Evaluation of the Arctic Shipping Season 2013

MV Yong Sheng
Courtesy of Oyoyoy on Wikipedia

By Kathrin Keil The 2013 shipping season along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) concluded in late November when the Russian-flagged „Indiga“ reached its port of destination on 27 November 2013. The expectations as to the increases in Arctic transit shipping along the NSR are indeed huge – volumes shipped along the NSR are predicted to grow to 4 million per year in 2015, 65 million tons in 2020 and even 120 million tons in 2030, predominantly due to the rapid growth of oil and gas development in Russia [1]. Against this background it is necessary to give a thorough analysis of this year’s shipping season in order to get an idea about the accurateness of such predictions.[2]

This year’s shipping season indeed started five days later than the 2012 season. The first ship to use the NSR set sail on 25 June 2013 in comparison to 20 June in 2012. In contrast, the season in 2013 lasted a few days longer – the last ship to take the NSR in 2013 departed from its homeport on 17 November 2013, while the last ship in 2012 departed five days earlier on 12 November 2012. So in total, both shipping seasons were of exactly the same length with 146 days.

In terms of actual transits, 2012 saw 46 vessels using the route while in 2013 71 ships took the NSR, an increase of 54%. While this percentage looks impressive, we have to keep in mind that we still deal with quite small absolute numbers. In contrast, the Suez Canal has around 18,000 transits per year and the Panama Canal about 13,000.

Furthermore, it is enlightening to take a closer look at some of the routes that the vessels took. In fact, 17 “transits” only started or ended in Pevek in Chukotka, and did not come from or go down to the Bering Strait. This is remarkable given that the NSR is defined in Russian law as a set of marine routes from Kara Gate, south of Novaya Zemlaya, in the west to the Bering Strait in the east.[3] Also Khatanga Bay and Anabar Bay in the Laptev Sea are mentioned once and twice, respectively as a port of destination, which is not anywhere close to the end points of the NSR definition.

The volume of cargo has hardly increased between 2012 and 2013, from 1.26 million tons of cargo to 1.36 million tons, i.e. only an increase of 7.5%. Given the expected volume increases as stated above, this is a rather surprising result.

Concerning the type of cargo, 2013 saw an increase in liquid cargo (in both years the predominant cargo - 57% in 2012 and 44% in 2013 of all cargo type vessels) and ballasting. Also general cargo has become stronger in 2013 and one LNG tanker used the route. Repositioning remained the same as well as fishing vessel usage (only 1 in both years).

While more foreign countries used the route as flag states – 7 states in 2012 and 11 in 2013 – the number of foreign flagged vessels actually decreased from 2012 to 2013 (28 in 2012 and 25 in 2013). In other words, the increase in vessel number is completely due to increased Russian usage of the route. So there is currently an increasing Russian usage of the route, while international interest in using the NSR is rather humble (in 2012 39% of the vessels using the route were under a Russian flag, increasing to 65% in 2013).

[1] For example, Nadia Rodova, “Cargo Turnover via Russian Northern Sea Route Climbs 19% Past 2012 Levels,” Platts, September 26, 2013, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/shipping/moscow/cargo-turnover-via-russian-northern-sea-route-26311774; Anton Vasiliev, “Russia’s Approaches to International Cooperation in the Arctic,” The Arctic Herald 1 (2012): 12–23, http://issuu.com/arctic-herald/docs/arctic-herald-1-full; Arctic info, “Cargo Turnover at Arctic Ports to Increase 2.8-Fold by 2030,” August 29, 2012, http://www.arctic-info.com/News/Page/cargo-turnover-at-arctic-ports-to-increase-2-8-fold-by-2030; Alexei Bambulyak and Bjørn Frantzen, Oil Transport from the Russian Part of the Barents Region - Status Per January 2011 (Tromsø: Akvaplan-niva, The Norwegian Barents Secretariat, Bioforsk, 2011), http://www.barentswatch.com/innhold/oil_gas/repport_oiltransp/OilTransport2011eng_Internet.pdf; Jonas Karlsbakk, “Oil Traffic Capacity of 100 Million Tons,” BarentsObserver, April 07, 2011, http://www.barentsobserver.com/oil-traffic-capacity-of-100-million-tons.html.

[2] Due to data availability, the current year 2013 is compared with the 2012 shipping season. All numbers are drawn from Northern Sea Route Information Office documents “Transists in 2012” and “Transists in 2013”. This analysis only looks at transit shipping along the NSR, and not at destinational or inner-Arctic shipping.

[3] Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (Tromsø, 2009), 20, 23, 34, http://arcticportal.org/uploads/4v/cb/4vcbFSnnKFT8AB5lXZ9_TQ/AMSA2009Report.pdf; Leonid Tymchenko, “The Northern Sea Route: Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Sea,” in The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, ed. Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), 269–71).

Canada in the Arctic - Arctic Shipping: Routes, Forecasts, and Politics

This article is part 2 of a background piece about "Canada in the Arctic."

By Kathrin Keil A Canadian government report describes Canada’s northern marine environment as consisting of the Arctic Ocean, the Beaufort Sea, Hudson Bay, Foxe Basin, Baffin Bay and various channels and straits between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago. The Arctic Ocean is connected to the Atlantic Ocean via the Greenland and Norwegian Seas and by numerous channels through the Arctic Archipelago to Baffin Bay and the Labrador Sea. These waters are covered with sea ice, either seasonal or multi-year ice, which can be several metres thick. In general, the distribution and thickness of sea ice are extremely variable. Permanent pack ice occurs in the central Arctic Ocean, while open waters develop in the late summer off the west coast of Banks Island and in the Beaufort Sea. Hudson Bay freezes by the end of December and begins to clear in July. With the exception of landfast ice within the Archipelago and along coastlines, the sea ice is in constant movement.

The Canadian Arctic provides three main routes for marine shipping: one to the port of Churchill and other communities in Hudson Bay via Hudson Strait; a second to the Beaufort Sea via Bering Strait or the Mackenzie River; and a third through the Arctic Archipelago via the Northwest Passage. The Northwest Passage extends from Baffin Bay through Lancaster Sound to the Beaufort Sea via a number of alternative routes.

Winter shipping is tremendously more difficult than summer shipping. The ice is stronger and consolidated from shore to shore without the cracks that make it easier for a ship to pass through. Near-total darkness and very low temperatures make winter navigation exceedingly hazardous. Finally, multi-year ice, although receding, is still present all year around, and because it hardly softens in summer it poses a serious hazard to shipping in winter and in summer.

Despite the challenges remaining and no expectation for an ice-free Arctic in winter, the summer shipping season in Arctic Canada could be extended due to the processes of climate change. For example, shipping of raw material exports on northern routes is expected to increase. Scientific voyages to the Arctic region have increased significantly since 1990, and are frequently carried out on Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) icebreakers that also serve other roles such as navigational support and maintenance of a Canadian government presence. For example, in 2004, the CCGS Amundsen was equipped specifically to support research on the impacts of climate change in the coastal Canadian Arctic as part of the ArcticNet Network Centre of Excellence. Also tourist cruises through the Northwest Passage are becoming increasingly common.

Table 1 indicates that sea-ice duration during summer is expected to be 10 days shorter by 2020, 15-20 days by 2050 and even 20-30 days shorter by 2080. This will be possible through expected ice-free shelves by 2020, a 30-50% reduction in sea ice by 2050 from present and a 50-100% reduction by 2080. The extent of multi-year ice is expected to decrease constantly, from some reduction especially on shelves by 2020, significant loss with no multi-year ice on shelves by 2050 to little or no multi-year ice by 2080.

Table 1: Future Changes in Sea Ice Duration, Summer Sea Ice Extent and Multi-Year Sea Ice in the North American Arctic. [2]

	2020	2050	2080
Sea ice duration	Shorter by 10 days	Shorter by 15-20 days	Shorter by 20-30 days
Summer sea ice extent	Shelves likely to be ice free	30-50% reduction from present	50-100% reduction from present
Multi-year sea ice	Some reduction especially on shelves	Significant loss with no multi-year ice on shelves	Little or no multi-year ice

Source: From Impacts to Adaptation:Canada in a Changing Climate 2007, referring to Arctic Climate ImpactAssessment Chapter 9. 

According to the above-mentioned report, the routes that will benefit the most from these changes are Hudson Bay and the Beaufort Sea because they show a very different ice regime in comparison to the rest of the Canadian Arctic, and are thus likely to see an increasing number of transits by large ships. A longer summer shipping season is expected to encourage shipping through the port of Churchill in Hudson Bay, and in the Beaufort Sea longer summer shipping seasons will increase the appeal of offshore hydrocarbon development as well as transport of oil and gas through the Bering Strait.

Although ships on these routes will see generally easier navigating conditions, processes of climate change also change the nature and severity of many risks to marine traffic. For example, rather than being confronted with an extensive ice pack that necessitates icebreaker escort, ships will be confronted will multi-year ice in low concentration that is difficult to detect, and extreme variability of conditions from one year to the next. The paradoxical situation may arise that despite decreased ice extent and ice thickness there will be a continued if not even an increasing demand for icebreaking and other navigational support for shipping activities in the north, also because of the increased traffic on some routes. 

In general, the increase in marine traffic on some Arctic routes together with more frequent and more intense hazards like more mobile ice and increased winds, waves and surges will increase the demand for marine services in the north. This includes for example updated navigational charts, up to date weather forecasts, ice reconnaissance and forecasting, icebreaking support, search-and-rescue capabilities, marine traffic surveillance, control and enforcement, ports for fuelling and cargo loading, ice-class vessels and specialised crews.

Canadian Shipping Policy

The Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy  says that “Arctic shipping is another key area of focus” in order to achieve the second aim of the Northern Strategy, which is promoting social and economic development in the North. The 2009 Strategy  reads that “[i]n 2007, satellite imaging verified that the Northwest Passage had less than 10 percent ice coverage, making it, by definition, “fully navigable” for several weeks. This was well ahead of most recent forecasts [and] in the near future, reduced ice coverage and longer periods of navigability may result in an increased number of ships undertaking destination travel for tourism, natural resource exploration or development”.

The government builds upon an extensive report on the effects of climate change on Canada from 2007, which forecasts that increased navigability of Arctic marine waters will lead to a “less ‘remote’ northern Canada” as diminishing sea ice will increase opportunities for shipping and passage within Canadian Arctic waters. This is expected to lead to the development of new infrastructure, particularly to access natural resources, which would also have far reaching socioeconomic and cultural impacts on Arctic communities from increased economic activity.

But despite the often very enthusiastic voices about the prosperous future of Arctic shipping along the Arctic routes, the Canadian government takes a rather cautious standpoint on the prospect of a thriving shipping route along the Northwest Passage in the near future. As the 2010 Statement reads: “[T]he various Canadian internal waterways known as Canada’s “Northwest Passage” are not predicted to become a viable, large-scale transit route in the near term, in part because mobile and unpredictable ice in the Passage poses significant navigational challenges and other routes are likely to be more commercially viable”. This is in line with the scientific research on the prospects of Arctic marine shipping, which indicates that the Northern Sea Route will sooner than the Northwest Passage become a viable route through northern waters.

Role of Sovereignty for Shipping

The dispute about the status of the Northwest Passage plays a prominent role in Canadian Arctic policies and is closely linked to Arctic shipping issues. Canada has in various ways in the past tried to strengthen its position in this dispute, mainly through referring to concerns about Arctic ecology and indigenous populations and concretely through the establishment of a shipping regime for the Canadian Arctic. Most prominently is the adoption of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1970 in response to increasing news about oil and gas discoveries in the Canadian Arctic, which imposed strict safety and environmental requirements on all ships within 100 nautical miles (nm) of Canada’s Arctic Coast. As Shelagh Grant writes: “Canada’s argument for anti-pollution measures rested on the moral obligation of a country with potentially vast oil and gas reserves to protect the vulnerable Arctic environment on behalf of the world community.”

The boldness of the Canadian move becomes apparent when one considers that the Act was, at that time, contrary to international law, which did not recognise coastal state rights in the waters beyond 12 nautical miles (nm). Even more, the Canadian government openly admitted that the Act was inconsistent with international law, as shortly before the adoption of the statute the government modified its general acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in order to prevent the issue from being litigated there. Many other states, most strongly the US, protested against the Canadian move but Ottawa refused to take the Act back or submit the issue to the ICJ. The dispute only receded after the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982 when Canadian diplomats succeeded in legalising the 1970 Act in Art. 234, which allows coastal states to enact “laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone”, which is 200 nm. This article has since then been called the “Arctic exception”.

Canada has then also amended the ‘Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act’ to extend the application of the Act to comprise the whole Canadian exclusive economic zone (EEZ), i.e. up to 200 nm from the Canadian coastline. The Bill C-3 – an ‘Act to amend the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act’ – came into force on 1 August 2009. As one means to strengthen the implementation of the Prevention Act in times of increasing Arctic traffic, the government amended the Canada Shipping Act turning the originally voluntary Coast Guard’s NORDREG [3] reporting system from 1977 into a mandatory reporting requirement for vessels when entering and operating within Canadian Arctic waters.

These regulations have been in force since July 2010 and they apply to all Canadian waters north of 60°. Vessels have to report information to the Canadian Coast Guard prior to entering, while operating within and upon exiting Canada’s northern waters. The Coast Guard can then provide the vessels with meteorological and navigational information, such as weather warnings and ice movement information. The aim of the mandatory NORDREG system is to ensure safe and efficient movement of marine traffic, to enhance the safety of vessels, crew and passengers and to safeguard the fragile Arctic marine environment.

The Canadian government favours a wide interpretation of Art. 234 UNCLOS, i.e. a wide discretion for coastal states to set rules unilaterally to protect the human and natural environment. As Molenaar and Corell righty point out, the broad prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction that Art. 234 UNCLOS confers upon coastal states is, however, only possible for a limited purpose and subject to several restrictions. One of these restrictions is of geographical character as Art. 234 UNCLOS only refers to “ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation” (own emphasis). Decreasing sea-ice through climate change means that fewer states will be able to rely on Art. 234 UNCLOS in fewer and fewer areas.

Canada usually refers to historical arguments to bolster its sovereignty claims in the North and thus to justify moves like the Prevention Act, mainly in form of inhabitation of the High North by Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples, Canadians that moved to the North and became ‘Northerners’ as well as explorers and researchers. As the government’s Northern Strategy reads, “Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is longstanding, well-established and based on historic title, founded in part on the presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples since time immemorial”.

A further argument is the necessity for strong national environmental protection of the Arctic region, which would become an increasingly important task given the dangers and risks connected to a proliferation of international shipping in the North. Such risks are, for example, the higher likelihood of environmentally harmful events such as oil spills, poaching and contamination, spread of new species and diseases, the rising possibility of shipwrecks, smuggling, illegal immigration and even threats to national security. Given the transboundary effects of environmental hazards, a strong environmental protection of the Canadian North would hereby not only be in the Canadian interest but also in the interest of all humankind. As Harper stated in 2008, “Canada takes responsibility for environmental protection and enforcement in our Arctic waters. This magnificent and unspoiled ecological region is one for which we will demonstrate stewardship on behalf of our country, and indeed, all of humanity”.

As another means to ensure, maintain and exercise its sovereignty in the North Canada believes that is has to maintain a strong presence in the region in order to have “the capability and capacity to protect and patrol the land, sea and sky in our sovereign Arctic territory” and in order to achieve this “[w]e are putting more boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-in-the-sky”. In this connection the plans to foster Canada’s military activities in the High North fit in. It is against this background that the Northwest Passage issue also becomes prevalent. Although the Northwest Passage route is not expected to become a viable shipping route in the short- to mid-term future, it appears substantial for Canada’s sovereignty ambitions in the north to ensure the Arctic Archipelago as Canadian internal waters. The Canadian government should thus not have an interest in resolving the Northwest Passage dispute for reasons of increased shipping opportunities on the route – as this is rather unlikely in the foreseeable future – but surely because of the strong meaning of the status of the passage for Canada’s Arctic sovereignty policy.

References:

[1] Canadian Geographic, retrieved April 27, 2012 from http://northwestpassage2011.blogspot.com/2010/11/northwest-passage-ice-treachery.html

[2] This includes the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas, the Canadian Archipelago, Baffin and Hudson Bays, and the Labrador Sea (Loeng, 2004: 476).

[3] NORDREG stands for ‘Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone’. Cf. http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/MCTS/Vtr_Arctic_Canada. 

A Bering Strait Vessel Traffic Service: Critical Infrastructure for an Opening Arctic (Part I)

by Olin Strader Nations and multi-national corporations are positioning themselves to take full advantage of the Arctic’s Northwest Passage (NWP) and Northern Sea Route (NSR). However, there is every little safety infrastructure in place to ensure incident-free transit. Both of these Sea Lines of Communication terminate in the Bering Strait, the gateway to the Arctic. In this critical water space it is essential the United States and Russia begin considering how to manage traffic through this strategic choke point. 

In September 2011 Prime Minister Putin announced at the second International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk, Russia’s “intention to turn the NSR into a key transport route of global importance”. PM Putin further said, “We believe that NSR has a bright future as an international transport artery capable of being a competitor to more traditional routes, both when it comes to price, safety and quality”.[1] Subsequently, Russia has announced it intends to build ten Arctic rescue centers, develop a new Arctic rescue ship, develop military ice-capable transports and construct new icebreakers to replace its aging fleet.

The Arctic, as observers know, is on the verge of historic change and with it mustcome the aids to navigation and safety infrastructure to ensure shipping can be conducted safely and with the reasonable prospect of rescue in the event of a major disaster. No place is more critical to safety in the Arctic than the confined waters of the Bering Strait. Therefore, what is needed is a Bering Strait Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) to mitigate risk associated with increased shipping. The Norwegians have a VTS at Vardø on the northern tip of Norway that could serve as a model for the Bering.[2]

According to the Norwegian Oceanic Vessel Traffic Management Services handbook, the Norwegian Coastal Administration’s missions are fourfold: Coastal Management, Maritime Safety, Maritime Transport and Emergency preparedness in case of acute pollution. Recognizing the Barents Sea is a financially productive water space representing three of Norway’s largest industries: oil, gas and fisheries, it is incumbent on Norway to manage maritime traffic to prevent accidents that could threaten their livelihood.[3] The US and Russian Federation economic zones in the Bering Strait are just as vulnerable as Norway’s.

The Bering Sea is an economic boon for Alaska. According to the State of Alaska’s 2010 State Economic Trends “more than 50 percent of all fish harvested in the U.S. comes from Alaska and accounts for more than 50 percent of basic private-sector employment in many of [Alaska’s] coastal communities”.[4] The Bering Sea is a significant contributor to Alaska’s fishing industry. Meanwhile, shipping and the risk of a maritime disaster is increasing in the Bering Strait with each passing year a VTS is not established.

Reasonable observers would conclude it is high time the United States and the Russian Federation initiate a dialogue on the need for a Bering Strait VTS due to increases in vessel traffic through the Strait during the lengthening summer months and the need to prevent a major shipping disaster. United States Coast Guard figures from 2008 to 2010 show an increase in Bering Strait transits from 245 to 325.[5] However, as the recent Nome gas resupply effort has demonstrated, winter months may no longer preclude Arctic shipping.

Meanwhile, the Russian Federation continues to increase throughput along the NSR.As the Barents Observer reported in late January 2012, “This year’s season on the NSR was special in many ways. Not only was the route accessible about one month longer than usual, but it also had the highest number ever of vessels in transit from Murmansk to another country”.[6] In a more recent Barents Observer article, Gazprom and Sovcomflot´s executives suggested “the relevance of LNG shipping along the NSRto the Asian-Pacific region [is] growing quickly”.[7] Clearly then, the Russian Federation expects to make the NSR a viable option between northern Pacific ports and northern Atlantic ports. There are dissenters who would suggest Arctic shipping will not be as safe and profitable as Russian Federation leaders would suggest. In a recent Insurance Journal article entitled, “Arctic Ice Melt Lifts Hopes for Russian Maritime Trade”, authors Albina Kovalyova & Alissa de Carbonnel opined, “industry analysts and mariners say ice floes, narrow straits, shallow waters, poor infrastructure and stormy winters continue to loom as obstacles to safe and profitable shipping through the polar shortcut”.[8]

Notwithstanding, Russia continues to demonstrate that the NSR is a viable shipping route. Two years ago the Russian Federation announced it would send five vessels of different classes through the NSR as a proof of principle, meeting the mark. They then publicly stated they would increase that number fivefold. This year reportedly 34 vessels transited the NSR. If increases were to continue at current calculations, within five years, however unlikely, transits would exceed over one hundred thousand.

Regardless of how many vessels actually transit the route in coming years, the Russian Federation’s fulfillment of their stated goals should lead observers, and especially policy makers, to believe the NSR will become a major Sea Line of Communication in the not too distant future.

Returning to the topic at hand, there are essentially two types of VTSs, manned and unmanned. The Vardø VTS is manned due to the heavy traffic that transits along Norway’s West coast and the need to safeguard critical state enterprises. Whereas, the few number of ships currently transiting the Bering Strait today may make it feasible to have an unmanned VTS until vessel traffic warrants an upgrade. An unmanned system would likely be monitored remotely both from Russia and the United States, using sensors to track and control Bering Strait traffic. Additionally, a traffic separation plan must be submitted and approved by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). For example, should north bound traffic transit east of Little Diomede Island and southbound traffic transit west of Big Diomede? These are details that must be negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation.

Clearly gas and oil traffic are expected to increase in the near-term, evidenced by Shell’s CEO Peter Voser’s 31 January Fox Business interview. "For us the focus is in Alaska and to some extent in Greenland, although in the coming years there may also be opportunities in Russia," stated Voser.[9]  Shell is not the only company expecting to profit from Arctic oil and gas.  Norway’s Statoil, Total, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips are all set to exploit the reported 90 billion barrels of oil, up to 50 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids that the 2008 US Geological Survey suggests are in the Arctic.  Therefore, it is essential to mitigate the accompanying risk of increased Bering Strait vessel traffic by resourcing a VTS. 

Part II can be found here.

Sources:

[1] Barents Observer, “Putin sees bright future for Arctic transport”, accessed at: http://www.barentsobserver.com/putin-sees-bright-future-for-arctic-transport.4963803-16149.html

[2] Norwegian Coastal Administration, The Vardø Vessel Traffic Service, accessed at: http://www.kystverket.no/Documents/Om%20Kystverket/Brosjyrer/Vard%C3%B8VTSbrosjyre_EN_HR.pdf

[3] The FishSite.com, “Norway Fishery Products Annual Report 2007” accessed at: http://www.thefishsite.com/articles/344/norway-fishery-products-annual-report-2007

[4] Brynn Keith, State Economic Trends: November 2010 (Juneau: Alaska Department of Labor andWorkforce Development, 2010), 3. accessed at: http://labor.alaska.gov/trends/nov10.pdf

[5] Rear Admiral Chris C. Colvin, “USCG District-17 Arctic Brief” (Slide 5), accessed at: http://www.uscg.mil/d17/Arctic%20Overview%20Feb2011.pdf

[6] Barents Observer, “34 vessels in transit on NSR”, accessed at: http://www.barentsobserver.com/34-vessels-in-transit-on-northern-sea-route.4991248.html

[7] Barents Observer, “Testing out LNG on NSR”, accessed at: http://www.barentsobserver.com/testing-out-lng-on-northern-sea-route.5013956-117495.html

[8] Albina Kovalyova and Alissa de Carbonnel, Insurance Journal, “Arctic Ice Melt Lifts Hopes for Russian Maritime Trade”, accessed at: http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2012/01/27/233056.htm

[9] Fox Business, “Shell CEO Says Arctic Focus on Alaska, Greenland”, accessed at: http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2012/01/31/shell-ceo-says-arctic-focus-on-alaska-greenland/#ixzz1l6aFgR8n

[10] Norwegian Coastal Administration, The Vardø Vessel Traffic Service, accessed at: http://www.kystverket.no/Documents/Om%20Kystverket/Brosjyrer/Vard%C3%B8VTSbrosjyre_EN_HR.pdf

Arctic 2012 Expedition - Request for Crew

by Malte Humpert The M/V GREY GOOSE is outfitting for a 10,000 nautical mile voyage in 2012 from Mobile Alabama 'over-the-top' through the Arctic Northwest Passage to Astoria Oregon. The 55 foot steel Motor Vessel GREY GOOSE ('GG') is planning to depart Mobile Alabama on a 10,000 nautical-mile voyage of discovery up the USA eastern seaboard, Canada and Greenland before staging at Pond Inlet Nunavut Canada to challenge the fabled Arctic Northwest Passage 'over-the-top' during the minimum ice season to Alaska then down through British Columbia's breathtaking 'Inside Passage' on the way to our homeport in Astoria Oregon. Departure is scheduled for May 14, 2012. 

Everett-based sea captain Douglas Pohl has announced his intention to sail his 55-foot expedition motor vessel, the Grey Goose, through the fabled – and dangerous – arctic waterway known as the Northwest Passage in the summer of 2012, and is offering six fellow boating adventurers “share-the-ride” berths for contributing to the expenses of the voyage. Captain Pohl plans to leave from his outfitting port of Mobile, Alabama in May 2012, and then sail northwards along the Atlantic coastline of the United States and Canada before crossing over to Greenland. By late summer he expects to complete an east-to-west traverse of the Northwest Passage, and by the fall reach his new home port in Astoria, Oregon.

Potential crew mates may join Captain Pohl for the entire voyage, or board the Grey Goose for just a leg of the voyage. The Northwest Passage along the northern coastline of Canada and Alaska, is widely considered by mariners to be one of the most difficult sea passages in the world. It has been ice-blocked throughout history, and only with the recent impact of global climate change has the waterway been free of ice long enough in the summer for a successful crossing. In August 2011, twelve small vessels are reportedly traversing the Northwest Passage, and the waterway is expected to again be ice-free next year in 2012. Captain Pohl estimates that the Grey Goose will be one of the first hundred vessels in history to complete a single season passage of the fabled Northwest Passage. “It’s a chance to do something that very few people have ever done,” said Pohl, adding that those who partake of the adventure will stand in an exclusive circle among nautical enthusiasts. (The above text was adopted from a Press Release from November 1, 2011).

For more information, please refer to www.northwestpassage2012.com, contact the Captain at (425) 971-5765, or email him at info@northwestpassage2012.com.

Canada's National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: New Capabilities for Arctic

by Malte Humpert The Canadian government recently announced the results of the bidding process to construct vessels for the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy. Canada plans to spend $33 billion on 28 large combat and non-combat vessels over the next 30 years. As part of that procurement the Royal Canadian Navy is slated to receive six to eight Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPS). The Canadian Coastguard meanwhile will see the addition of a new Polar-class icebreaker in 2017. 

The A/OPS are one of the centerpieces of Canada's Northern Strategy and will conduct armed sea-borne surveillance in Canada's waters. Currently, the Canadian Navy can patrol the coastal waters of Atlantic and the Pacific, but does not have the capability to effectively patrol the Arctic Ocean. The Navy can only operate in northern waters for a short period of time, and only when there is no ice. The Northern strategy aims to strengthen Arctic sovereignty and protect the region's environmental heritage.

Canada lays claim to parts of the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, which could become an important shipping route as sea ice continues to recede. The United States and the EU, among others, contend that the passage is an international strait and should be considered international waters. 

The new ships will be based in Halifax, Nova Scotia as well as Esquimalt, British Columbia. In order to accommodate the vessels and their operation the existing infrastructure will be expanded and upgraded. In addition a refueling and docking facility will be constructed in Nanisivik, Nunavut.

According to the Canadian government the "ships will have sufficient flexibility to operate independently and effectively in Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), including such diverse environments as the Canadian Arctic, the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and off the Northwest coast of the Queen Charlotte Islands. The ships would also be capable of navigating the St-Lawrence River on a year-round basis and berthing in Quebec City."

Over the course of their 25-year lifespan the A/OPS will cost $7.4 billion - $3.1 billion for construction and $4.3 billion for operation and maintenance. The Canadian government's plan to obtain A/OPS follows on the heels of similar vessels launched in Norway and Denmark. The Norwegian Coast Guard icebreaker and offshore patrol vessel KV Svalbard entered into service in 2001. The Royal Danish Navy has operated a smaller version of A/OPS, the Knud Rasmussen, since 2008. The Canadian vessels' area of operation will be at great distances from their homeports, requiring the ships to be able to sustain operations for up to four months and at least 6800 nautical miles. From Halifax to the refueling station in Nanisivik the vessels will have to travel nearly 3,000 nm, the same distance as crossing the Atlantic Ocean.

The vessels' thick ice-strengthened hull will allow them to operate year-round in medium first-year ice and ensure their own mobility without the need for icebreaker assistance. The vessels will, however, not provide icebreaking services to other ships. Critics point out that A/OPS are significantly heavier than non-Arctic vessels of similar size. While the ice-strengthened hull design is required for operation in the Arctic during the summer months, the added weight makes them less efficient and more expensive to operate during the rest of the year.

The Canadian Coast Guard is to receive a new Polar-class icebreaker, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker, in 2017 giving the agency increased coverage in the Canadian Arctic and allowing it "to operate during three seasons in the Arctic, over a larger area and in more difficult ice conditions than is currently possible." The vessel will be 120-140 meters in length, carry 100 personnel, and provide accommodation for 25 additional people, e.g. scientists and researchers. Construction on the vessel is scheduled to begin in 2013 and the Coast Guard anticipates final acceptance for late 2017. It will be the largest and most powerful vessel ever owned by the Canadian government.

The investments into Arctic infrastructure and vessels come in the light of a recent public opinion poll which concluded that "many Canadians felt that Arctic sovereignty [isn’t] as great of a priority as the government says it is." The majority of respondents agreed Arctic sovereignty was important, but stated that it should not trump other issues such as health care.

Search For Sovereignty: Historic Shipwrecks in the Canadian Arctic

by Anneliese Guess Parks Canada, the country's national park agency, recently concluded its latest search for the shipwrecks of the HMS Erebus and HMS Terror, which were lost in what has been called the "worst tragedy in the history of Arctic exploration."

Arctic explorer Sir John Franklin set off on May 19th, 1845, intending to map the middle section of the Northwest Passage. Now Canadian officials are using this historic expedition to boost Canada's claims to Arctic sovereignty, hoping that discovering the wrecks will bring international attention to Canada’s Arctic history. Additionally, both historical and contemporary searches for these famous ships have led to increased charting of the Canadian Arctic territory.

Although interest in recovering the Erebus and the Terror has existed since the ships went missing, the Canadian government has renewed its efforts since 2008, when the recent series of explorations was launched as a collaborative effort between Parks Canada, the Canadian Hydrographic Service, the Canadian Coast Guard, and the Government of Nunavut. [1]

At the launch of the expedition, the Minister of the Environment (in 2008—now serving as Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs) John Baird stated: "We certainly think by establishing a long-standing presence in the Arctic that can enhance issues of sovereignty ... Look at the strait (the Northwest Passage) not far from where this ship is….We think every bit of weight we can put behind our case for sovereignty is important. Adding history to that equation can only enhance that case." [2]

The 2008, 2010, and 2011 missions have all failed to locate the Erebus and the Terror. [3] Although the discovery of the ships has been the most pronounced goal, Parks Canada has announced that the expeditions continue to map uncharted waters and "contribute to improving charts of the Canadian Arctic." In addition, the 2010 search yielded the discovery of the HMS Investigator, a British expedition ship abandoned in the Canadian Arctic in 1853.

Coincidentally, mapping uncharted Arctic territory was also a goal of the Franklin Expedition. Franklin, a veteran of Arctic mapping expeditions, set sail on May 19th,1845 with 129 crew members. [4] The two ships became immobilized in ice floes in 1846 in the Victoria Strait near King William Island. About a year after Franklin’s death in 1847, the crew members, suffering from health problems like tuberculosis, scurvy, and lead poisoning, decided to abandon the ships and seek help on foot.

Between 1847-1887 more than 26 searches for the ships were conducted, but none of the crew members was found alive. Although unsuccessful in finding survivors and shipwrecks, these expeditions produced more detailed maps of the Canadian Arctic. [5] Search missions continued through the twentieth century, leading to the remarkable discoveries of three frozen, mummified bodies, an expedition note, and bone fragments.

In 1992, the yet-undiscovered wreck sites were declared National Historic Sites of Canada, and in 1997 the UK and Canada signed a Memorandum of Understanding that the ships belong to Canada.

According to Baird, the Canadian Arctic lacks some international legitimacy: “it’s certainly part of what we call Canada; others don’t necessarily recognize that claim. So we’re committed to doing everything we can to have a presence in the north - environmentally, whether it’s establishing a long-standing presence and history, whether it’s resource-based, whether it’s militarily...” [6]

By continuing to research and explore the Arctic, the Canadian government is continuing Franklin’s mission of mapping remote territory. While Franklin “had put a roof on the map of Canada, and given a definite shape to the North American Continent” [7], the Canadian government is ensuring that the “roof” of the country continues to be a recognized part of Canada.

sources:

[1] “Parks Canada 2010 Arctic Surveys: HMS Erebus and HMS Terror” Parks Canada. http://www.pc.gc.ca/culture/expeditions/erebus-terror.aspx

[2] “Parks Canada to lead new search for Franklin ships”. Canwest News Service. http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=147541d1-0d04-445c-963a-f9c498b32883

[3] “Parks Canada to lead new search for Franklin ships”. http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=147541d1-0d04-445c-963a-f9c498b32883

[4] Krock, Lexi. “Arctic Passage: Tracing the Routes”. NOVA http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/arctic/expe-nf.html

[5] Bayliss, Richard. “Sir John Franklin's last arctic expedition: a medical disaster”. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1279489/

[6] “Parks Canada to lead new search for Franklin ships”. http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=147541d1-0d04-445c-963a-f9c498b32883

[7] Quote from LH Neatby found in Houston, C. Stuart. “Continuing interest in the Franklin expeditions”. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1491183/pdf/cmaj00122-0023.pdf