Showing posts with label Alaska. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alaska. Show all posts

Arctic Oil and Gas: The Role of Regions




This article is based on a larger research report by the author, published by the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) which is available here. 

courtesy of Nordregio
By Andreas Østhagen The starting point for regional governments is a desire for economic development and prosperity. Whether the end-goal is economic independence or sustaining higher levels of income, this has led some Arctic regions pursuing natural resource development at a rapid  pace. How the regions promote such interests in their interaction with federal/national governments that are not always as pro-development, arguably determines  much of the actual pace of offshore oil and gas development in the Arctic.

Three cases of Arctic offshore developments in North America – the Chukchi Sea off the coast of Alaska; the Beaufort Sea off the Northwest Territories in Canada; and the waters  around Greenland of the Realm of Denmark – highlight the relationship between regional interests and their respective systemic constraints and can help us understand the role of regions,  an important dimension of Arctic oil and gas development.

Regions in the North American Arctic
Looking beyond overarching international trends related to price levels, technology and ice-melting, this study analyses what influences specific development of offshore oil and gas in the Arctic. A key dimension in focus was the interests of those actually  living in the areas in question, represented through their respective regional governments, as this factor is often neglected or understated in current Arctic research literature. Consequently, the following question must be asked: what role do regional interests have in theprocess of developing oil and gas in the North American Arctic?

With no current offshore production activity, yet with high expectations of a rapid pace of development in exploratory drillings in the near future, the North American Arctic was chosen as the focus area. The three cases studied here share relatively similar climactic conditions. However, they have seen different paces of petroleum development against the backdrop of rising Arctic oil and gas on the international agenda and increasing commercial interests in the North American Arctic. By looking at the processes surrounding the influx of new commercial interests and factors determining the development pace in each case, some important conclusions can be made.

Defining an Interest
First, the regions themselves need to have a clearly defined interest that is promoted and acted upon as development proceeds. The regions’ preferences are naturally a product of their own dependence on oil and gas revenues to support local and regional economies. Perceived future gains from such activities inevitably also come into consideration. Internal cohesion, however, is often lacking, and although all the regions in question favour oil and gas activities, their commitment and/or ability to promote such activities  vary in degree.

Interest in all three regions is undoubtedly influenced by the level of hydrocarbon resources in offshore basins, as outlined by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and other geological surveys. Together with international price trends, accessibility, transport infrastructure and the cost of Arctic operations, this forms the basis of the commercial viability in each case. Commercial viability in turn determines the extent to which commercial actors, such as Shell, Statoil or Cairn, push for exploratory offshore drilling.

Yet this study has proven that case-specific development is also influenced by the interests of the regional actors engaged in the matter. The way regional governments define their interests in petroleum development constitutes the basis of regions’ participation in the development process.

Exhibiting strong regional interests, the State of Alaska continues to push for development in the Chukchi Sea, although the final decision is made federally by the Department of Interior in Washington, D.C. The State consequently acts as a facilitator, with local interest groups and environmental organisations attempting to halt development at every crossroad.

The Canadian Beaufort Sea is similar to the U.S. in terms of the locus of decision-making for outer continental shelf development. Regional interests, however, are not as strongly defined as in Alaska, and consequently the Territories are not as active in policy-making processes. Greenland, as the most autonomous of the three regions in question, has acquired self-governance over its offshore petroleum resources.

Similar to Alaska, the Greenlandic government has actively pushed for development: first by encouraging commercial interests in the region, then through the rapid pace of lease sales from 2006 onwards. While development of the Chukchi Sea has encountered domestic resistance in the U.S., Greenlandic offshore development has met with international resistance, notably from the EU and Greenpeace.

Regional vs. Federal
Second, the impact of regional interests is a function of how strongly these interests are enforced in the process of opening up areas for oil and gas activity. This relates to the unique and systemic context in which the regional governments operate – a context that in turn determines how regional interests are allowed to influence the decision-making process. First, the devolved decision-making competences and autonomy vary considerably throughout the regions in question. Second, in all three cases, regional interests are balanced against federal/national approval of Arctic drilling. The interests of the federal level come into play at this point, which often are linked with the formulation of national energy policies.

In the U.S. and Canada, the federal governments have the authority over the Outer Continental Shelf, and consequently the regional governments in Alaska and the Northwest Territories can only act as facilitators and promoters of their individual interests when a federal decision is underway. In these two cases, the locus of decision-making power lies outside of the Arctic Circle and a decision is the result of the respective federal governments striking a balance between different policy interests. In Greenland, however, the line of sight between regional interests and policy outcomes is substantially clearer, as decision-making competences are devolved to regional self-government. However, Greenland’s enduring relationship with Denmark and the EU is a systemic factor that still should be taken into consideration.

It is interesting to note that the Arctic often causes strong popular sentiment amongst people who do not reside in the region itself. Due to the usage of the Arctic as a symbol of pristine nature and the devastating effects of climate change, there is undoubtedly a strong desire present in capitals like Ottawa, Washington D.C. and Copenhagen to leave the Arctic untouched by industrial activity (Emmerson 2010; Williams 2011). Local inhabitants of the Arctic, however, do not always share such sentiments. Non-Arctic interference in matters of development for Arctic inhabitants has long been a source of conflict (Williams 2011). The Arctic is also jointly populated by different groups of indigenous peoples, with the possibility for tension to arise between non-indigenous regional populations and indigenous local populations over how to deal with the increased influx of commercial interests to the region.

Conclusion
Altogether, these comparisons show that international trends and commercial viability, while important, are not the only factors to consider when tracking and explaining development processes in the Arctic. Offshore activity takes place in the context of regions, both geographically and politically, and all three cases involve regional governments that interact with centrally located decision-makers,  besides commercial, environmental and social actors. Consequently, it seems that the relationship between the regional level, where specific Arctic offshore development is taking place, and the national level, often located far away from the Arctic, constitutes an important, and arguably also frequently neglected, determinant of the development of Arctic oil and gas.

This observation might hold relevance for other areas of the Arctic given the controversy surrounding offshore development in North Norway or in Northwest Russia. However, the Arctic is not the only part of the world facing this influx of commercial interests. Deepwater drilling has boomed in the last decade, and controversial offshore fields west of the Shetland Islands in the UK, off the coast of Brazil, and in ‘iceberg alley’ off Newfoundland in Canada, are currently being explored for recoverable resources. As soaring price levels, new technologies and increased market demands push companies towards new and challenging areas like the Arctic;the role of the regions  where these activities take place will only become increasingly important.













Arctic Analysis: Taxes and Arctic Resource Development




By Kevin Casey Two recent developments have called attention to the role that taxation plays in oil and gas exploration and development in the Arctic. First came announcements by BP and ConocoPhillips of significant new investments in Alaska’s North Slope in response to the state’s recent reduction in oil taxes.[1] Second came the decision by Statoil to delay its planned investment in the Johan Castberg field in the Barents Sea after the Norwegian government announced an increase in the tax rate on oil and gas producers.[2] The prevailing interpretation of these events, plain to see in the headlines, is that tax increases stifle investment while tax decreases encourage development and exploration. While these maxims are partly true, a closer look at the similarities and differences between these two examples reveals that taxation is only one of many important factors that shape investment decisions such as these in the Arctic. While taxation will continue to play an important role in shaping Arctic energy development, this role should not be exaggerated.

First, let’s look at the Alaskan example. On May 21 Alaska Governor Sean Parnell signed into law Senate Bill 21.[3] The bill, the result of lengthy deliberations in the Alaska legislature, seeks to correct the perceived deficiencies of the last adjustment to Alaska’s oil tax regime, the Alaska Clear and Equitable Share (ACES) Act which was passed in 2007 during the governorship of Sarah Palin. ACES established a 25% baseline tax and a progressive surcharge on net profits pegged to the price of oil. Under ACES, as prices rose, the state took a higher cut in taxes, approaching and exceeding 75% at high prices.[4] ACES provided various credits, particularly aimed at increasing production in new fields. In spite of these credits, investment in the North Slope continued to lag and production declines continued. Industry complained that progressive surcharges severely limited upside profit potential on large projects, thus discouraging investment.[5] Without significant investment, production levels were in danger of falling below 500,000 barrels a day, a development which would cause significant problems for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.[6]

The purpose of Senate Bill 21 was to establish a more attractive climate for investment on the North Slope. The bill did away with the progressivity of ACES and set a flat rate on oil profits at 35%, placing the total government take (including federal income taxes) at around 60-62%.[7] The bill also sought to correct perceived imbalances in ACES subsidies and credits for new investment. ACES provided credits of up to 60% of the cost of production, but only on new fields outside of existing North Slope units.[8] This acted as a disincentive for production improvements for existing fields. The new tax bill extends these credits to new developments within legacy fields, encouraging new investment that will increase efficiency and production at these fields. Will the bill have the intended effect?  Both BP and ConocoPhillips announced new investments at legacy fields, rather than in new fields.[9]

On the surface, Norway suffers from some of the same problems as Alaska: falling production from legacy fields and expansion into new fields in remote locations like the Barents Sea that require significant investments to bring on-line. Both Norway and Alaska depend heavily on oil and gas revenues. Oil and gas taxes make up between 80 and 90 percent of Alaska’s general fund budget on a yearly basis.[10] While oil and gas revenues make up a smaller portion of Norway’s government revenues (26% in 2012), these revenues remain essential for funding the country’s generous welfare programs.[11] There are, however, significant structural differences between the two countries’ approaches to the oil industry. First, Norway does not charge royalties on oil and gas while exacting higher overall taxes through corporate and production taxes, which together yield a 78% government take.[12] Second, Norway derives additional profits from oil and gas through its 67% interest in Statoil and through participation in offshore oil and gas projects by state-run Petoro. All of Petoro’s revenues from shares in particular leases are either reinvested or transferred to state coffers.[13] Third, Norway’s declining crude oil production has been tempered somewhat by increased production of natural gas which has continued to buoy revenues.[14] Alaska is also rich in gas, but plans for a pipeline to bring North Slope gas to market have not come to fruition due to high costs, and the state’s production has languished.[15]

Norway’s recent modifications to its oil and gas taxes were much more modest than Alaska’s, and reflect both different objectives and differences between Norway’s tax structure and Alaska’s. Norway intends to enact a 1% increase in the tax on oil company profits while at the same time balancing that with a 1% decrease in its corporate tax rate.[16] Norway’s decision to raise taxes was not driven by the need to develop more revenue, or to stop exploration and development of new fields (though that may be a second-order impact), but rather to correct an economic imbalance brought about by continued growth of the oil sector in comparison to Norway’s other industries.[17]  The oil sector dwarfs Norway’s other industries in share of GDP (23%) and total exports (52%).[18] This can tend to crowd out other industries by distorting the labor market, monopolizing investment and driving inflation. By raising taxes on the oil industry while dropping them on other sectors, the government hopes to cool the oil sector and provide more breathing room for non-oil sector growth.  Norway’s tax decision, then, is driven by macroeconomic concerns, and not narrowly by concerns with oil production.

The industry’s response to the tax reforms in Alaska and Norway was swift and predictable. Oil majors that had lobbied heavily for tax reform in Alaska welcomed the new law. BP and ConocoPhillips announced new investments focused on increasing production at legacy fields on the North Slope,[19] through skeptics say the timing of these announcements was more political than anything. And the controversy over the new law is far from over: a petition to submit the new law to a state-wide referendum is on track to collect the required signatures by 13 July.[20] In Norway, Statoil announced that the 1% tax increase would cause it to rethink its development plan for the Johan Castberg project in the Barents Sea, though once again taxes are only part of the story. Statoil is still uncertain about resource estimates for the field and delays in development of shore-based infrastructure to support the project.[21] In both cases, it is difficult to separate out what is political posturing on the part of industry and what the actual impact of the new tax rates will be.

A final and somewhat intangible element of the ongoing debate on oil and gas taxes in Alaska and Norway is the importance of a stable and predictable investment climate. Industry obviously likes stability as it allows them to more accurately predict the costs and revenues of large projects that can stretch over many years. The fact that a government can choose to modify tax rates at any time adds an element of risk and uncertainty. The larger and more long-term the project, the more the risk. A prominent industry critique of Norway’s tax increase is that the government’s decision to tweak tax rates undercuts the country’s reputation for a stable investment environment.[22] While stability is certainly an important factor that investors must consider, it is also difficult to quantify and highly subjective. While Alaska’s oil tax reforms were much more radical than Norway’s, we heard little from the oil industry about how Alaska’s reforms undercut a stable and predictable investment environment.

What does all this mean, if anything, about the future of oil and gas development in the Arctic? First, these recent events show that the factors impacting development decisions in each Arctic state are diverse, highly contextual, and politically charged. Taxation and its relationship to overall fiscal policy is an important factor but hardly the only factor. However, because the development of Arctic resources will in the near term be characterized by high investment requirements and narrow profit margins, small changes in tax policy have the ability to make or break individual development projects. Second, political decisions on taxation will be made based mostly on factors that are in some senses exogenous to the issue of Arctic energy development. As such, it is important to understand the role that national and regional fiscal policies (and the politics that drive them) play in encouraging or inhibiting Arctic energy development. Third, the elephant in the room remains tight oil and gas. As unconventional resource extraction continues to expand around the globe, tight oil and gas plays are presenting more attractive investment opportunities for major oil companies and competing for a limited pool of global investment funds. Statoil has made significant investments in tight oil and gas development in Australia and the US, and is exploring similar opportunities in China and Argentina.[23] The additional downward pressure on resource prices will continue to affect calculations on Arctic energy development in places like Norway and Alaska. Though taxation remains an important factor in shaping these calculations, it remains one among many and we should be careful not to exaggerate its influence.  It is the complex interaction of all these factors and not one alone which will determine the course of Arctic energy development. 





[1] Dlouhy, Jennifer. “BP to spend $1 billion in Alaska’s North Slope,” FuelFix, June 2, 2013, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2013/06/02/bp-to-spend-1-billion-in-alaskas-north-slope-2/.
[2] Reed, Alastair. “Statoil delays Barents Sea oilfield project after tax boost,” Bloomberg, June 5, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/statoil-delays-castberg-oil-project-amid-unexpected-tax-rise-1-.html.
[4] Alexander Weber, Nicole Crighton, Maria Keating and Dale Berg. “Alaska’s Clear and Equitable Share (“ACES”) production tax and available credits,” What’s News in Tax, KPMG (2011), 2., http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/taxnewsflash/2011/Feb/AK_ACES.pdf
[5] Marks, Roger. “Alaska’s oil and gas production tax severely limits upside profit potential,” Oil and Gas Journal, September 1, 2013.  http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-7/issue-9/features-/alaska_s-oil_and_gas.html.
[6] Alyeska Pipeline Service Company. Final Report: Low Flow Impact Study, June 15, 2011, 1,  http://www.alyeska-pipe.com/assets/uploads/pagestructure/TAPS_Operations_LowFlow/editor_uploads/LoFIS_Summary_Report_P6%2027_FullReport.pdf.
[7] Bradner, Tim. “Senate passes oil tax reform,” Alaska Journal of Commerce, March, 2013.  http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/March-Issue-3-2013/Senate-passes-oil-tax-reform/.
[8] Keithley, Brad. “Alaska oil policy – Out of alignment,” Thoughts on Alaska Oil and Gas, November 4, 2012, http://bgkeithley.com/2012/11/04/the-third-in-the-alaska-business-monthly-series-alaska-oil-policy-out-of-alignment-from-the-november-2012-alaska-business-monthly/.
[9] “ConocoPhillips Plans to Increase Investment in Alaska Following Oil Tax Reform Legislation,” Alaska Business Monthly, http://www.akbizmag.com/Alaska-Business-Monthly/April-2013/ConocoPhillips-Plans-to-Increase-Investment-in-Alaska-Following-Oil-Tax-Reform-Legislation/.  DeMarban, Alex. “BP to add rigs, wells on Alaska's North Slope after oil-tax cut,” Alaska Dispatch, June 3, 2013, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130603/bp-add-rigs-wells-alaskas-north-slope-after-oil-tax-cut.
[10] Alaska’s Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime – A Closer Look from a Global Perspective, Alaska Department of Revenue, January, 2012, 9,  http://www.revenue.state.ak.us/acloserlook.pdf.  In 2012, oil revenues accounted for a record 92% of Alaska’s general fund budget.
[11]Norway Country Analysis Brief, US Energy Information Administration, December 17, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Norway/norway.pdf.
[12] Alaska’s Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime – A Closer Look from a Global Perspective, 29.
[13] Persily, Larry. “Norway’s different approach to oil and gas development,” Office of the Federal Coordinator for Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Projects, September 7, 2011,  http://www.arcticgas.gov/norway%E2%80%99s-different-approach-to-oil-and-gas-development.  This revenue and investment stream, known as the State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI), accounts for a significant portion of Norway’s revenues from oil and gas on a yearly basis.  Petoro generally takes a 20% stake in new leases.  Petoro’s revenues account for anywhere from 30 to 50% of the state’s total oil and gas revenues in any given year.
[14] Lars-Jakob Alveberg and Eldbjørg Vaage Melberg, eds., Facts 2013: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, March 2013, 23, http://npd.no/en/Publications/Facts/Facts-2013/.
[15] US Energy Information Administration, “Alaska Natural Gas Marketed Production,” http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050ak2a.htm.
[16] Treloar, Stevan. “Norway raises oil taxes in bid to ease cost pressures on economy,” Bloomberg News, May 5, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-05-05/norway-raises-oil-taxes-in-bid-to-ease-cost-pressures-on-economy. 
[17] Keithley, Brad. “Alaska Oil – Missing the Point,” Thoughts on Alaska Oil and Gas, May 6, 2013.  http://bgkeithley.com/2013/05/06/alaska-oil-missing-the-point/.
[18] Lars-Jakob Alveberg and Eldbjørg Vaage Melberg, eds., Facts 2013: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, March 2013, 23, http://npd.no/en/Publications/Facts/Facts-2013/.
[19] Bradner, Tim. “Slope investments may top $5B with BP plans,” Alaska Journal of Commerce, June 6, 2013, http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/June-Issue-2-2013/Slope-investments-may-top-5B-with-BP-plans/.
[20] Martin, Eli. “Deadline looming, Alaska oil tax repeal petition gains momentum,” Alaska Dispatch, June 11, 2013.  http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130611/deadline-looming-alaska-oil-tax-repeal-petition-gains-momentum.
[21] “Statoil recommends Johan Castberg project delay,” Oil and Gas Journal, June 10, 2013, http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-6a/general-interest/statoil-recommends-johan-castberg-project-delay.html.
[22] Reed, Alastair. “Statoil Delays Barents Sea Oilfield Project After Tax Boost,” Bloomberg, June 5, 2013.  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/statoil-delays-castberg-oil-project-amid-unexpected-tax-rise-1-.html.
[23] Paton, James. “Statoil seeking shale oil opportunities in Australia, China.” Bloomberg, September 21, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-21/statoil-seeking-shale-oil-opportunities-in-australia-china.html.
[24] Chris Arsenault. Retrieved February 20th 2012 from snippits-and-slappits.blogspot.com/2011/05/wikileaks-battle-to-carve-up-arctic.html


Pragmatic Thinking: How the U.S. Coast Guard Is Making Do with Less in the Arctic




By Mihaela David The Coast Guard came to the rescue just as the Obama Administration faced criticism over the lofty but vague National Strategy for the Arctic Region it revealed last month (for more information, read our recent article discussing the lack of specificity and the absence of an implementation strategy and long-term budgetary plan). The Coast Guard was the first departmental service to release a strategic document that furthers the lines of effort identified in the national strategy and offers the much anticipated specifics for its engagement in the Arctic region. The Coast Guard has also submitted its budget request for 2014 and made plans for its operations in the Arctic this summer, in a pragmatic effort to provide effective governance in a remote and rapidly changing maritime frontier within the limits of financial constraints.

Mission and Objectives

With increased accessibility and human activity in the Arctic region, the Coast Guard has a responsibility to provide effective maritime governance in the Arctic Ocean just as it does in other U.S. waters. According to Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, the service’s mission in the region is to “uphold the rule of law, ensure the safety and security of its people, and ensure environmentally responsible maritime activity.”[1]

The Coast Guard strategy for the next ten years delineates three strategic objectives to guide operations and further the goals of maritime safety, security and stewardship in the Arctic:

 1. “Improving Awareness”
·      increasing collection and analysis of maritime activity data;
·      enhancing coordination and information-sharing of maritime intelligence; and
·      sustaining “effective maritime presence.”[2]
2. “Modernizing Governance”
·      safeguarding the marine environment and living marine resources;
·      protecting “U.S. sovereignty and sovereign rights”; and
·      sustaining effective governance domestically and internationally.[3]
3. “Broadening Partnerships”
·      building and “leveraging” strategic domestic and international partnerships;
·      promoting the Coast Guard as an “expert resource”; and
·      supporting national-level Arctic planning.[4]

The document was presented in the introductory statement as a “theater strategy” for its operations in the Arctic, and not an implementation plan.[5] As such, similar to the national strategy, the document offers a strategic vision for U.S. involvement in the Arctic but no insight on budgetary questions or specific plans to develop capabilities and assets. However, the Coast Guard’s 40-page strategic document is notably different from the national one: it is comprehensive in its review of the present physical and geo-strategic Arctic environment in which the service must operate and it provides substantive proposals and details the means through which its stated goals and objectives are to be achieved.

Sharing the Burden of Governance

The Coast Guard demonstrates an astute understanding of the limitations it faces in the Arctic region, from gaps in capabilities and financial resource constraints to transnational challenges and informational shortfalls.

Acknowledging that “no single agency or nation has the sovereignty, capacity, or control over resources necessary to meet all emerging challenges in the Arctic,” the Coast Guard’s strategically emphasizes building “a strong network of partnerships” at multiple levels of government and internationally.[6] Among the domestic partners targeted are other departments and agencies (notably the Department of Defense and its National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Science Foundation, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), interagency entities (such as the Capabilities Assessment Working Group established by the Homeland Security and Defense departments), as well as state and tribal governments, the private sector, advocacy groups, and academia.[7]

To overcome challenges and obstacles of a transnational nature, the Coast Guard also plans to enhance coordination with other Arctic states, especially border partners Canada and the Russian Federation; to leverage existing international arrangements, such as the North American Ice Service; and to advocate for international cooperation within the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization and for the ratification of UNCLOS.[8]

Most notably, the Coast Guard offered several specific governance proposals for a whole-of-government approach to governance of the Arctic region. It proposed the establishment of three Arctic expert bodies to inform decision-making at three levels of governance:

1.     An Arctic Center of Expertise at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy
·   to promote “safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity” in the Arctic region;[9]
2.     An Arctic Policy Board within the Department of Homeland Security
·   to bring “external perspectives on Arctic policy” from industry and academia;[10]
3.     An Arctic Fusion Center at the federal level
·   to promote interagency information-sharing and coordination in the area of “sustainable development and environmental protection.”[11]

The Coast Guard ducked the budgetary question by stating upfront that these proposals will be adopted "pending resources or funding."[12] However, the cost to set up these governance structures pales in comparison to the cost of modernizing infrastructure and assets, including the U.S.’ outdated icebreaker fleet.

Breaking the (Budgetary) Ice

The U.S. is in dire need of more icebreakers for assured access to the ice-covered Arctic waters: it currently relies on only one medium icebreaker, Healy, and one heavy icebreaker, the recently reactivated Polar Star. The strategy document does not discuss at length the Coast Guard’s plans to increase its icebreaking capability. The only mention of icebreakers is buried within a paragraph entitled “Science and Technology” in a final chapter on concepts to ensure long-term success. The document merely states that the U.S. “must have adequate icebreaking capability to support research,” and “must also make a strategic investment in icebreaking capability to enable access to the high latitudes over the long-term.”[13]

However, like all government entities, the Coast Guard is operating within a severely austere fiscal climate, and is forced to make tough decisions regarding the use of its limited financial resources. The U.S. Coast Guard is slated for a 13 percent budgetary cut in FY 2014, which will make its acquisition budget fall far short of what the service needs to modernize and maintain its infrastructure.[14] These fiscal constraints have already impacted the Coast Guard’s plan to upgrade its icebreaker fleet, forcing the service to push back its incremental funding timeline for the construction of a new heavy-duty polar icebreaker, which is projected to cost between $900 million and $1 billion.

In FY 2013, $8 million were allocated to initiate “survey and design activities” for the vessel and the Coast Guard projected that it would allocate $860 million over 5 years for its acquisition.[15] However, under the latest investment plan, only $2 million are allocated to continue design activities in FY 2014 and just $230 million are allocated through FY2018.[16] Table 1 shows the breakdown of the funding request differences: funding for the actual construction of the vessel has been postponed until 2016, and the incremental installments for acquisition are much lower than the previous plan (none exceeds $100 million per year).

Under this funding scheme, it would take over a decade until the vessel would be complete. The Coast Guard is cutting it a little close, since the only other heavy icebreaker, the recently reactivated Polar Star, is only expected to remain in service for another 7 to 10 years (i.e. until 2019-2022). 


What is remarkable is that even if this new heavy icebreaker is built in time to replace the Polar  Star, U.S. icebreaker fleet will still fall short of operational requirements and pales in comparison to those of other Arctic states. The 2011 Coast Guard High Latitude Study concluded that “The Coast Guard requires three heavy and three medium icebreakers to fulfill its statutory missions;” six heavy and four medium icebreakers if it expects to maintain “continuous presence requirements.”[17] To highlight the gap in icebreaker capability, it is important to note that, as of September 2012, Russia had 36 icebreakers in its inventory, 4 under construction, and 9 planned; Sweden, Finland and Canada had 8, 7, and 6 icebreakers, respectively.[18]

While the Coast Guard is acutely aware of its shortcomings in this respect, Commandant Papp considers the planned acquisition of a new icebreaker a success given the “finite number of resources” and a much better option than the more expensive leasing options.[19]

Mobile Infrastructure and Seasonal Presence

In his remarks at the strategy roll-out event, Commandant Papp argued that the changing Arctic environment requires “persistent, capable U.S. Coast Guard presence” in the region, but acknowledged that achieving sustained presence “is a challenge given the distances involved and the often hostile environment.”[20]

Noting the “lack of shore infrastructure” and “the expense of building permanent infrastructure” in the remote Arctic, Commandant Papp announced that the Coast Guard will continue to “rely on mobile offshore infrastructure to meet demands” for the coming decade.[21]

What this means is that the Coast Guard has no plans at this time to invest in permanent shore infrastructure, such as a forward-operating base closer to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. It also does not expect other government entities to make these investments in the near future: the Alaska Department of Transportation and the Army Corps of Engineers are conducting a feasibility study for a deep-water port in the Nome area, but “no funds have been identified for construction at this time.”[22]

The Coast Guard is thus forced to “react and adapt” by employing “mobile infrastructure and seasonal presence of cutters, boats and aircraft – supplemented by the existing shore-side infrastructure” for its operations in the Arctic.[23]

There are clear advantages and disadvantages to this strategy. On the one hand, Papp argued that this is a “tested and proven” approach that offers the service flexibility, which is particularly necessary given the “uncertainty of dynamic and evolving requirements.”[24] The Coast Guard has hailed as a success the performance of the National Security Cutter Bertholf in the Operation Arctic Shield 2012, and plans to send a similar cutter, the NSC Waesche, to assist with mission in the summer of 2013.[25] This is also a cost-saving option, as the multi-purpose national security cutters can be deployed in other regions of the world during the off-season. 

On the other hand, the Coast Guard’s national security cutters were designed for the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean and “are not optimized for the region's extreme climate.”[26] This capability gap means that the Coast Guard is limited to operations in the summer months. While this corresponds to the peak of human activity, the need for off-season operations may also arise. In addition, using the national security cutters in the Arctic, even if only seasonally, means they are diverted from other locations and uses, such as drug interdiction. This will pose a significant challenge in the future if more than one cutter is needed in the Arctic, since the Coast Guard only has three such vessels in active service and four more in construction.

Another dilemma for the Coast Guard has been the lack of an adequate forward-operating base in the Arctic region of Alaska, as proximity to the shore is imperative to perform search-and-rescue and other operations in the region. In the summer of 2012, the Coast Guard leased a hangar in Barrow, AK for its two helicopters; this option was expensive ($60,000 per month) and the building had partially sunk due to permafrost thawing.[27] For the 2013 season, the Coast Guard opted for Kotzebue as its forward-operating location, where it could use an Alaska National Guard hangar.[28]

In the absence of permanent facilities in the remote region, the Coast Guard leadership is improvising and making the most of existing resources. Nonetheless, the flexibility of choosing different locations along the vast northern Alaskan shoreline can be considered a strategic advantage: the Coast Guard can select which location is most suitable depending on the specific mission requirements each season. Last year, a northern location was needed as the Coast Guard had to supervise Shell’s offshore drilling operations, while this year the Coast Guard shifted its priorities to the western shore to observe the increased traffic through the Bering Strait. In the future, the Coast Guard may have to deploy assets to multiple locations if the mission requirements dictate it, so having one permanent operating base in the region may not suffice and such a large investment could divert financial resources from better uses.  

When Handed Lemons, Make Lemonade

Coast Guard leadership has demonstrated a strong sense of pragmatism, both in articulating its strategic vision for its engagement in the Arctic region and in its budgetary and operational decisions.

Acknowledging its institutional and resource limitations, the Coast Guard is looking to forge domestic and international partnerships that it can leverage to more effectively fulfill its responsibilities in the Arctic. This is a cooperative and cost-effective approach to governance that, if implemented successfully, can be a blueprint for other departments’ and agencies’ engagement in the region. Burden-sharing within and among multiple levels of government is not just strategically wise, but also necessary given the fiscal austerity climate. 

The Coast Guard is also aware of its capabilities gaps and the necessity for both assured access and sustained presence in Arctic waters. The budget requests and operational decisions it has made thus far reflect the difficult choices the Coast Guard leaders had to make under the constraint of finite financial resources. The Coast Guard would ideally want to expand and modernize its icebreaker fleet to multiple heavy and medium vessels, but the costs are much too high and any budget request beyond the current plans for one new icebreaker would be deemed unrealistic and promptly rejected by the Administration and Congress. The pragmatic Coast Guard leadership sees success where others see failure: it has been able, at least, to argue in favor of acquisition instead of leasing of icebreakers and, if budgets are approved, having a new icebreaker a decade from now is better than none at all.

For the time being, the Coast Guard plans to achieve a sustained seasonal presence in Arctic waters using existing shore infrastructure and multi-purpose vessels. The flexibility and adaptability of mobile assets and temporary forward-operating locations seem to be a good fit with current mission requirements.

However, given the projected increase in shipping, offshore drilling, fisheries, and tourism in the Arctic region in the next decade, the Coast Guard will undoubtedly face increasing responsibilities as a law-enforcement agency and first-responder – for search and rescue missions, oil spill response, and border protection. It will most likely need to adapt its operations and possibly need to deploy more mobile assets, sustain presence in multiple locations, or operate for more extended periods of time. This, in turn, will require additional budgetary resources currently unavailable. These challenges will test the Coast Guard’s ability to fulfill its mission and the country’s goals in the Arctic. Only time will tell if this strategy will be successfully implemented and whether the service will be able to address emerging challenges and effectively perform its responsibilities in the region. The good news is that the Coast Guard can rely on a solid strategic vision to guide its efforts and its leadership is not a stranger to finding innovative cost-saving solutions. The bad news is that a reactionary and adaptive approach to governance cannot be sustained indefinitely. It must make way for strong, proactive leadership so that the Coast Guard can keep up with and stay ahead of the challenges posed by the rapidly growing maritime activity in the Arctic.


[1] Papp, Robert. “Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Rollout: Remarks of the Commandant,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 21, 2013, 2, http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/Arctic%20Strategy%20Rollout%20FINAL%20to%20post.pdf.
[2] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” May 2013, 23-26, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736969.
[3] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 27-29.
[4] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 31-32.
[5] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 7.
[6] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 31.
[7] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 22 and 25.
[8] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 23-24 and 31.
[9] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 31.
[10] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 27.
[11] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 23.
[12] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 23, 27 and 31.
[13] U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Strategy,” 35.
[14] Perera, David. “2014 Budget Request: Coast Guard faces deep cuts in fiscal 2014,” Fierce Homeland Security, April 11, 2013, http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/2014-budget-request-coast-guard/2013-04-11#ixzz2V5njEUTR.
[15] O'Rourke, Ronald. “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2012, 19, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc94137/m1/1/high_res_d/RL34391_2012Jun14.pdf.
[16] O'Rourke, Ronald. “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, May 24, 2013, 1,  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf.
[17] O'Rourke, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization,” 10.
[18] U.S. Coast Guard, “Major Icebreakers of the World,” September 2012, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg552/images/130220%20Icebreaker%20Chart.pdf.
[19] Marcario, John. “Papp: Growing Risks in Arctic Demand Coast Guard’s Attention,” Seapower Magazine, May 21, 2013, http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20130521-arctic.html.
[20] Papp, “Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Rollout,” 4.
[21] Ibid.
[22] DeMarban, Alex. “Deepwater port in Nome or Port Clarence to support Arctic shipping?,” Alaska Dispatch, February 1, 2013, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/deepwater-port-nome-or-port-clarence-support-arctic-shipping.
[23] Papp, “Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Rollout,” 5.
[24] Papp, “Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Rollout,” 4.
[25] Marcario, “Papp: Growing Risks in Arctic Demand Coast Guard’s Attention.”
[26] Troedsson, Peter “A Coast Guard for the Emerging Arctic,” Council for Foreign Relations, May 31, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/coast-guard-emerging-arctic/p30820.
[27] Johnson, Kirk. “For Coast Guard Patrol North of Alaska, Much to Learn in a Remote New Place,” New York Times, July 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/us/coast-guard-strengthens-presence-north-of-alaska.html?_r=0.
[28] Caldwell, Suzanna. “Coast Guard shifting Arctic operations off Alaska to the west this season,” Alaska Dispatch, May 16, 2013, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130516/coast-guard-shifting-arctic-operations-alaska-west-season. 

Table based on:
U.S. Coast Guard, "FY 2014-2018 Five Year Capital Investment Plan (CIP)," 2013, http://www.uscg.mil/posturestatement/docs/USCG_Capital%20Investment%20Plan_FY14-18.pdf 
U.S. Coast Guard, "Fiscal Year 2013 Congressional Justification," 2012, p. I-12, http://www.uscg.mil/posturestatement/docs/USCG_FY2013_Congressional_Justification.pdf