johan Castberg project delay,” Oil and Gas Journal, 5 June, 2013. http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/06/statoil-recommends-johan-castberg-project-delay.html, accessed 3 January 2014.
[17] Kevin McGwin, “If ExxonMobil speaks, will oil industry listen?” Arctic Journal, 12 December 2013. http://arcticjournal.com/oil-minerals/if-exxon-speaks-will-oil-industry-listen, accessed 1/4/2013.



Evaluation of the Arctic Shipping Season 2013




MV Yong Sheng
Courtesy of Oyoyoy on Wikipedia
By Kathrin Keil The 2013 shipping season along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) concluded in late November when the Russian-flagged „Indiga“ reached its port of destination on 27 November 2013. The expectations as to the increases in Arctic transit shipping along the NSR are indeed huge – volumes shipped along the NSR are predicted to grow to 4 million per year in 2015, 65 million tons in 2020 and even 120 million tons in 2030, predominantly due to the rapid growth of oil and gas development in Russia [1]. Against this background it is necessary to give a thorough analysis of this year’s shipping season in order to get an idea about the accurateness of such predictions.[2]

This year’s shipping season indeed started five days later than the 2012 season. The first ship to use the NSR set sail on 25 June 2013 in comparison to 20 June in 2012. In contrast, the season in 2013 lasted a few days longer – the last ship to take the NSR in 2013 departed from its homeport on 17 November 2013, while the last ship in 2012 departed five days earlier on 12 November 2012. So in total, both shipping seasons were of exactly the same length with 146 days.

In terms of actual transits, 2012 saw 46 vessels using the route while in 2013 71 ships took the NSR, an increase of 54%. While this percentage looks impressive, we have to keep in mind that we still deal with quite small absolute numbers. In contrast, the Suez Canal has around 18,000 transits per year and the Panama Canal about 13,000.

Furthermore, it is enlightening to take a closer look at some of the routes that the vessels took. In fact, 17 “transits” only started or ended in Pevek in Chukotka, and did not come from or go down to the Bering Strait. This is remarkable given that the NSR is defined in Russian law as a set of marine routes from Kara Gate, south of Novaya Zemlaya, in the west to the Bering Strait in the east.[3] Also Khatanga Bay and Anabar Bay in the Laptev Sea are mentioned once and twice, respectively as a port of destination, which is not anywhere close to the end points of the NSR definition.

The volume of cargo has hardly increased between 2012 and 2013, from 1.26 million tons of cargo to 1.36 million tons, i.e. only an increase of 7.5%. Given the expected volume increases as stated above, this is a rather surprising result.

Concerning the type of cargo, 2013 saw an increase in liquid cargo (in both years the predominant cargo - 57% in 2012 and 44% in 2013 of all cargo type vessels) and ballasting. Also general cargo has become stronger in 2013 and one LNG tanker used the route. Repositioning remained the same as well as fishing vessel usage (only 1 in both years).

While more foreign countries used the route as flag states – 7 states in 2012 and 11 in 2013 – the number of foreign flagged vessels actually decreased from 2012 to 2013 (28 in 2012 and 25 in 2013). In other words, the increase in vessel number is completely due to increased Russian usage of the route. So there is currently an increasing Russian usage of the route, while international interest in using the NSR is rather humble (in 2012 39% of the vessels using the route were under a Russian flag, increasing to 65% in 2013).

[1] For example, Nadia Rodova, “Cargo Turnover via Russian Northern Sea Route Climbs 19% Past 2012 Levels,” Platts, September 26, 2013, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/shipping/moscow/cargo-turnover-via-russian-northern-sea-route-26311774; Anton Vasiliev, “Russia’s Approaches to International Cooperation in the Arctic,” The Arctic Herald 1 (2012): 12–23, http://issuu.com/arctic-herald/docs/arctic-herald-1-full; Arctic info, “Cargo Turnover at Arctic Ports to Increase 2.8-Fold by 2030,” August 29, 2012, http://www.arctic-info.com/News/Page/cargo-turnover-at-arctic-ports-to-increase-2-8-fold-by-2030; Alexei Bambulyak and Bjørn Frantzen, Oil Transport from the Russian Part of the Barents Region - Status Per January 2011 (Tromsø: Akvaplan-niva, The Norwegian Barents Secretariat, Bioforsk, 2011), http://www.barentswatch.com/innhold/oil_gas/repport_oiltransp/OilTransport2011eng_Internet.pdf; Jonas Karlsbakk, “Oil Traffic Capacity of 100 Million Tons,” BarentsObserver, April 07, 2011, http://www.barentsobserver.com/oil-traffic-capacity-of-100-million-tons.html.
[2] Due to data availability, the current year 2013 is compared with the 2012 shipping season. All numbers are drawn from Northern Sea Route Information Office documents “Transists in 2012” and “Transists in 2013”. This analysis only looks at transit shipping along the NSR, and not at destinational or inner-Arctic shipping.
[3] Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (Tromsø, 2009), 20, 23, 34, http://arcticportal.org/uploads/4v/cb/4vcbFSnnKFT8AB5lXZ9_TQ/AMSA2009Report.pdf; Leonid Tymchenko, “The Northern Sea Route: Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Sea,” in The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, ed. Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), 269–71).



The Future of Arctic Shipping along the Transpolar Sea Route




Below you can find a short excerpt of a paper on the Transpolar Sea Route  published by the Arctic Yearbook, a research project by the Northern Research Forum and the University of the Arctic Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security. You can read the full article and many others here.

By Malte Humpert and Andreas Raspotnik The Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) represents the most direct route for trans-Arctic shipment but has yet to attract significant commercial interest, as multi-year ice remains a formidable obstacle for most of the Arctic shipping season. The effects of climate change are, however, increasingly observed throughout the region and the Arctic is now warmer than it has been at any time during the last 2,000 years. Summer ice extent has declined by 40% since satellite observation began in 1979. Over the same period, Arctic sea ice has thinned considerably, experiencing a decline in average volume of 70%. Within the next decade this warming trend may transform the region from an inaccessible frozen desert into a seasonally navigable ocean and the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free for short periods as early as 2015.

Seaborne trade currently accounts for 90% of world trade and is dominated by the transportation of raw materials, tanker trade, and other dry cargo, including containerized cargo. The growing importance of the trade relationship between Europe and Asia and the resulting increase in seaborne traffic between the two regions will result in further congestion and a higher risk of collisions along the existing sea routes and their choke points, e.g. the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca.

Trans-Arctic shipping, regardless of the actual route used, will not serve as a substitute for existing shipping routes, but will instead be supplemental and provide additional capacity for a growing transportation volume. For the foreseeable future, the limited seasonal window for trans-Arctic voyages must be taken into account in any projections. Nonetheless, the development of Arctic offshore hydrocarbon resources and related economic activities will result in an improved integration of the Arctic economy in global trade patterns.

The Arctic region has become increasingly politicized, affecting its future development and influencing the policy decisions of Arctic countries. The Arctic Ocean’s potential economic and geostrategic importance has also begun to attract the attention of non-Arctic actors, who are in the process of defining their interests and intentions. The People’s Republic of China, in addition to the European Union (EU), is arguably the most important non-Arctic actor and will be instrumental to the development and future of the TSR.

Read more »

About the article: 
The authors highlight the future potential of the Transpolar Sea Route, an Arctic shipping route which has thus far been neglected in the realm of academia and in the public eyes. The article represents the first comprehensive assessment on the feasibility of the TSR from a climatic and economic standpoint and discusses how legal and geostrategic considerations will influence the development of this shipping route. The authors conclude that the opening and future development of Arctic shipping routes will not only depend on favorable climatic conditions across the Arctic Ocean, but will also be influenced by a shift in economic and political spheres of influence. The development of the TSR and its significant economic potential may in part be determined by key geostrategic considerations as the center of economic and political power continues to shift towards Asia.


Where Did All the Ice Go? Arctic Ice Extent Reaches New Record Low





By Malte Humpert Arctic Ice Extent set a new all-time record low on August 24, 2012. Preliminary figures by the IARC-JAXA Information System (IJIS), a collaboration between International Arctic Research Center (IARC) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), suggest that ice extent reached 4,189,375 square kilometers surpassing the previous record low of 4,267,656 square kilometers from September 16, 2007.


After the University Bremen (extent), Arctic ROOS (area), Cryosphere Today (extent), and the Danish Meteorological Institute (extent), IJIS becomes the latest scientific organization to report a new record in either ice extent or area. IJIS' numbers together with data by the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) are often cited as the most reliable measurements of ice extent available. The NSIDC has not released figures for August 24 but according to Julienne Stroeve, a scientist at the Center, it also expects a new record to be set over the weekend or early next week. NSIDC reported an ice extent of 4,190,430 square kilometers for August 23, 2012, a mere 30,000 square kilometers above its all-time record low of 4,160,700 square kilometers set on September 14, 2007.

UPDATE (8/25, 10:15am EST): According to data released by NSIDC ice extent reached a new record low on August 24 at 4,089,200 square kilometers. This is 71,000 square kilometers below the previous all-time record low of September 14, 2007 of 4,160,700 square kilometers. The raw data can be found here.


The melt season is likely to continue for an additional 2-3 weeks until mid-September. Ice extent has decreased by roughly 100,000 square kilometers over the past two weeks but the rate of daily ice loss is expected to slow down over the next weeks as only thicker less vulnerable ice remains. Nonetheless, the 2012 melt season will exceed the 2007 record low by a significant margin. By the time it's all said and done we may see a new record low ice extent in the range of 3,750,000 square kilometers, around 400,000 square kilometers below the 2007 record. More significant than a single year's record, however, will be the long-term impact this second collapse of Arctic sea ice in 5 years will have on the coming ice season. How quickly will sea ice recover once the Arctic Ocean begins to freeze up again in October and what will the impact on the 2013 melt season be?


[1] Chart based on data from Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Sea Ice extent Data through the IARC-JAXA Information System (IJIS). Data accessed on 08/24/2012 at http://www.ijis.iarc.uaf.edu/en/home/seaice_extent.htm