Showing posts with label NSR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NSR. Show all posts

Conference Report: “The Arctic: Region of Cooperation and Development”




Courtesy of RIAC
By Elizaveta Kozlova On 2-3rd December 2013, “The Arctic: Region of Cooperation and Development” international conference took place in Moscow, Russia. The conference was organized by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and its partners – the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations (RAS IMEMO), International Maritime Law Association, The Pew Charitable Trusts, and The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The conference enjoyed a high-level opening ceremony which featured the Russian President’s Special Representative for International Cooperation in The Arctic and Antarctic Arthur Chilingarov, Senior Arctic Official for Russia Anton Vasilyev, RIAC Director Andrey Kortunov, RAS IMEMO Director Alexander Dynkin, followed by Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program Andrew Kuchins, Director of The Pew Charitable Trusts International Arctic Programme Scott Highleyman, President of International Maritime Law Association Vladimir Mednikov, and Leonid Kalashnikov of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The proceedings were organized in six consecutive panels on shipping, fisheries, environmental legislation, regional development in the Russian Arctic, resource exploitation, and potential for further Russian-U.S. cooperation in the Arctic. The conference delivered informative and detailed perspectives from the Russian Arctic stakeholders, thus addressing what Mr. Kuchins referred to as “deficit of understanding how Russia perceives the Arctic”.

The “Regulation of International Navigation in the Arctic” section discussed the increase in shipping along the Northern Sear Route (NSR) and the prospects for its further development from a practical, infrastructural point of view. 

Timur Mukhametyanov of the Department of International Cooperation in the Russian Ministry of Transport gave an overview of the relevant recent legislative developments: the clear definition of the NSR water area, the adoption of the new ‘Rules of Navigation in the Northern Sea Route water area’ in January 2013, and the establishment of the Northern Sea Route Administration in March 2013.

Sovcomflot Deputy Director General Mikhail Suslin highlighted the potential for further shipping development in polar waters against the backdrop of offshore oil and gas projects in the Russian Arctic. In 2010-2013, hydrocarbons made up 70% of NSR cargo flows, while bulk cargo amounted to 24%. The recent increase in the number of ships transiting the NSR may lead to its transit cargo reaching as much as 70 million tons, Mr. Suslin said. Sovcomflot has also explored the deepwater section of the route, which is an alternative to the passage via the Sannikova Strait.

Deputy Director General of Rosatomflot Stanislav Golovinskiy described the main functions of Rosatomflot icebreakers, which are not limited to icebreaker support to cargo vessels but provide service to military vessels in the Northern Navy Fleet and assist in disembarkation and evacuation of scientific research stations as well. He pointed out how unpredictable the changing climate and sea ice conditions can be, referring to the vast area that was covered by one-year sea ice floes in the East Siberian Sea in September 2013 as opposed to the record sea ice minimum one year before. Appealing to the voyage by Tor Viking II in December 2010,Mr. Golovinskiy said that navigation along the Northern Sea Route is also possible in December, therefore the navigation period may be prolonged. Finally, he presented the Russian nuclear icebreaker capacity, which is currently comprised of five vessels: three “Arktika” and two “Taimyr” type icebreakers, with three IB-60 type universal nuclear icebreakers planned to start operations in 2017-2021.

In concordance with the conference title, cooperation was indeed the main theme of the conference, which  concerned governmental, civil, scientific, and business interactions both within and across borders.

During the opening ceremony, RAS IMEMO Director Alexander Dynkin stated that there isno conflict potential in the Arctic, while Ambassador Vasilyev referred to the region as “stable and predictable”. The dissonance between mass media speculation and real Arctic diplomacy was accurately reflected in a comment by Ambassador David Balton who said,“I wish I had a ruble for each story that I read about conflict in the Arctic”. In his turn, Andrey Zagorsky of RAS IMEMO complimented the U.S. Department of Defense’s Arctic Strategy because it aims at ensuring security in the region by means of cooperation rather than military deployment.

Business can play a significant role in regional development through participation in various forms of business or public-private partnerships with federal and regional authorities, research centers, or companies from the same or another industrial sector. As announced by Lukoil representative Alexander Abashin, Lukoil and Gazpromneft were on the brink of signing a partnership agreement between their flagship Arctic projects in the Pechora Sea, namely the Varandey Oil Export Terminal and Prirazlomnaya Oil Platform, respectively. The agreement would entail joint training sessions and exchange of experience and information. After a brief review of the company’s main operations, Vladimir Zhukov of Norilsk Nickel made a rather impressive presentation of the corporate citizenship strategy, which takes up as much as 4% of Norilsk Nickel profits spent on investment in regional infrastructure in Taimyr and the High North generally. This includes two relocation programs for inhabitants of areas suffering from industrial pollution in Norilsk and Dudinka, a partnership with the regional Taimyr Airline to modernize its fleet, and contribution to the development of the Northern Sea Route by virtue of investment into Dudinka port infrastructure. The presentation of Vladimir Bagreev of the Norwegian-Russian Chamber of Commerce (NRCC) provided a good example of how comprehensive cross-border business interactions can be. With a membership of some 140 companies, NRCC promotes networking among both government agencies and large and medium size enterprises in the form of, among others, high-level business forums, market information seminars, and business-to-business (B2B) and Young Entrepreneurship matchmaking programs.

Andrey Krivorotov of the Shtokman Development AG claimed that the government-business-science triangle would be the most effective model for the sustainable exploitation of the Arctic resource base. However, he noted, social and economic development in the Arctic cannot be compatible with a liberal economy. The Arctic is competing for investment flows with other regions, such as Africa, Brazil, Australia; the government is therefore responsible for establishing favorable “rules of the game” to attract investment, as well as for providing the necessary infrastructure.

The human dimension of international cooperation in the Arctic was represented by the “Human in the Arctic” project which was announced by Permanent Representative of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) to the President of the Russian Federation Alexey Struchkov. The project, aimed to deliver a comprehensive evaluation of life quality and human development in northern regions, has been recently launched by the Northern Forum, founded in 1991, an international organization which brings together nine regional governments across Russia, Canada, Iceland, South Korea, and Japan.

Saint Petersburg State University (SPBU) Professor Georgiy Cherkashyov introduced several case studies of international scientific and educational cooperation in the Arctic: University of the Arctic coalition of higher education institutions, and bilateral university cooperation programs: POMOR polar and marine sciences cooperation between Russian and German universities, SPBU cooperation with a number of Norwegian universities; and scientific workshops and expeditions under the auspices of the joint Russian-American Long-Term Census of the Arctic (RUSALCA) project.

A separate panel was devoted to U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. The panel participants seemed to have a shared vision of the two states’ relations in the polar dimension as that of a committed and effective working relationship.

The two states cooperate within the framework of the Arctic Council, where the United States and Russia co-chaired the negotiations of the Search-and-Rescue agreement, which was the first legally binding document negotiated under the auspices of  the Arctic Council in 2011; together with Norway, Russia and the United States also co-chaired the Arctic Council negotiations of the second legally binding agreement – Oil Spill Preparedness and Response – which was finalized in 2013. Head of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission David Benton suggested that together the United States and Russia could lead the way to improve the Arctic Council.

The main areas of bilateral cooperation include numerous joint scientific projects, coast guard cooperation and joint trainings, and fisheries management in the Bering Sea. Mr. Zagorsky called for more cooperation in regulating shipping in the Bering Strait, which may soon turn into a “bottleneck” due to increased shipping activities in polar waters.

Mr. Benton argued in favor of extending fisheries cooperation to the Chukchi Sea, part of which lies beyond the 200-mile zones of Russia and the United States and may therefore fall prey to unregulated fishing, for these high seas areas are becoming very attractive to third-party fishing nations due to the retreat of polar sea ice. The need for future fisheries regulation in the Chukchi Sea and the central parts of the Arctic Ocean was prominently featured across several panels and was supported by many conference speakers, among them Ambassador Balton, Commissioner Benton, Mr. Highleyman, former Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture Trevor Taylor, and Chairman of  “Sevryba” Coordinating Council Vyacheslav Zilanov.

The conference made a valuable contribution in terms of demythologization of some popular themes frequently discussed in Arctic forums.

Oleg Kozlov of the Russian Ministry of Transport provided a detailed explanation of the main issues, which are behind the slow progress of the Polar Code negotiations. There are differing opinions among negotiating parties in a number of issues, which include ice strengthening categorization for vessels, determination of the minimum acceptable temperatures, the applicability of the Polar Code to different kind of vessels, and environmental regulations for shipping in polar waters. He acknowledged that the Polar Code negotiations are proceeding more slowly than expected and still have a long way to go before the agreement can be finalized.

Saint Petersburg State University Professor Valery Konyshev explained the internal political struggle and some national legislation issues, which constitute the major impediments to ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the U.S. Senate. He made it clear that the problem stems from a domestic issue rather than geopolitical motivation.

The issue of charging fees for using the Northern Sea Route came up in discussions several times. A key objective of the Russian government’s transport policy in the Arctic region is to attract shipping traffic to the NSR in order to ensure its commercial development. For this purpose, the federal law "On Amendments to Certain Russian Federation Legislative Acts for Commercial Shipping in the Arctic Ocean", adopted in July 2012, lifted the polar shipping charge for vessels taking the route, leaving only icebreaker escort and pilotage charges. In other words, the Russian government does not charge foreign vessels for traveling along the route per se. Icebreaker escort is no longer mandatory, [1] but it is widely agreed among members of the Russian shipping community that provision of icebreaker and pilotage services to vessels traveling along the route is crucial to its navigation safety. Mr. Golovinskiy remarked that the current tariffs are marginal, which means that service providers such as Rosatomflot may negotiate lower transit fees with shipowners, which would bridge the tariff gap between the Northern Sea Route and the Suez Canal and enhance the NSR’s  commercial viability. At the same time, during the plenary session a representative of “Transport of Russia” newspaper voiced the concern that the elimination of the polar shipping charges might be regarded as an infringement on the Russian transport industry’s interest, as these charges could otherwise be a source of transport revenue. Mr. Zagorsky and Deputy Secretary of Security Council of the Russian Federation Vladimir Nazarov, however, explained that the NSR is already subsidized by the Russian government, and in case of its full self-sufficiency the costs for shipowners would be so high that none of them would consider using the route.


[1] For a more detailed discussion of recent developments in the Northern Sea Route navigation regulations, and economic factors which are relevant to the prospective development of shipping in the Russian polar waters, see this article by The Arctic Institute’s Kathrin Keil and Andreas Raspotnik, available here - http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/09/the-myth-of-arctic-shipping-why_8.html




Report: The Future of Arctic Shipping - A New Silk Road for China?





By Malte Humpert Every time Arctic sea ice extent reaches a new record low a host of new reports and studies predict a rapid increase in shipping activities in the Arctic. Expectations are high that Arctic shipping routes, particularly the Northern Sea Route, will rival traditional shipping routes and complement the Suez Canal route as a key waterway for trade to and from Asia by the middle of this century. 

One of the drivers of Arctic shipping, as the logic goes, is China’s rapidly growing international trade. As China aims to diversify its trade routes and reduce its dependence on trade passing through the Strait of Malacca, the Arctic offers an alternative and shorter route to conduct part of its trade. How realistic are such scenarios? 

Read the report here.
Download PDF version (11MB) of the report here.


The Myth of Arctic Shipping - Why the Northern Sea Route is Still of Limited Geo-Economic Importance




Courtesy of Oyoyoy on Wikimedia
By Kathrin Keil and Andreas Raspotnik With the Chinese Yong Sheng[1] currently transiting the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the potential of Arctic shipping is being discussed by the world’s media.[2] The Yong Sheng is the first Chinese cargo vessel to transport container goods (steel and heavy equipment) from Dalian, China to Rotterdam, Europe.

Researchers and public media have often cited the development of Arctic shipping routes as the driving factor of China’s regional interests, and, vice versa, China’s interest in Arctic shipping is taken as an important factor in the development of the NSR. Consequently, the NSR is identified as the most promising Arctic seaway with a considerable potential to shorten sailing distances from Europe to Asia (and, to a lesser extent, vice versa). A closer look at the actual NSR statistics tells a more differentiated story about the future outlook of the route.

Shipping Statistics and Omitted Questions

As of September 5, 2013 the NSR Administration has issued 495 permits to navigate and operate on the NSR so far this year.[3] However, most of these permits are for only parts of the route, predominantly the western part of Russian waters, i.e. the southwestern Kara Sea. As of 31 July 2013, of the 296 permits granted only 18% (58 permits) are for actual transits and 45% (133 permits) are approved for voyages only in the southwestern Kara Sea, primarily shipping goods within the region or bringing them south-westwards to Europe.[4]

This is just one example of how current discussions on the NSR generally remain superficial, drawing an undifferentiated picture of current and future Arctic shipping. Discussions tend to ignore the complexity of global shipping and its immediate repercussions on the potential of Arctic shipping. Relevant questions such as for which goods the northern routes will be relevant and which markets can be sensibly served need to be asked. Shipping types of many kinds, including fishing, tourism, cargo, container, destinational, transit, and intra trade and supply, are lumped together, despite the tremendous differences in the economics, conditions and potential of different types of ship traffic.

Reliability and viability are key factors in global shipping operations that are often not taken into account when discussing the economic feasibility of Arctic shipping.[5] That these factors are usually ignored is a major issue given that predictability, punctuality, and economy-of-scale of Arctic shipping are currently afflicted with many challenges and uncertainties, and will continue to be for some time to come.

Thus, public discussions regarding the future of Arctic shipping must begin to include the economic considerations given to global shipping in general. Additionally, going into more detail concerning the many particularities and subtleties that are decisive when aiming to evaluate the potential of Arctic maritime routes, would be equally important. In this regard, several essential questions arise:

  1. Which kinds of shipping are relevant for northern routes? Will intra- and destination shipping remain the predominant shipping activity or will transit take over the leading role?
  2. What are relevant goods for northern maritime transport?
  3. What are the relevant import and export markets for these goods and what are their respective routes?
  4. What do the major, global trading routes currently look like? How will they develop in the years ahead and how do northern routes fit into the general maritime trade picture? 
From a less economic perspective, debates about the future of Arctic shipping also need to include the evaluation and acceptance of risks, including environmental and human risks, linked to navigation in Arctic areas. Important questions include: How safe is safe enough? What kind of risks can be accepted?[6]

To shed some light on these questions, the following maps illustrate the regional distribution of China’s imports and exports. China is often highlighted as the driving force of potential Arctic shipping developments. However, the analysis of global trade patterns exemplified by China’s current imports and exports and its future outlook show a different picture. China conducts half of its trade with its neighbors in the Pacific region. Europe’s share - which would be relevant for Arctic shipping - is substantially smaller. Less than 20% of China’s trade is bound for or originates in Europe.

Further, the majority of trade between China and Europe is of a containerized nature, which, most experts agree, will not be routed through the Arctic Ocean, due to the seasonality of Arctic transit routes, limited reliability and predictability, and the lack of infrastructure.

National Incentives and New Administration

In addition to these geo-economic considerations, national deliberations and interests have to be kept in mind. With regard to the NSR, it is essential to discuss the immediate relevance of this seaway for the Russian Federation: What is Russia’s incentive to develop the NSR? Is it intended to be a national waterway or an internationally used sea route? Is it meant to transport regional goods, i.e. energy resources to Asian and/or European markets, or considered as a transiting route transporting goods from markets outside the Russian Federation navigating through Russian water? What is the strategic value of the NSR for Russia?

Several on-going developments in regard to the administration of the NSR currently influence the deliberation of these questions, with the “icebreaker paradox” as the most prominent. With the recently implemented Rules of navigation on the water area of the NSR[7], icebreaker assistance is no longer compulsory for each voyage through NSR straits, but now it depends on the ice class of the vessel and the ice conditions in the area in which the vessel will be traveling. Icebreaker fees will depend on the capacity of the respective ship, its ice class, the distance of the escort and the time of navigation.[8]

However, while the legal framework is now established, a detailed mechanism for the calculation of the fees still needs to be developed. Until this mechanism is in place, shipping fees for using the NSR will continue to be determined by the old rules from 1990, meaning fee determination through individual negotiations.

According to the rules, the Russian authorities only demand fees for icebreaker assistance (not only for breaking ice but also for search and rescue and other functions) and pilotage for using the NSR, which constitute the only revenue sources from the NSR. As these sources are not enough to maintain and develop the necessary infrastructure assets for safe navigation on the NSR, the Russian government has to provide significant subsidies.

One begins to question the economic viability of the NSR for the Russian Federation. And also the question remains about who will bring about the vast investments needed to modernise, maintain, and (potentially) expand the existing icebreaker fleet. The potential lack of sufficient icebreaker capabilities in the NSR will likely lead to a delay in shipping traffic and has immediate negative effects on the development of the NSR as a transit route used for international navigation. For several maritime trading sectors, time savings are crucial for any economic feasibility considerations of transiting the NSR, especially in the case of seismic and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vessels, which have very high time-charter costs per day. Waiting times of a few days due to icebreaker delays may destroy any pre-calculated cost benefits in comparison to southern routes.

Based on these considerations, it may be possible that an agreement between the Russian Federation and user states of the NSR increasing the latter’s financial contribution to the maintenance of the NSR is a reasonable option to improve and safeguard NSR usage. This is especially relevant if Russia is seriously interested in the NSR not only being a national waterway, but also a route for international transits.

Conclusion

Development in the Arctic is happening and shipping numbers are indeed increasing. But both scientific and public debates and reporting need to be directed into a more nuanced and differentiated discussion about the region’s general future and the potential of shipping along northern routes.

A realistic perspective suggests that currently the NSR is intended as a Russian sea route. International shipping and potential revenues derived from the NSR are generally welcome but most likely Arctic shipping will not change major global trading routes. Consequently, while it is of regional relevance and potential importance as a niche route for a number of goods, the NSR’s geopolitical and geo-economic relevance, especially in the sense of global trade patterns, is rather limited.

This article is part of a larger study which takes a look at China’s geo-economic interests in Arctic shipping and the future of Arctic shipping generally. The study will be released by The Arctic Institute later this year.


[1] The ship is Hong Kong-flagged but owned by Chinese state-owned company Cosco Group.
[2] See for example: The Guardian, “China's voyage of discovery to cross the less frozen north”, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/18/china-northeastern-sea-route-trial-voyage, accessed 4 September 2013; The Wall Street Journal, “Ship Travels Arctic From China to Europe. Northern Passage Shaves Two Weeks of Travel Time Off Journey”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323423804579022982364681464.html#, accessed 4 September 2013.
[3] The Northern Sea Route Administration, “Permissions for navigation on the water area of the Northern sea route”, http://asmp.morflot.ru/en/razresheniya/, accessed 2 September 2013.
[4] Northern Sea Route Information Office, “Brief statistical analysis on the Permissions issued by the NSR Administration as of 31 July 2013”, http://www.arctic-lio.com/node/190, accessed 4 September 2013.
[5] For a current assessment about the potential of the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) see Humpert & Raspotnik 2012: http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/11/the-future-of-arctic-shipping-along.html. The four outlined variables influencing shipping considerations along the TSR can also be used for future shipping scenarios along the NSR and the NWP (Northwest Passage).
[6] The Norwegian classification society Det Norske Veritas (DNV) identifies risks related to Arctic navigation by contrasting probability with consequences and concludes several main risks elements: design, emergency, evacuation and rescue, the environment, regularity/logistics, long term commitment and estimation of costs; see presentation by Morten Mejlænder-Larsen, Discipline Leader Arctic Operation and Technology, DNV; presentation at Nansen-NVP Summer School, 19 August 2013, Longyearbyen, Svalbard.
[7] Rules of navigation on the water area of the Northern Sea Route, unofficial English translation taken from Northern Sea Route Information Office, accessible at http://www.arctic-lio.com/docs/nsr/legislation/20130425185806en-Rules_unof.pdf.
[8] Ibid., p. 5 f.





The Arctic Institute's reaction to the arrival of the Yong Sheng in Rotterdam




Berlin, September 8, 2013 - In response to the arrival of the Yong Sheng in Rotterdam, the first Chinese cargo vessel traveling along the Northern Sea Route, Malte Humpert, Executive Director of The Arctic Institute, said: 

“In contrast to recent reports, Arctic shipping will remain of limited importance to China. The geographic distribution of China’s main trade partners and its substantial and ongoing investments in port infrastructure along existing trade routes speak counter to the idea of large-scale Chinese trans-Arctic shipping.”

With regard to widespread reports of an exponential increase of shipping along the NSR Kathrin Keil, The Arctic Institute’s Europe Director, stated:

“In 2013 the Russian authorities for the first time made available a list of all granted permits for the NSR. The vast majority of permits are not for full transits, but are for regional traffic, primarily in the Kara Sea in the western part of the NSR. The number of Arctic transits—vessels traveling from the Pacific to the Atlantic or vice versa—is expected to be on par or slightly below 2012 figures when 46 ships made the journey.” 

On the overall importance of Arctic shipping, Andreas Raspotnik, Analyst at the Institute said:

“With the melting of Arctic sea ice, Arctic shipping has become part of today’s maritime landscape. Large-scale trans-Arctic shipping and a shift in global trade patterns towards the Arctic, however, are far from becoming a reality. Traffic along the NSR will continue to be dominated by regional – primarily Russian – traffic and remain a seasonal and niche trade route.”

For the full analysis please click here.

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Review: Arctic Governance and Japan’s Foreign Strategy




Japanese Icebreaker Shirase
By Aki Tonami The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), a private Japanese policy think-tank focused on foreign affairs and security issues, released a report on Arctic Governance and Japan's Foreign Strategy. The institute has traditionally had a close relationship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as an external advisor. Every year, the Ministry commissions a series of project reports from JIIA containing policy recommendations on specific topics. The most recent report focuses on the Arctic and is based on seven workshops held with selected experts in international law, shipping, defense, and international relations. At present, the report is not available in English and this article summarizes the main content of the report.

The 97-page report, written in Japanese, is divided into 8 Chapters covering various aspects of the Arctic. While the report has not garnered much attention outside of Japan, it stands out as one of the first ‘official’ Japanese reports on the Arctic from an organization closely linked to the government. The Japanese government has not released an Arctic strategy, but the commissioning symbolizes the government’s attempt to gather opinions and understand the topic. There has been ongoing discussion about the Arctic in various business sectors and academic fields, and the report closely mirrors these views. In this regard, the report is not ground breaking but should rather be understood as a comprehensive analysis of the general mood of the current and potential Arctic actors. It includes detailed data and analysis, which will be especially valuable for Japanese policymakers. 

In Chapter 1, Kazuhiro Nakatani, a renowned professor of international law, gives a general overview of the Arctic ’issues’. He contends that for Japan, the most desirable option is decision-making by the Arctic “stakeholders”; if impossible, decision-making by the Arctic Council would be second best. This is a rather frank opinion considering that Japan has been relatively quiet about what happens if the Arctic Council rejects Japan’s application for Permanent Observer Status, and that the Icelandic Prime Minister has recently suggested a new, more open forum to discuss Arctic affairs.

In Chapter 2, Masumi Kimura, who is a principal researcher at the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Cooperation (JOGMEC), reminds the reader why Japan needs to participate in energy developments in the Arctic. Energy development projects are highly profitable for any country that has capital and technology, and Arctic resources could be important for Japan’s energy security as well. 

While the overall tone of the report is positive about greater Japanese involvement in the Arctic, the shipping industry is not shy in voicing its cautious stance. The Japanese shipping industry has been skeptical about the economic feasibility of the use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Chapter 3, by two people from major Japanese shipping companies, stresses that it is still more expensive to use the NSR for container shipping: “There is no reason to use a shipping route if it does not make economic sense, even if it is the shortest route…shipping companies do not exist to enhance the national prestige.” (p.30)

In Chapter 4, Hideaki Kaneda, a former Vice Admiral of Japan's Defense Forces, discusses the Arctic and Japan’s defense. Kaneda argues that, in the short-run, Japan should promote the use of Arctic sea routes by the international community. In the medium to long run, however, as a maritime nation Japan must strengthen its independent defense capabilities. It is because as maritime and fishery activities in the Arctic eventually increase, such activities in the Sea of Japan will increase as well, and as a result straits such as Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima will be more congested than they currently are. Further deepening the US-Japan alliance would be useful for Japan as the US is one of the Arctic 5 and considering its nuclear deterrence capability. Kaneda also argues for taking a multilateral approach and expanding Japan’s maritime defense coalition would be necessary.

The following chapters discuss the environmental problems in the Arctic, Arctic governance, and the relationship between Arctic issues and international relations in East Asia, arguing that Japan must closely watch for possible long-term impacts on Japan’s geopolitical environment as a result of changes in the Arctic.

The report concludes with six policy recommendations for the Japanese government:
  1. Construct a win-win relationship with Arctic coastal states regarding resource exploration and development;
  2. Secure appropriate implementation of UNCLOS;
  3. Build a closer cooperation with the United States on Arctic issues;
  4. Play a leading role in environmental conservation, using Japan's knowledge and environmental technology;
  5. More active Arctic diplomacy;
  6. Strengthen the government system for Arctic policy, such as establishing an Arctic Headquarters within the Cabinet Office.
It remains to be seen whether the Japanese government will implement the recommendations in full, but both the commissioning and tone of the report clearly indicate that Japan has finally recognized the political importance of Arctic affairs. There are also real actions moving the country in this direction: Just days before the report was publicly released, Japan took a step towards more active Arctic diplomacy, as recommended in the report, and assigned an Arctic ambassador for the first time.

Aki Tonami is a researcher at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at the University of Copenhagen. You may contact her at aki.tonami@nias.ku.dk




The Future of Arctic Shipping along the Transpolar Sea Route




Below you can find a short excerpt of a paper on the Transpolar Sea Route  published by the Arctic Yearbook, a research project by the Northern Research Forum and the University of the Arctic Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security. You can read the full article and many others here.

By Malte Humpert and Andreas Raspotnik The Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) represents the most direct route for trans-Arctic shipment but has yet to attract significant commercial interest, as multi-year ice remains a formidable obstacle for most of the Arctic shipping season. The effects of climate change are, however, increasingly observed throughout the region and the Arctic is now warmer than it has been at any time during the last 2,000 years. Summer ice extent has declined by 40% since satellite observation began in 1979. Over the same period, Arctic sea ice has thinned considerably, experiencing a decline in average volume of 70%. Within the next decade this warming trend may transform the region from an inaccessible frozen desert into a seasonally navigable ocean and the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free for short periods as early as 2015.

Seaborne trade currently accounts for 90% of world trade and is dominated by the transportation of raw materials, tanker trade, and other dry cargo, including containerized cargo. The growing importance of the trade relationship between Europe and Asia and the resulting increase in seaborne traffic between the two regions will result in further congestion and a higher risk of collisions along the existing sea routes and their choke points, e.g. the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca.

Trans-Arctic shipping, regardless of the actual route used, will not serve as a substitute for existing shipping routes, but will instead be supplemental and provide additional capacity for a growing transportation volume. For the foreseeable future, the limited seasonal window for trans-Arctic voyages must be taken into account in any projections. Nonetheless, the development of Arctic offshore hydrocarbon resources and related economic activities will result in an improved integration of the Arctic economy in global trade patterns.

The Arctic region has become increasingly politicized, affecting its future development and influencing the policy decisions of Arctic countries. The Arctic Ocean’s potential economic and geostrategic importance has also begun to attract the attention of non-Arctic actors, who are in the process of defining their interests and intentions. The People’s Republic of China, in addition to the European Union (EU), is arguably the most important non-Arctic actor and will be instrumental to the development and future of the TSR.

Read more »

About the article: 
The authors highlight the future potential of the Transpolar Sea Route, an Arctic shipping route which has thus far been neglected in the realm of academia and in the public eyes. The article represents the first comprehensive assessment on the feasibility of the TSR from a climatic and economic standpoint and discusses how legal and geostrategic considerations will influence the development of this shipping route. The authors conclude that the opening and future development of Arctic shipping routes will not only depend on favorable climatic conditions across the Arctic Ocean, but will also be influenced by a shift in economic and political spheres of influence. The development of the TSR and its significant economic potential may in part be determined by key geostrategic considerations as the center of economic and political power continues to shift towards Asia.


The Future of Arctic Shipping




By Malte Humpert and Andreas Raspotnik Arctic sea ice is melting rapidly, and within the next decade the effects of global warming may transform the Polar region from an inaccessible frozen desert into a seasonally navigable ocean. The summer of 2011 saw a record 33 ships, carrying 850,000 tons of cargo navigate the Northern Sea Route (NSR) off Russia’s northern coast. This year’s shipping season may see up to 1.5 million tons of cargo, as Germany’s Alfred Wegener Institute predicts the NSR to be ice-free and passable for ships by early summer.

The North West Passage (NWP), first ice-free in 2007, and the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) may also open up to shipping traffic over the coming decades. An in-depth assessment of the viability of shipping along the TSR will be published in the upcoming Arctic Yearbook 2012, which will be available from the Northern Research Forum’s website from October 2012. The development of Arctic offshore hydrocarbon resources and related economic activities will also improve the integration of the Arctic economy in global trade patterns. Multi-year ice and the limited seasonal window for trans-Arctic voyages however, will for the foreseeable future remain formidable obstacles to the development of Arctic shipping and its economic viability. Trans-Arctic shipping routes will thus not serve as a substitute for existing shipping lanes, but will instead provide new and additional capacity for a growing transportation volume.

A navigable Arctic Ocean?

Summer ice extent has declined by 40 percent since satellite observation began in 1979, and over the same period sea ice has thinned considerably, experiencing a decline in volume of 70 percent. Studies differ widely in their predictions of when summer sea ice will melt completely. The latest findings suggest that Arctic sea ice may have entered into a new state of low ice cover. A recent article by Valerie N. Livina and Timothy M. Lenton on the bifurcation of Arctic sea-ice cover describes it as "distinct from the normal state of seasonal sea ice variation." Arctic sea-ice may have crossed a tipping point which could soon make ice-free summers an annual feature across most of the Arctic Ocean.

Longer ice-free periods

Sea ice extent observations (1970 to 2007) and forecast (2030 to 2100) 
reproduced using data from the NOAA GFDL model. 
Yearly extent represents an average 80 percent sea ice concentrationn
A new study by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) suggests that multi-year ice, which is the oldest and thickest Arctic sea ice and the principal obstacle to shipping in the Arctic Ocean, is disappearing at a faster rate than the younger and thinner ice. The ice-free period along the Arctic’s main shipping routes is expected to increase from around 30 days in 2010 to more than 120 days by the middle of the century. Furthermore, the distribution of the remaining summer ice will not be uniform across the Arctic Ocean. Studies suggest that sea ice will collect and persist longest along the northern flanks of the Canadian Archipelago and Greenland while the central and eastern part of the Arctic will see the most significant decline of ice, further extending the shipping season along the NSR. In 2011 the navigational season along the NSR lasted for 141 days, from early July until mid-November (see figure 1).

Significant obstacles remain

Nonetheless, significant obstacles to shipping remain such as icing from sea spray, wind chill, remoteness as well as their implications for rescue and emergency operations, and the lack of reliable weather forecasts. During the winter and spring months ice conditions along Arctic shipping routes will remain heavy, and the amount of floating sea ice and number of icebergs - a hazard to the safety of marine transport, may increase during the early melt season as more ice floes break apart and drift across the Arctic Ocean.

Shorter sailing distances

Routing shipping traffic through the Arctic allows for shorter sailing distances resulting in shorter trips. Shipping operators can achieve cost savings through a reduction of number of days at sea, energy efficiency improvements due to slower sailing speeds, or a combination of both.

Distance savings along Arctic shipping routes can be as high as 40 percent compared to the traditional shipping lanes via the Suez Canal. Shorter sailing distances allow for considerable fuel cost savings. The reduced number of days at sea allows a ship to make more return trips resulting in increased revenue and potentially greater profits.

Instead of realizing time savings, operators can also adopt super-slow sailing. A vessel traveling from Murmansk to Tokyo can reduce its speed by 40 percent and still arrive in Japan at the same time as a ship sailing at full speed traveling through the Suez Canal. Super-slow sailing can also double a vessel’s energy efficiency performance, resulting in a significant reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions. If a future emissions control framework was to include global maritime traffic, this reduction of emissions could thus also result in significant cost savings.

Economic feasibility of Arctic shipping

Global shipping operations are dependent on three key factors: predictability, punctuality, and economy-of-scale, all of which are currently limited in Arctic shipping. Consequently, the lack of schedule reliability and highly variable transit times along the Arctic shipping routes represent major obstacles to the development of Arctic shipping.

The majority of cargo ships that travel the world’s oceans operate on regular schedules, known as liner service. In total more than 6,000 ships, most of them container ships, follow a set route calling at a number of ports to load and unload cargo, which consequently supplies the concerned country’s hinterland. Profitability can only be achieved with large- scale shipping based on stable and predictable (year-round) operations.The ability to schedule journeys a long time in advance and to guarantee uninterrupted service is considered key for container ship operators. Bulk dry and wet carriers, on the other hand, follow less predictable schedules and their routes depend more on changing supply and demand of less time- sensitive items. Of the four kinds of Arctic voyages undertaken in the Arctic Ocean - destination transport, intra-Arctic transport, trans-Arctic transport and cabotage - trans-Arctic shipping may face the most significant hurdle to becoming part of the global trade patterns.

Draft and beam restrictions

Arctic shipping routes, especially the NSR, are subject to significant draft and beam restrictions. Ships along the NSR must pass through a number of narrow and shallow straits in the Kara and Laptev Sea. The Yugorskiy Shar Strait at the southernmost entrance from the Barents to the Kara Sea follows a channel 21 nautical miles long and 12-30 meters deep. Along the eastern section of the NSR, ships must navigate either the Dmitry Laptev Strait or the Sannikov Strait to pass through the New Siberian Islands and travel from the Laptev to the East Siberian Seas.The eastern approach of the Laptev Strait has a depth of less than 10 meters, restricting the draft of ships to less than 6.7 meters. In addition, Russia’s government only permits ships with the highest ice classification – 1A Finnish Swedish, to sail the route. Currently, only three vessels out of more than 2,000 Panamax ships have that classification.

Arctic shipping infrastructure

A key characteristic of Arctic shipping routes is the limited number of ports of call. According to the Arctic Logistics Information Office, 16 ports, most of them ice-covered for part of the year, are located along the NSR. The port of Murmansk and the port of Petropavlovsk on Russia’s far-east Kamchatka peninsula are considered essential for the development of the NSR. Both ports are expected to serve as terminals and hubs of the NSR. In November 2011 Vladimir Putin announced a major overhaul of the entire Russian transport system with special attention to maritime traffic in the Arctic. Russia plans to build up to 10 emergency centers focused on meteorological and rescue services as well as border patrol along the NSR.The capacity of Russia’s seaports is scheduled to increase 50 percent by 2015 and the country plans to invest 134 rubles (€3.4 billion) into developing maritime traffic over the next 10 years.

The port of Kirkenes, Norway and the port of Vopnafjörður, Iceland may serve as major future Arctic hubs. Iceland’s strategic location at the entrance and exit to the Arctic Ocean and Vopnafjörður’s suitability as a deep-water port with depth up to 70m, may allow development into a transshipment hub. Future development and investment will however, depend significantly on the country’s financial and economic situation and foreign investments. Over the past decade China has continuously increased its economic cooperation with the small island nation and China’s premier Wen Jiabao recently visited Iceland to further strengthen the economic ties between the two countries. A Chinese delegation also visited the Faroe Islands, a small group of islands under the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark, where domestic policy makers have also identified the island’s role in future Arctic shipping as a priority.

Conclusion

Over the past decades the Arctic has witnessed a much faster than anticipated decline of sea ice and the continuation of this trend will transform the Arctic Ocean into a navigable seaway over the coming decades.Yet due to the region’s unique navigational and economic challenges Arctic shipping will, for the foreseeable future, only be cost effective for a limited number of operators.

This article was first published in the 55th Edition of Port Technology International and is republished here with permission. 



A Bering Strait Vessel Traffic Service: Critical Infrastructure for an Opening Arctic (Part I)





by Olin Strader Nations and multi-national corporations are positioning themselves to take full advantage of the Arctic’s Northwest Passage (NWP) and Northern Sea Route (NSR). However, there is every little safety infrastructure in place to ensure incident-free transit. Both of these Sea Lines of Communication terminate in the Bering Strait, the gateway to the Arctic. In this critical water space it is essential the United States and Russia begin considering how to manage traffic through this strategic choke point. 

In September 2011 Prime Minister Putin announced at the second International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk, Russia’s “intention to turn the NSR into a key transport route of global importance”. PM Putin further said, “We believe that NSR has a bright future as an international transport artery capable of being a competitor to more traditional routes, both when it comes to price, safety and quality”.[1] Subsequently, Russia has announced it intends to build ten Arctic rescue centers, develop a new Arctic rescue ship, develop military ice-capable transports and construct new icebreakers to replace its aging fleet.

The Arctic, as observers know, is on the verge of historic change and with it mustcome the aids to navigation and safety infrastructure to ensure shipping can be conducted safely and with the reasonable prospect of rescue in the event of a major disaster. No place is more critical to safety in the Arctic than the confined waters of the Bering Strait. Therefore, what is needed is a Bering Strait Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) to mitigate risk associated with increased shipping. The Norwegians have a VTS at Vardø on the northern tip of Norway that could serve as a model for the Bering.[2]

According to the Norwegian Oceanic Vessel Traffic Management Services handbook, the Norwegian Coastal Administration’s missions are fourfold: Coastal Management, Maritime Safety, Maritime Transport and Emergency preparedness in case of acute pollution. Recognizing the Barents Sea is a financially productive water space representing three of Norway’s largest industries: oil, gas and fisheries, it is incumbent on Norway to manage maritime traffic to prevent accidents that could threaten their livelihood.[3] The US and Russian Federation economic zones in the Bering Strait are just as vulnerable as Norway’s.

The Bering Sea is an economic boon for Alaska. According to the State of Alaska’s 2010 State Economic Trends “more than 50 percent of all fish harvested in the U.S. comes from Alaska and accounts for more than 50 percent of basic private-sector employment in many of [Alaska’s] coastal communities”.[4] The Bering Sea is a significant contributor to Alaska’s fishing industry. Meanwhile, shipping and the risk of a maritime disaster is increasing in the Bering Strait with each passing year a VTS is not established.


Reasonable observers would conclude it is high time the United States and the Russian Federation initiate a dialogue on the need for a Bering Strait VTS due to increases in vessel traffic through the Strait during the lengthening summer months and the need to prevent a major shipping disaster. United States Coast Guard figures from 2008 to 2010 show an increase in Bering Strait transits from 245 to 325.[5] However, as the recent Nome gas resupply effort has demonstrated, winter months may no longer preclude Arctic shipping.

Meanwhile, the Russian Federation continues to increase throughput along the NSR.As the Barents Observer reported in late January 2012, “This year’s season on the NSR was special in many ways. Not only was the route accessible about one month longer than usual, but it also had the highest number ever of vessels in transit from Murmansk to another country”.[6] In a more recent Barents Observer article, Gazprom and Sovcomflot´s executives suggested “the relevance of LNG shipping along the NSRto the Asian-Pacific region [is] growing quickly”.[7] Clearly then, the Russian Federation expects to make the NSR a viable option between northern Pacific ports and northern Atlantic ports. There are dissenters who would suggest Arctic shipping will not be as safe and profitable as Russian Federation leaders would suggest. In a recent Insurance Journal article entitled, “Arctic Ice Melt Lifts Hopes for Russian Maritime Trade”, authors Albina Kovalyova & Alissa de Carbonnel opined, “industry analysts and mariners say ice floes, narrow straits, shallow waters, poor infrastructure and stormy winters continue to loom as obstacles to safe and profitable shipping through the polar shortcut”.[8]

Notwithstanding, Russia continues to demonstrate that the NSR is a viable shipping route. Two years ago the Russian Federation announced it would send five vessels of different classes through the NSR as a proof of principle, meeting the mark. They then publicly stated they would increase that number fivefold. This year reportedly 34 vessels transited the NSR. If increases were to continue at current calculations, within five years, however unlikely, transits would exceed over one hundred thousand.

Regardless of how many vessels actually transit the route in coming years, the Russian Federation’s fulfillment of their stated goals should lead observers, and especially policy makers, to believe the NSR will become a major Sea Line of Communication in the not too distant future.

Returning to the topic at hand, there are essentially two types of VTSs, manned and unmanned. The Vardø VTS is manned due to the heavy traffic that transits along Norway’s West coast and the need to safeguard critical state enterprises. Whereas, the few number of ships currently transiting the Bering Strait today may make it feasible to have an unmanned VTS until vessel traffic warrants an upgrade. An unmanned system would likely be monitored remotely both from Russia and the United States, using sensors to track and control Bering Strait traffic. Additionally, a traffic separation plan must be submitted and approved by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). For example, should north bound traffic transit east of Little Diomede Island and southbound traffic transit west of Big Diomede? These are details that must be negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation.

Clearly gas and oil traffic are expected to increase in the near-term, evidenced by Shell’s CEO Peter Voser’s 31 January Fox Business interview. "For us the focus is in Alaska and to some extent in Greenland, although in the coming years there may also be opportunities in Russia," stated Voser.[9]  Shell is not the only company expecting to 
profit from Arctic oil and gas.  Norway’s Statoil, Total, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips are all set to exploit the reported 90 billion barrels of oil, up to 50 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids that the 2008 US Geological Survey suggests are in the Arctic.  Therefore, it is essential to mitigate the accompanying risk of increased Bering Strait vessel traffic by resourcing a VTS. 

Part II can be found here.

Sources:
[1] Barents Observer, “Putin sees bright future for Arctic transport”, accessed at: http://www.barentsobserver.com/putin-sees-bright-future-for-arctic-transport.4963803-16149.html
[2] Norwegian Coastal Administration, The Vardø Vessel Traffic Service, accessed at: http://www.kystverket.no/Documents/Om%20Kystverket/Brosjyrer/Vard%C3%B8VTSbrosjyre_EN_HR.pdf
[3] The FishSite.com, “Norway Fishery Products Annual Report 2007” accessed at: http://www.thefishsite.com/articles/344/norway-fishery-products-annual-report-2007
[4] Brynn Keith, State Economic Trends: November 2010 (Juneau: Alaska Department of Labor andWorkforce Development, 2010), 3. accessed at: http://labor.alaska.gov/trends/nov10.pdf
[5] Rear Admiral Chris C. Colvin, “USCG District-17 Arctic Brief” (Slide 5), accessed at: http://www.uscg.mil/d17/Arctic%20Overview%20Feb2011.pdf
[6] Barents Observer, “34 vessels in transit on NSR”, accessed at: http://www.barentsobserver.com/34-vessels-in-transit-on-northern-sea-route.4991248.html
[7] Barents Observer, “Testing out LNG on NSR”, accessed at: http://www.barentsobserver.com/testing-out-lng-on-northern-sea-route.5013956-117495.html
[8] Albina Kovalyova and Alissa de Carbonnel, Insurance Journal, “Arctic Ice Melt Lifts Hopes for Russian Maritime Trade”, accessed at: http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2012/01/27/233056.htm
[9] Fox Business, “Shell CEO Says Arctic Focus on Alaska, Greenland”, accessed at: http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2012/01/31/shell-ceo-says-arctic-focus-on-alaska-greenland/#ixzz1l6aFgR8n
[10] Norwegian Coastal Administration, The Vardø Vessel Traffic Service, accessed at: http://www.kystverket.no/Documents/Om%20Kystverket/Brosjyrer/Vard%C3%B8VTSbrosjyre_EN_HR.pdf