By Kevin Casey During this year’s Arctic Dialogue conference, we’ll be publishing a regular series of short interviews with some of the many speakers and participants at the conference. This project is a collaboration between the High North Center, the University of Nordland, and The Arctic Institute. The podcasts will be available on iTunes via The Arctic Institute, as well as on the Arctic Dialogue website. You can find a list of all podcasts here. You can download a full transcript of the interview here.
Showing posts with label arctic. Show all posts
Showing posts with label arctic. Show all posts
Arctic Dialogue 2014 - Interview with Willy Østreng
By Kevin Casey During this year’s Arctic Dialogue conference, we’ll be publishing a regular series of short interviews with some of the many speakers and participants at the conference. This project is a collaboration between the High North Center, the University of Nordland, and The Arctic Institute. The podcasts will be available on iTunes via The Arctic Institute, as well as on the Arctic Dialogue website. You can find a list of all podcasts here. You can download a full transcript of the interview here.
Canada and the Arctic: An Ambiguous Relationship
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| Courtesy of Arctic-Antarctic Collection |
By Andreas Østhagen Canada undoubtedly holds a prominent place in the Arctic. Currently in the Arctic, only Russia has more Arctic territory, making Canada an “Arctic superpower” in terms of geography and location. As foreign minister Baird announced on December 9, its recent claim for an extension of its continental shelf claim stretched as far as the North Pole.
Canadian nation-building has at times also been concentrated around its “true north” [1]. Yet, 75 percent of the Canadian population is based within 100 miles from the United States border, more than 1.000 miles beneath the Arctic Circle [2]. Its Arctic population, residing in the three territories Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, only numbers approximately 100.000 inhabitants, which is less than 0.3 percent of Canada’s total population.
Arctic policies are, for all Arctic states, a mix of domestic and foreign policy. Similarly, in its policy for the Arctic, the Canadian federal government in Ottawa needs to balance the interests of the residents actually residing in its Arctic territories and the foreign policy interests of Canada at large. These different set of interests do not always converge, as this article will attempt to highlight. As a consequence, Canada’s actual Arctic policy can be termed somewhat “bi-polar”, juggling different sets of domestic interest while attempting to formulate a coherent foreign policy approach towards its Arctic neighbors. This juggling is a common trait amongst all the Arctic states, yet the Canadian case is especially pronounced in nature.
Comparing the Arctic Five
All Arctic coastal states are interesting case studies for center-periphery conflicts and the complicate intricacies of formulating foreign policy in tandem with rapid domestic regional development. Alaska holds a special role in the United States, far removed from the lower 48 in both geography and mentality, while forming a cohesive entity pushing for increased federal engagement in everything from resource development to the formulation of a coherent US Arctic policy [3]. In Greenland, consecutive self-governments have put economic independence from Denmark on top of the political agenda, with the idea of full-fledged independence looming in the background, as increased autonomy was granted in 2009 [4].
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| Courtesy of NSF |
On the other side of the Pole, Norway’s Arctic counties (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) hold 10 percent of Norway’s total population and are, as a consequence, relatively well integrated into the national economy as a whole. There is no marked difference between the Norwegian Arctic and the rest of Norway. Svalbard, being governed by the 1920 Treaty, is a special case with a population of only 2.195 [5]. Russia is in a strong position, with half of the total Arctic territory and a majority of the Arctic population. Just Murmansk oblast has a population of approximately 787.000, which is almost eight times the Canadian Arctic or almost the double of the Norwegian Arctic [6]. At large, the Arctic has a prominent role in Russian contemporary strategic thinking, while also constituting the backbone of its natural resource extraction [7].
Canada: Domestic Policy
Returning to Canada, its three Arctic territories are in a unique situation in terms of regional autonomy. Whereas the ten provinces south of the Arctic Circle have a high degree of autonomy ever since the Dominion was formed in 1867 because of their recognized constitutional powers in section 92 of the Constitution Act (formerly the British North American Act), the three northern territories have not enjoyed the same privileges and operate “at the pleasure of the Crown”. The regional governments of Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut have a substantially lower degree of autonomy than their southern neighbors, but also compared to that of their American and Greenlandic counterparts.
Nunavut in particular did not become a territory of its own until 1999, decades after claiming its Inuit heritage as separate from the Northwest Territories [8]. Although the federal government in Ottawa is slowly devolving decision-making competence and authority to the territories, the starting point is relatively low, as most decisions are still made by the federal Department for Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (AANDC) [9]. It is also the only one of the three territories to not have devolved powers over natural resources.
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| Frontier Lands Courtesy of Government of Canada |
Turning towards infrastructure and local capacity, the situation is very different in the Canadian Arctic than in the provinces. Every year since 2005 Stephen Harper has travelled to the northern territories and has thus displayed continued Arctic commitment by Ottawa, with promises of investment. As argued by Whitney Lackenbauer, focus in recent years has been on enabling natural resource development in the region, while serious deficiencies in social conditions and at the community level are being neglected.
In terms of infrastructure, there are also no deep water ports in any of the three territories, while the closest search and rescue centers are in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Trenton, Ontario, well beneath the Arctic Circle [10]. An offshore presence from the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), in terms of icebreaking capability, is only active in the summer months during the sealift season, when the small communities in Nunavut are being re-supplied. Should a serious incident, in terms of an oil spill or a grounding of a cruise ship, the lack of capacity combined with limited infrastructure might prove catastrophic.
Canada: Foreign Policy
Moving to the foreign policy dimension of Canada’s Arctic engagement, sovereignty has continuously been on the agenda. The current Conservative Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, has placed security issues high on the agenda with quotes like “use it or lose it” and promises of investment in a deep-water docking facility, Arctic capable patrol ships and a new Arctic training centre [11]. The recent claim to the North Pole has similarly been mentioned as a potential source of conflict [12].
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| Prime Minister Harper in the Arctic Courtesy of Pmwebphotos |
The actual threats to Canadian sovereignty, however, are few and far between. Canada’s territorial disputes in the Beaufort Sea with the United States, and over Hans Island with Denmark/Greenland, are minor, with limited potential of ever becoming more than diplomatic disagreements. The disagreement with the US over the status of the Northwest Passage, as internal waters or an international transit, is also an issue where the two have agreed to disagree, which does not prompt increased military presence in the area. Its recent submission to the UN Commission determining the limits of the continental shelf, is another area where all the Arctic littoral states have agreed to abide to the UNCLOS framework, reiterated continuously since the Ilulissat Deceleration in 2008.
Still, protecting Canadian sovereignty in the north seems a particular foreign policy goal. The results, however, are pending also in this area. Promises of military investments have not been followed through, as exemplified with the Arctic patrol ships. The first ship was initially set to be delivered in 2014, while recent budget leaks now show that construction is set to first begin in 2015 [12]. As a result, the foreign policy rhetoric does not match domestic action. It is consequently not Canadian sovereignty that is under threat in the Arctic, but rather its domestic ability to provide basic public capacities.
Conclusion – Merging Domestic and Foreign Policies
Canada’s Arctic development seems somewhat twofold. On the one hand, Canada actively participates on the international stage in Arctic matters, emphasizing its sovereignty, rights and seabed claims, in addition to its Arctic Council slogan “Development for the people in the North”. On the other hand, domestic development and actual investments are lagging behind its Arctic neighbors, with serious gaps in infrastructure and local/regional capacity. The Canadian Arctic territories are also granted less autonomy and self-governance than the rest of the country’s sub-national units, with a slow process of devolution, in particular with regards to Nunavut.
When Comparing Canada to the other Arctic coastal states, the gap between rhetoric and factual development becomes apparent. Amongst the Nordic countries, the Arctic regions are relatively well enmeshed in nation building at large, while Russia has placed a considerable emphasis on its Arctic region, both rhetorically and in terms of investments. The Greenlandic self-government is in the driving seat of its own development, while Alaska has a particular strong Arctic voice, encouraging Washington to look northwards. Yet, the federal government in Ottawa understands that it needs to engage its Arctic territories, as can be seen by the inclusion of regional representatives in its delegation to the Arctic Council. Inclusion and dialogue, however, is one thing. Actual investments and capacity building is something else, no matter who owns the North Pole.
[1] Under the administrative responsibility of the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
[3] http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130603/alaska-lobbying-group-quietly-plows-ahead-open-anwr
[5] Only the Norwegian population on Svalbard. source: http://www.ssb.no/befsvalbard
The Arctic Institute's reaction to the arrival of the Yong Sheng in Rotterdam
Berlin, September 8, 2013 - In response to the arrival of the Yong Sheng in Rotterdam, the first Chinese cargo vessel traveling along the Northern Sea Route, Malte Humpert, Executive Director of The Arctic Institute, said:
“In contrast to recent reports, Arctic shipping will remain of limited importance to China. The geographic distribution of China’s main trade partners and its substantial and ongoing investments in port infrastructure along existing trade routes speak counter to the idea of large-scale Chinese trans-Arctic shipping.”
With regard to widespread reports of an exponential increase of shipping along the NSR Kathrin Keil, The Arctic Institute’s Europe Director, stated:
“In 2013 the Russian authorities for the first time made available a list of all granted permits for the NSR. The vast majority of permits are not for full transits, but are for regional traffic, primarily in the Kara Sea in the western part of the NSR. The number of Arctic transits—vessels traveling from the Pacific to the Atlantic or vice versa—is expected to be on par or slightly below 2012 figures when 46 ships made the journey.”
On the overall importance of Arctic shipping, Andreas Raspotnik, Analyst at the Institute said:
“With the melting of Arctic sea ice, Arctic shipping has become part of today’s maritime landscape. Large-scale trans-Arctic shipping and a shift in global trade patterns towards the Arctic, however, are far from becoming a reality. Traffic along the NSR will continue to be dominated by regional – primarily Russian – traffic and remain a seasonal and niche trade route.”
For the full analysis please click here.
Contacts:
Dr. Kathrin Keil, Berlin, Germany, kathrin.keil@thearcticinstitute.org, +49 (0) 331 28822 364
Andreas Raspotnik, Cologne, Germany, andreas.raspotnik@thearcticinstitute.org, +49 (0) 221 470 8622
Arctic Geopolitics Revisited: Spatialising Governance in the Circumpolar North
By Kathrin Keil & Sebastian Knecht With the Arctic ice barrier melting away due to anthropogenic global warming, Arctic states’ governmental policies will inevitably determine future governance prospects in high northern latitudes. Whether multilateral cooperation will prevail over or at least complement national economic and security ambitions in the vulnerable Arctic ecosystem, is an often spotlighted but principally hypothetical question that lacks empirical depth. To shed light on this issue, we argue that foreign policy strategies on both sides of the Arctic Ocean are underpinned by a distinct “spatial logic” that drives state behaviour in a fuzzy definition of Arctic territory and accounts for recent region-building dynamics. Assessing geopolitical perceptions of the USA, Canada and the Russian Federation unveils the dichotomous nature of Arctic strategies swaying back and forth between “internal” and “common” waters. From this perspective, it is more Canada’s domestically motivated demand for absolute sovereignty that hampers pan-Arctic collaboration rather than Russia’s hegemon-like status as an Arctic actor.
The full article was published in the June edition of The Polar Journal. The Arctic Institute is excited to be able to provide access to the full article to the first 50 readers. To read the full version click here.
Pragmatic Thinking: How the U.S. Coast Guard Is Making Do with Less in the Arctic
By Mihaela David The Coast Guard came to the rescue just as the Obama Administration faced criticism over the lofty but vague National Strategy for the Arctic Region it revealed last month (for more information, read our recent article discussing the lack of specificity and the absence of an implementation strategy and long-term budgetary plan). The Coast Guard was the first departmental service to release a strategic document that furthers the lines of effort identified in the national strategy and offers the much anticipated specifics for its engagement in the Arctic region. The Coast Guard has also submitted its budget request for 2014 and made plans for its operations in the Arctic this summer, in a pragmatic effort to provide effective governance in a remote and rapidly changing maritime frontier within the limits of financial constraints.
Mission and Objectives
With increased accessibility and human activity in the Arctic region, the Coast Guard has a responsibility to provide effective maritime governance in the Arctic Ocean just as it does in other U.S. waters. According to Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, the service’s mission in the region is to “uphold the rule of law, ensure the safety and security of its people, and ensure environmentally responsible maritime activity.”[1]
The Coast Guard strategy for the next ten years delineates three strategic objectives to guide operations and further the goals of maritime safety, security and stewardship in the Arctic:
· increasing collection and analysis of maritime activity data;
· enhancing coordination and information-sharing of maritime intelligence; and
· sustaining “effective maritime presence.”[2]
2. “Modernizing Governance”
· safeguarding the marine environment and living marine resources;
· protecting “U.S. sovereignty and sovereign rights”; and
· sustaining effective governance domestically and internationally.[3]
3. “Broadening Partnerships”
· building and “leveraging” strategic domestic and international partnerships;
· promoting the Coast Guard as an “expert resource”; and
· supporting national-level Arctic planning.[4]
The document was presented in the introductory statement as a “theater strategy” for its operations in the Arctic, and not an implementation plan.[5] As such, similar to the national strategy, the document offers a strategic vision for U.S. involvement in the Arctic but no insight on budgetary questions or specific plans to develop capabilities and assets. However, the Coast Guard’s 40-page strategic document is notably different from the national one: it is comprehensive in its review of the present physical and geo-strategic Arctic environment in which the service must operate and it provides substantive proposals and details the means through which its stated goals and objectives are to be achieved.
Sharing the Burden of Governance
The Coast Guard demonstrates an astute understanding of the limitations it faces in the Arctic region, from gaps in capabilities and financial resource constraints to transnational challenges and informational shortfalls.
Acknowledging that “no single agency or nation has the sovereignty, capacity, or control over resources necessary to meet all emerging challenges in the Arctic,” the Coast Guard’s strategically emphasizes building “a strong network of partnerships” at multiple levels of government and internationally.[6] Among the domestic partners targeted are other departments and agencies (notably the Department of Defense and its National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Science Foundation, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), interagency entities (such as the Capabilities Assessment Working Group established by the Homeland Security and Defense departments), as well as state and tribal governments, the private sector, advocacy groups, and academia.[7]
To overcome challenges and obstacles of a transnational nature, the Coast Guard also plans to enhance coordination with other Arctic states, especially border partners Canada and the Russian Federation; to leverage existing international arrangements, such as the North American Ice Service; and to advocate for international cooperation within the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization and for the ratification of UNCLOS.[8]
Most notably, the Coast Guard offered several specific governance proposals for a whole-of-government approach to governance of the Arctic region. It proposed the establishment of three Arctic expert bodies to inform decision-making at three levels of governance:
1. An Arctic Center of Expertise at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy
· to promote “safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity” in the Arctic region;[9]
2. An Arctic Policy Board within the Department of Homeland Security
· to bring “external perspectives on Arctic policy” from industry and academia;[10]
3. An Arctic Fusion Center at the federal level
· to promote interagency information-sharing and coordination in the area of “sustainable development and environmental protection.”[11]
The Coast Guard ducked the budgetary question by stating upfront that these proposals will be adopted "pending resources or funding."[12] However, the cost to set up these governance structures pales in comparison to the cost of modernizing infrastructure and assets, including the U.S.’ outdated icebreaker fleet.
Breaking the (Budgetary) Ice
The U.S. is in dire need of more icebreakers for assured access to the ice-covered Arctic waters: it currently relies on only one medium icebreaker, Healy, and one heavy icebreaker, the recently reactivated Polar Star. The strategy document does not discuss at length the Coast Guard’s plans to increase its icebreaking capability. The only mention of icebreakers is buried within a paragraph entitled “Science and Technology” in a final chapter on concepts to ensure long-term success. The document merely states that the U.S. “must have adequate icebreaking capability to support research,” and “must also make a strategic investment in icebreaking capability to enable access to the high latitudes over the long-term.”[13]
However, like all government entities, the Coast Guard is operating within a severely austere fiscal climate, and is forced to make tough decisions regarding the use of its limited financial resources. The U.S. Coast Guard is slated for a 13 percent budgetary cut in FY 2014, which will make its acquisition budget fall far short of what the service needs to modernize and maintain its infrastructure.[14] These fiscal constraints have already impacted the Coast Guard’s plan to upgrade its icebreaker fleet, forcing the service to push back its incremental funding timeline for the construction of a new heavy-duty polar icebreaker, which is projected to cost between $900 million and $1 billion.
In FY 2013, $8 million were allocated to initiate “survey and design activities” for the vessel and the Coast Guard projected that it would allocate $860 million over 5 years for its acquisition.[15] However, under the latest investment plan, only $2 million are allocated to continue design activities in FY 2014 and just $230 million are allocated through FY2018.[16] Table 1 shows the breakdown of the funding request differences: funding for the actual construction of the vessel has been postponed until 2016, and the incremental installments for acquisition are much lower than the previous plan (none exceeds $100 million per year).
Under this funding scheme, it would take over a decade until the vessel would be complete. The Coast Guard is cutting it a little close, since the only other heavy icebreaker, the recently reactivated Polar Star, is only expected to remain in service for another 7 to 10 years (i.e. until 2019-2022).
What is remarkable is that even if this new heavy icebreaker is built in time to replace the Polar Star, U.S. icebreaker fleet will still fall short of operational requirements and pales in comparison to those of other Arctic states. The 2011 Coast Guard High Latitude Study concluded that “The Coast Guard requires three heavy and three medium icebreakers to fulfill its statutory missions;” six heavy and four medium icebreakers if it expects to maintain “continuous presence requirements.”[17] To highlight the gap in icebreaker capability, it is important to note that, as of September 2012, Russia had 36 icebreakers in its inventory, 4 under construction, and 9 planned; Sweden, Finland and Canada had 8, 7, and 6 icebreakers, respectively.[18]
While the Coast Guard is acutely aware of its shortcomings in this respect, Commandant Papp considers the planned acquisition of a new icebreaker a success given the “finite number of resources” and a much better option than the more expensive leasing options.[19]
Mobile Infrastructure and Seasonal Presence
In his remarks at the strategy roll-out event, Commandant Papp argued that the changing Arctic environment requires “persistent, capable U.S. Coast Guard presence” in the region, but acknowledged that achieving sustained presence “is a challenge given the distances involved and the often hostile environment.”[20]
Noting the “lack of shore infrastructure” and “the expense of building permanent infrastructure” in the remote Arctic, Commandant Papp announced that the Coast Guard will continue to “rely on mobile offshore infrastructure to meet demands” for the coming decade.[21]
What this means is that the Coast Guard has no plans at this time to invest in permanent shore infrastructure, such as a forward-operating base closer to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. It also does not expect other government entities to make these investments in the near future: the Alaska Department of Transportation and the Army Corps of Engineers are conducting a feasibility study for a deep-water port in the Nome area, but “no funds have been identified for construction at this time.”[22]
The Coast Guard is thus forced to “react and adapt” by employing “mobile infrastructure and seasonal presence of cutters, boats and aircraft – supplemented by the existing shore-side infrastructure” for its operations in the Arctic.[23]
There are clear advantages and disadvantages to this strategy. On the one hand, Papp argued that this is a “tested and proven” approach that offers the service flexibility, which is particularly necessary given the “uncertainty of dynamic and evolving requirements.”[24] The Coast Guard has hailed as a success the performance of the National Security Cutter Bertholf in the Operation Arctic Shield 2012, and plans to send a similar cutter, the NSC Waesche, to assist with mission in the summer of 2013.[25] This is also a cost-saving option, as the multi-purpose national security cutters can be deployed in other regions of the world during the off-season.
On the other hand, the Coast Guard’s national security cutters were designed for the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean and “are not optimized for the region's extreme climate.”[26] This capability gap means that the Coast Guard is limited to operations in the summer months. While this corresponds to the peak of human activity, the need for off-season operations may also arise. In addition, using the national security cutters in the Arctic, even if only seasonally, means they are diverted from other locations and uses, such as drug interdiction. This will pose a significant challenge in the future if more than one cutter is needed in the Arctic, since the Coast Guard only has three such vessels in active service and four more in construction.
Another dilemma for the Coast Guard has been the lack of an adequate forward-operating base in the Arctic region of Alaska, as proximity to the shore is imperative to perform search-and-rescue and other operations in the region. In the summer of 2012, the Coast Guard leased a hangar in Barrow, AK for its two helicopters; this option was expensive ($60,000 per month) and the building had partially sunk due to permafrost thawing.[27] For the 2013 season, the Coast Guard opted for Kotzebue as its forward-operating location, where it could use an Alaska National Guard hangar.[28]
In the absence of permanent facilities in the remote region, the Coast Guard leadership is improvising and making the most of existing resources. Nonetheless, the flexibility of choosing different locations along the vast northern Alaskan shoreline can be considered a strategic advantage: the Coast Guard can select which location is most suitable depending on the specific mission requirements each season. Last year, a northern location was needed as the Coast Guard had to supervise Shell’s offshore drilling operations, while this year the Coast Guard shifted its priorities to the western shore to observe the increased traffic through the Bering Strait. In the future, the Coast Guard may have to deploy assets to multiple locations if the mission requirements dictate it, so having one permanent operating base in the region may not suffice and such a large investment could divert financial resources from better uses.
When Handed Lemons, Make Lemonade
Coast Guard leadership has demonstrated a strong sense of pragmatism, both in articulating its strategic vision for its engagement in the Arctic region and in its budgetary and operational decisions.
Acknowledging its institutional and resource limitations, the Coast Guard is looking to forge domestic and international partnerships that it can leverage to more effectively fulfill its responsibilities in the Arctic. This is a cooperative and cost-effective approach to governance that, if implemented successfully, can be a blueprint for other departments’ and agencies’ engagement in the region. Burden-sharing within and among multiple levels of government is not just strategically wise, but also necessary given the fiscal austerity climate.
The Coast Guard is also aware of its capabilities gaps and the necessity for both assured access and sustained presence in Arctic waters. The budget requests and operational decisions it has made thus far reflect the difficult choices the Coast Guard leaders had to make under the constraint of finite financial resources. The Coast Guard would ideally want to expand and modernize its icebreaker fleet to multiple heavy and medium vessels, but the costs are much too high and any budget request beyond the current plans for one new icebreaker would be deemed unrealistic and promptly rejected by the Administration and Congress. The pragmatic Coast Guard leadership sees success where others see failure: it has been able, at least, to argue in favor of acquisition instead of leasing of icebreakers and, if budgets are approved, having a new icebreaker a decade from now is better than none at all.
For the time being, the Coast Guard plans to achieve a sustained seasonal presence in Arctic waters using existing shore infrastructure and multi-purpose vessels. The flexibility and adaptability of mobile assets and temporary forward-operating locations seem to be a good fit with current mission requirements.
However, given the projected increase in shipping, offshore drilling, fisheries, and tourism in the Arctic region in the next decade, the Coast Guard will undoubtedly face increasing responsibilities as a law-enforcement agency and first-responder – for search and rescue missions, oil spill response, and border protection. It will most likely need to adapt its operations and possibly need to deploy more mobile assets, sustain presence in multiple locations, or operate for more extended periods of time. This, in turn, will require additional budgetary resources currently unavailable. These challenges will test the Coast Guard’s ability to fulfill its mission and the country’s goals in the Arctic. Only time will tell if this strategy will be successfully implemented and whether the service will be able to address emerging challenges and effectively perform its responsibilities in the region. The good news is that the Coast Guard can rely on a solid strategic vision to guide its efforts and its leadership is not a stranger to finding innovative cost-saving solutions. The bad news is that a reactionary and adaptive approach to governance cannot be sustained indefinitely. It must make way for strong, proactive leadership so that the Coast Guard can keep up with and stay ahead of the challenges posed by the rapidly growing maritime activity in the Arctic.
[1] Papp, Robert. “Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Rollout: Remarks of the Commandant,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 21, 2013, 2, http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/Arctic%20Strategy%20Rollout%20FINAL%20to%20post.pdf.
[2] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” May 2013, 23-26, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736969.
[3] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 27-29.
[4] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 31-32.
[5] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 7.
[6] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 31.
[7] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 22 and 25.
[8] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 23-24 and 31.
[9] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 31.
[10] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 27.
[11] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 23.
[12] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 23, 27 and 31.
[13] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 35.
[14] Perera, David. “2014 Budget Request: Coast Guard faces deep cuts in fiscal 2014,” Fierce Homeland Security, April 11, 2013, http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/2014-budget-request-coast-guard/2013-04-11#ixzz2V5njEUTR.
[15] O'Rourke, Ronald. “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2012, 19, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc94137/m1/1/high_res_d/RL34391_2012Jun14.pdf.
[16] O'Rourke, Ronald. “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, May 24, 2013, 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf.
[17] O'Rourke, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization,” 10.
[18] U.S. Coast Guard, “Major Icebreakers of the World,” September 2012, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg552/images/130220%20Icebreaker%20Chart.pdf.
[19] Marcario, John. “Papp: Growing Risks in Arctic Demand Coast Guard’s Attention,” Seapower Magazine, May 21, 2013, http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20130521-arctic.html.
[20] Papp, “Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Rollout,” 4.
[21] Ibid.
[22] DeMarban, Alex. “Deepwater port in Nome or Port Clarence to support Arctic shipping?,” Alaska Dispatch, February 1, 2013, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/deepwater-port-nome-or-port-clarence-support-arctic-shipping.
[23] Papp, “Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Rollout,” 5.
[24] Papp, “Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Rollout,” 4.
[25] Marcario, “Papp: Growing Risks in Arctic Demand Coast Guard’s Attention.”
[26] Troedsson, Peter “A Coast Guard for the Emerging Arctic,” Council for Foreign Relations, May 31, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/coast-guard-emerging-arctic/p30820.
[27] Johnson, Kirk. “For Coast Guard Patrol North of Alaska, Much to Learn in a Remote New Place,” New York Times, July 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/us/coast-guard-strengthens-presence-north-of-alaska.html?_r=0.
[28] Caldwell, Suzanna. “Coast Guard shifting Arctic operations off Alaska to the west this season,” Alaska Dispatch, May 16, 2013, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130516/coast-guard-shifting-arctic-operations-alaska-west-season.
Table based on:
U.S. Coast Guard, "FY 2014-2018 Five Year Capital Investment Plan (CIP)," 2013, http://www.uscg.mil/posturestatement/docs/USCG_Capital%20Investment%20Plan_FY14-18.pdf
U.S. Coast Guard, "Fiscal Year 2013 Congressional Justification," 2012, p. I-12, http://www.uscg.mil/posturestatement/docs/USCG_FY2013_Congressional_Justification.pdf
Moving Mosaic: The Arctic Governance Debate
If the announcement of a rival club was a means to increase the pressure on the eight Arctic Council member states to admit new observers states, then it seems to have been a successful strategy. At the Council’s Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna on 15 May 2013, six new observer states were admitted, expanding the (so far entirely European) observer list by five key Asian states (China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore), and one European country - Italy. The total number of observer states was thus raised to 12 and the number of observer non-governmental organisations kept at 11.[4]
Despite the extension of the observer list, the Arctic Circle is in the world now, and so the question arises: Will this new forum take clout and political relevance away from the established political forum for the region, the Arctic Council? Unfortunately, the debate about the effect of the new institution on Arctic governance too often takes a zero-sum game approach, taking place within the narrow margins of a rivalry concept, which gives short shrift to the complex issue of Arctic governance.
The Arctic Governance Mosaic
The Arctic governance system is already characterised by a multitude of different governance arrangements. This constellation includes bilateral, regional and multilateral/international institutions and regimes. The Arctic Council is but one piece of this colourful mosaic.[5] While many writings on Arctic governance often mention only the Arctic Council and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as relevant Arctic institutions, there exist a multitude of organisations, conventions, and agreements on various levels. To take Arctic fishing as an example, the table below outlines the numerous institutions with rules and regulations for Arctic fishing activities, ranging from broad, multilateral institutions on the UN (especially on the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)) level to the numerous regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) and bilateral agreements.
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| Overview of Institutions with relevance for Arctic fishing activities © Kathrin Keil |
This is not to say that the Arctic fishing regime is perfect, requiring neither improvement nor reform. Not all relevant fishing actors are party to all relevant institutions; not all species are covered in all maritime areas; and especially the multilateral institutions with relevance for the high seas areas of the Arctic Ocean struggle in several ways with severe implementation and compliance issues. The recent initiative to debate a RFMO for the high Arctic Ocean[6] is indicative of the current shortcomings of the significantly fragmented Arctic fishing regime. Nevertheless, beyond the High Arctic Ocean, a regional approach to fisheries management makes sense. This is so because of the differences in climatic conditions, fisheries environments and species and stock distributions around the Arctic, as well as the varying importance of fishing regions for different fishing actors. The notable number of existing RFMOs mirrors this.
Existing institutions, new arrangements such as the Arctic Circle, and institutional changes such as the acceptance of new observer states to the Arctic Council must all be carefully analysed to assess their actual substantive meaning for policies and their effect on peoples’ livelihoods, the state of the environment, and the state of fish stocks, among others. All other talk, especially about one institution ‘stealing’ clout from another, remains shallow if it fails to address the actual issues at stake.
The Arctic Circle: The New Kid on the Block?
Against this background, what does the creation of the Arctic Circle mean for Arctic governance generally and the Arctic Council specifically? Any talk of competition between the Arctic Circle and the Arctic Council must first of all consider the desired spoils of any such competition. These might include pre-eminence in particular issue areas, funding, or political attention. Such a competition might also inadvertently cause redundant work on the part of the two organizations and, accordingly, a waste of resources which could have been avoided had the institutions joined forces, shared burdens, and exploited their synergies where applicable.
First of all, the Council is meant to be a policy forum predominantly for the eight Arctic states with the consultation of the Permanent Participants and the possible contribution of observer states and organisations to the working groups. Even with the admission of new observers, the Council keeps the principle of exclusiveness when it comes to its membership. Further, the Council is currently developing more and more into an umbrella institution for the eight Arctic countries to negotiate legal arrangements among them.
Second, one has to remember that the main purpose and biggest merit of the Arctic Council is to enhance Arctic research, which it does with tremendously detailed and sophisticated reports. At the recent Ministerial Meeting new extensive research reports were added to the already very impressive list of research reports from the Council, such as the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, “the first Arctic-wide comprehensive assessment of status and emerging trends in Arctic biodiversity”[7], the Arctic Ocean Acidification assessment, the Arctic Ocean Review report, the report on Ecosystem Based Management, and reports from the Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic initiative.
The Arctic Circle, in fact, will work to be and do something different from the Arctic Council, at least as far as one can tell from today’s available information about it five months before its official inauguration.
First, the Arctic Circle is designed as a non-profit organisation and not as a political forum primarily for states. It does not intend to provide a forum for state negotiations to produce legally binding arrangements. On the contrary, it has a very inclusive approach to actor involvement, aiming to be a “forum for discussions” and generally an umbrella organisation for “as many Arctic and international partners as possible,” including “a range of Arctic and global decision-makers from all sectors, including political and business leaders, indigenous representatives, nongovernmental and environmental representatives, policy and thought leaders, scientists, experts, activists, students and media”.[8]
Second, while the forum aims to organize “sessions” on “global research cooperation”, there are no explicit research tasks outlined that the institution would adopt and implement on its own.
These fundamental differences illustrate that it makes little sense to talk of a rivalry between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Circle, at least from today’s knowledge of what the Arctic Circle is intended to be. If the Arctic Council loses clout, it will first and foremost depend on the political attention its members devote to it – in terms of actual usage as a forum, research efforts, national representation on ministerial meetings, funding, administrative endowment –and not on the decision by, for example, China, Iceland, and Google to discuss their involvement in the Arctic in a conference or business-like fashion on a regular basis.
The Arctic Council: Stronger and More Inclusive
At the moment, it looks like the opposite development in fact: the Arctic Council appears to gain in importance and the institution shows more activity than ever before, quite independent of the fuss about the admittance of new observers.
Two binding agreements have been negotiated under the auspices of the Council: the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic and the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. The Kiruna meeting also saw the establishment of a Task Force to develop an Arctic Council action plan or other arrangement on oil pollution prevention, which will report at the next Ministerial Meeting in 2015.[9]
A considerable number of further initiatives have been announced in Kiruna, showing a highly active Arctic Council. Several Task Forces have been created; one to facilitate the creation of a circumpolar business forum; one to develop “arrangements on actions” to reduce black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic; and one to work towards an arrangement on improved scientific research cooperation among the eight Arctic States.
Recommendations are planned to integrate traditional and local knowledge in the work of the Arctic Council. The Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) will work on recommendations to increase awareness regionally and globally on traditional ways of life of the Arctic indigenous peoples and will present a report on this work at the next Ministerial meeting in 2015. The SAOs will further develop a plan to ensure the implementation of the recommendations from the new Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, which was presented in Kiruna, and present a progress report at the next meeting.
The Council has also been strengthened institutionally and politically. At the Ministerial Meeting in Nuuk in 2011, a standing Arctic Council secretariat was established in Tromsø. The Council’s prominence was further raised as Secretary of State John Kerry attended the 2013 Ministerial meeting, marking only the second time that the U.S. administration sent its highest-ranking cabinet member to the biannual meeting.
The member states have also been active in clarifying the different participation categories of the Council. Specifically, the role and admittance of observers has been institutionalised at the 2013 meeting with updated Rules of Procedure and an Observer Manual, which outlined the conditions, rights and duties of prospective and current observers.[10] Crucially, “[t]he primary role of observers is to observe the work of the Arctic Council. Furthermore, observers are encouraged to continue to make relevant contributions through their engagement primarily at the level of working groups”.[11]
For clarification, many commentators speak of the category of ‘permanent observers’, which has just been extended. This term has been used to differentiate from ‘ad hoc’ observer status, which for example China and the EU had in the past. However, one has to clarify that the official Arctic documents nowhere use the term ‘permanent’ and thus this category has no official and legal relevance. The term can also be quite misleading, as current and newly admitted observers can have their status revoked. As the Manual reads:
“Observer status continues for such time as consensus exists among Ministers. Any observer that engages in activities which are at odds with the Ottawa Declaration or with the Rules of Procedure will have its status as an observer suspended”.[12]
Finally, there is no automatic right to attend all Arctic Council meetings or access all related documents once observer status has been granted:
“Observers may attend meetings and other activities of the Arctic Council, unless Senior Arctic Officials have decided otherwise. The Heads of Delegation of the Arctic States may also at any time meet privately at their discretion […] Observers admitted to a meeting will have access to the documents available to Arctic States and Permanent Participant delegations, with the exception of documents designated as ”restricted to Arctic States and Permanent Participants””.[13]
The substantive influence of observers is also limited. They have to propose projects through an Arctic State or a Permanent Participant and “the total financial contributions from all observers to any given project may not exceed the financing from Arctic States, unless otherwise decided by the Senior Arctic Officials”.[14]
Observers also have to continuously prove their ability and willingness to actively and constructively contribute to the work of the Arctic Council; they must be accredited before each Ministerial Meeting:
“Observers are requested to submit to the Chairmanship not later than 120 days before a Ministerial meeting, up to date information about relevant activities and their contributions to the work of the Arctic Council should they wish to continue as an observer to the Council.”[15]
Institutional Rivalry? Think Again
In conclusion, against the background of the strengthening and opening of the Arctic Council to new observers and the different portfolios of the Arctic Council and Arctic Circle, it makes more sense to understand the Arctic Circle as an addition of another piece to the Arctic governance mosaic instead of a rival to the Arctic Council. This new piece will have to find its place and purpose among the many different institutions that already exist with relevance for the Arctic, and it should be evaluated according to the merit and added value it brings, especially for the people living in the region. This will, not least, also depend on how the new forum will be perceived by the eight Arctic states. As the above analysis outlines, there is little reason to expect rivalry with the Arctic Council given the substantial differences between the two institutions in terms of scope, membership outreach, and legal outcomes. Espen Barth Eide can thus put his mind at ease.
[1] Kim Ghattas, “Arctic Council: John Kerry Steps into Arctic Diplomacy,” BBC News (London, May 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22528594.
[2] The new ‘Arctic Circle’ (homepage www.arcticcircle.org) is not to be confused with an existing New York artist and exhibition group called ‘The Arctic Circle’ (homepage www.thearcticcircle.org).
[3] Deborah Zabarenko, “China, India, Singapore Could Join New Arctic Circle Forum,” Reuters, April 16, 2013, http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/arctic-circle-idINDEE93E0I420130415.china
[4] See homepage of the Arctic Council, “Observers”, accessible at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers.
[5] The mosaic metaphor for Arctic governance was first introduced by Oran R. Young, “Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Cooperation,” Global Governance 11, no. 1 (2005): 9–15.
[6] Andrew E. Kramer, “Accord Would Regulate Fishing in Arctic Waters,” The New York Times (New York, April 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/world/agreement-would-regulate-fishing-in-arctic-waters.html?_r=0.
[7] Arctic Council, “Kiruna Declaration On the Occasion of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, 15 May 2013” (Kiruna: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2013), 4, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting?download=1757:kiruna-declaration-final-signed-version.
[8] For all quotes see the homepage of the Arctic Circle at www.thearcticcircle.org.
[9] Ibid, 2, 4.
[10] SAO, “Senior Arctic Officials Report to Ministers” (Kiruna: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2013), 78–96, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting?download=1758:kiruna-senior-arctic-officials-report-to-ministers.
[11] Ibid, 93, own emphasis.
[12] Ibid, 92.
[13] Ibid, 94, own emphasis.
[14] Ibid, 95.
[15] Ibid, 88.
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