By Malte Humpert During this year’s Arctic Dialogue conference, we conducted a series of short interviews with some of the speakers and participants of the conference as well as other Arctic voices. This project is a collaboration between the High North Center, the University of Nordland, and The Arctic Institute. The podcasts will be available on iTunes via The Arctic Institute, as well as on the Arctic Dialogue website. You can find a list of all podcasts here.
Showing posts with label resource development. Show all posts
Showing posts with label resource development. Show all posts
Arctic Dialogue 2014 - Interview with Joël Plouffe
By Malte Humpert During this year’s Arctic Dialogue conference, we conducted a series of short interviews with some of the speakers and participants of the conference as well as other Arctic voices. This project is a collaboration between the High North Center, the University of Nordland, and The Arctic Institute. The podcasts will be available on iTunes via The Arctic Institute, as well as on the Arctic Dialogue website. You can find a list of all podcasts here.
Canada and the Arctic: An Ambiguous Relationship
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| Courtesy of Arctic-Antarctic Collection |
By Andreas Østhagen Canada undoubtedly holds a prominent place in the Arctic. Currently in the Arctic, only Russia has more Arctic territory, making Canada an “Arctic superpower” in terms of geography and location. As foreign minister Baird announced on December 9, its recent claim for an extension of its continental shelf claim stretched as far as the North Pole.
Canadian nation-building has at times also been concentrated around its “true north” [1]. Yet, 75 percent of the Canadian population is based within 100 miles from the United States border, more than 1.000 miles beneath the Arctic Circle [2]. Its Arctic population, residing in the three territories Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, only numbers approximately 100.000 inhabitants, which is less than 0.3 percent of Canada’s total population.
Arctic policies are, for all Arctic states, a mix of domestic and foreign policy. Similarly, in its policy for the Arctic, the Canadian federal government in Ottawa needs to balance the interests of the residents actually residing in its Arctic territories and the foreign policy interests of Canada at large. These different set of interests do not always converge, as this article will attempt to highlight. As a consequence, Canada’s actual Arctic policy can be termed somewhat “bi-polar”, juggling different sets of domestic interest while attempting to formulate a coherent foreign policy approach towards its Arctic neighbors. This juggling is a common trait amongst all the Arctic states, yet the Canadian case is especially pronounced in nature.
Comparing the Arctic Five
All Arctic coastal states are interesting case studies for center-periphery conflicts and the complicate intricacies of formulating foreign policy in tandem with rapid domestic regional development. Alaska holds a special role in the United States, far removed from the lower 48 in both geography and mentality, while forming a cohesive entity pushing for increased federal engagement in everything from resource development to the formulation of a coherent US Arctic policy [3]. In Greenland, consecutive self-governments have put economic independence from Denmark on top of the political agenda, with the idea of full-fledged independence looming in the background, as increased autonomy was granted in 2009 [4].
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| Courtesy of NSF |
On the other side of the Pole, Norway’s Arctic counties (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) hold 10 percent of Norway’s total population and are, as a consequence, relatively well integrated into the national economy as a whole. There is no marked difference between the Norwegian Arctic and the rest of Norway. Svalbard, being governed by the 1920 Treaty, is a special case with a population of only 2.195 [5]. Russia is in a strong position, with half of the total Arctic territory and a majority of the Arctic population. Just Murmansk oblast has a population of approximately 787.000, which is almost eight times the Canadian Arctic or almost the double of the Norwegian Arctic [6]. At large, the Arctic has a prominent role in Russian contemporary strategic thinking, while also constituting the backbone of its natural resource extraction [7].
Canada: Domestic Policy
Returning to Canada, its three Arctic territories are in a unique situation in terms of regional autonomy. Whereas the ten provinces south of the Arctic Circle have a high degree of autonomy ever since the Dominion was formed in 1867 because of their recognized constitutional powers in section 92 of the Constitution Act (formerly the British North American Act), the three northern territories have not enjoyed the same privileges and operate “at the pleasure of the Crown”. The regional governments of Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut have a substantially lower degree of autonomy than their southern neighbors, but also compared to that of their American and Greenlandic counterparts.
Nunavut in particular did not become a territory of its own until 1999, decades after claiming its Inuit heritage as separate from the Northwest Territories [8]. Although the federal government in Ottawa is slowly devolving decision-making competence and authority to the territories, the starting point is relatively low, as most decisions are still made by the federal Department for Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (AANDC) [9]. It is also the only one of the three territories to not have devolved powers over natural resources.
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| Frontier Lands Courtesy of Government of Canada |
Turning towards infrastructure and local capacity, the situation is very different in the Canadian Arctic than in the provinces. Every year since 2005 Stephen Harper has travelled to the northern territories and has thus displayed continued Arctic commitment by Ottawa, with promises of investment. As argued by Whitney Lackenbauer, focus in recent years has been on enabling natural resource development in the region, while serious deficiencies in social conditions and at the community level are being neglected.
In terms of infrastructure, there are also no deep water ports in any of the three territories, while the closest search and rescue centers are in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Trenton, Ontario, well beneath the Arctic Circle [10]. An offshore presence from the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), in terms of icebreaking capability, is only active in the summer months during the sealift season, when the small communities in Nunavut are being re-supplied. Should a serious incident, in terms of an oil spill or a grounding of a cruise ship, the lack of capacity combined with limited infrastructure might prove catastrophic.
Canada: Foreign Policy
Moving to the foreign policy dimension of Canada’s Arctic engagement, sovereignty has continuously been on the agenda. The current Conservative Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, has placed security issues high on the agenda with quotes like “use it or lose it” and promises of investment in a deep-water docking facility, Arctic capable patrol ships and a new Arctic training centre [11]. The recent claim to the North Pole has similarly been mentioned as a potential source of conflict [12].
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| Prime Minister Harper in the Arctic Courtesy of Pmwebphotos |
The actual threats to Canadian sovereignty, however, are few and far between. Canada’s territorial disputes in the Beaufort Sea with the United States, and over Hans Island with Denmark/Greenland, are minor, with limited potential of ever becoming more than diplomatic disagreements. The disagreement with the US over the status of the Northwest Passage, as internal waters or an international transit, is also an issue where the two have agreed to disagree, which does not prompt increased military presence in the area. Its recent submission to the UN Commission determining the limits of the continental shelf, is another area where all the Arctic littoral states have agreed to abide to the UNCLOS framework, reiterated continuously since the Ilulissat Deceleration in 2008.
Still, protecting Canadian sovereignty in the north seems a particular foreign policy goal. The results, however, are pending also in this area. Promises of military investments have not been followed through, as exemplified with the Arctic patrol ships. The first ship was initially set to be delivered in 2014, while recent budget leaks now show that construction is set to first begin in 2015 [12]. As a result, the foreign policy rhetoric does not match domestic action. It is consequently not Canadian sovereignty that is under threat in the Arctic, but rather its domestic ability to provide basic public capacities.
Conclusion – Merging Domestic and Foreign Policies
Canada’s Arctic development seems somewhat twofold. On the one hand, Canada actively participates on the international stage in Arctic matters, emphasizing its sovereignty, rights and seabed claims, in addition to its Arctic Council slogan “Development for the people in the North”. On the other hand, domestic development and actual investments are lagging behind its Arctic neighbors, with serious gaps in infrastructure and local/regional capacity. The Canadian Arctic territories are also granted less autonomy and self-governance than the rest of the country’s sub-national units, with a slow process of devolution, in particular with regards to Nunavut.
When Comparing Canada to the other Arctic coastal states, the gap between rhetoric and factual development becomes apparent. Amongst the Nordic countries, the Arctic regions are relatively well enmeshed in nation building at large, while Russia has placed a considerable emphasis on its Arctic region, both rhetorically and in terms of investments. The Greenlandic self-government is in the driving seat of its own development, while Alaska has a particular strong Arctic voice, encouraging Washington to look northwards. Yet, the federal government in Ottawa understands that it needs to engage its Arctic territories, as can be seen by the inclusion of regional representatives in its delegation to the Arctic Council. Inclusion and dialogue, however, is one thing. Actual investments and capacity building is something else, no matter who owns the North Pole.
[1] Under the administrative responsibility of the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
[3] http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130603/alaska-lobbying-group-quietly-plows-ahead-open-anwr
[5] Only the Norwegian population on Svalbard. source: http://www.ssb.no/befsvalbard
Arctic Oil and Gas: The Role of Regions
This article is based on a larger research report by the author, published by the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) which is available here.
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| courtesy of Nordregio |
Three cases of Arctic offshore developments in North America – the Chukchi Sea off the coast of Alaska; the Beaufort Sea off the Northwest Territories in Canada; and the waters around Greenland of the Realm of Denmark – highlight the relationship between regional interests and their respective systemic constraints and can help us understand the role of regions, an important dimension of Arctic oil and gas development.
Regions in the North American Arctic
Looking beyond overarching international trends related to price levels, technology and ice-melting, this study analyses what influences specific development of offshore oil and gas in the Arctic. A key dimension in focus was the interests of those actually living in the areas in question, represented through their respective regional governments, as this factor is often neglected or understated in current Arctic research literature. Consequently, the following question must be asked: what role do regional interests have in theprocess of developing oil and gas in the North American Arctic?
Defining an Interest
First, the regions themselves need to have a clearly defined interest that is promoted and acted upon as development proceeds. The regions’ preferences are naturally a product of their own dependence on oil and gas revenues to support local and regional economies. Perceived future gains from such activities inevitably also come into consideration. Internal cohesion, however, is often lacking, and although all the regions in question favour oil and gas activities, their commitment and/or ability to promote such activities vary in degree.
Interest in all three regions is undoubtedly influenced by the level of hydrocarbon resources in offshore basins, as outlined by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and other geological surveys. Together with international price trends, accessibility, transport infrastructure and the cost of Arctic operations, this forms the basis of the commercial viability in each case. Commercial viability in turn determines the extent to which commercial actors, such as Shell, Statoil or Cairn, push for exploratory offshore drilling.
Yet this study has proven that case-specific development is also influenced by the interests of the regional actors engaged in the matter. The way regional governments define their interests in petroleum development constitutes the basis of regions’ participation in the development process.
Exhibiting strong regional interests, the State of Alaska continues to push for development in the Chukchi Sea, although the final decision is made federally by the Department of Interior in Washington, D.C. The State consequently acts as a facilitator, with local interest groups and environmental organisations attempting to halt development at every crossroad.
The Canadian Beaufort Sea is similar to the U.S. in terms of the locus of decision-making for outer continental shelf development. Regional interests, however, are not as strongly defined as in Alaska, and consequently the Territories are not as active in policy-making processes. Greenland, as the most autonomous of the three regions in question, has acquired self-governance over its offshore petroleum resources.
Similar to Alaska, the Greenlandic government has actively pushed for development: first by encouraging commercial interests in the region, then through the rapid pace of lease sales from 2006 onwards. While development of the Chukchi Sea has encountered domestic resistance in the U.S., Greenlandic offshore development has met with international resistance, notably from the EU and Greenpeace.
Regional vs. Federal
Second, the impact of regional interests is a function of how strongly these interests are enforced in the process of opening up areas for oil and gas activity. This relates to the unique and systemic context in which the regional governments operate – a context that in turn determines how regional interests are allowed to influence the decision-making process. First, the devolved decision-making competences and autonomy vary considerably throughout the regions in question. Second, in all three cases, regional interests are balanced against federal/national approval of Arctic drilling. The interests of the federal level come into play at this point, which often are linked with the formulation of national energy policies.
In the U.S. and Canada, the federal governments have the authority over the Outer Continental Shelf, and consequently the regional governments in Alaska and the Northwest Territories can only act as facilitators and promoters of their individual interests when a federal decision is underway. In these two cases, the locus of decision-making power lies outside of the Arctic Circle and a decision is the result of the respective federal governments striking a balance between different policy interests. In Greenland, however, the line of sight between regional interests and policy outcomes is substantially clearer, as decision-making competences are devolved to regional self-government. However, Greenland’s enduring relationship with Denmark and the EU is a systemic factor that still should be taken into consideration.
It is interesting to note that the Arctic often causes strong popular sentiment amongst people who do not reside in the region itself. Due to the usage of the Arctic as a symbol of pristine nature and the devastating effects of climate change, there is undoubtedly a strong desire present in capitals like Ottawa, Washington D.C. and Copenhagen to leave the Arctic untouched by industrial activity (Emmerson 2010; Williams 2011). Local inhabitants of the Arctic, however, do not always share such sentiments. Non-Arctic interference in matters of development for Arctic inhabitants has long been a source of conflict (Williams 2011). The Arctic is also jointly populated by different groups of indigenous peoples, with the possibility for tension to arise between non-indigenous regional populations and indigenous local populations over how to deal with the increased influx of commercial interests to the region.
Conclusion
Altogether, these comparisons show that international trends and commercial viability, while important, are not the only factors to consider when tracking and explaining development processes in the Arctic. Offshore activity takes place in the context of regions, both geographically and politically, and all three cases involve regional governments that interact with centrally located decision-makers, besides commercial, environmental and social actors. Consequently, it seems that the relationship between the regional level, where specific Arctic offshore development is taking place, and the national level, often located far away from the Arctic, constitutes an important, and arguably also frequently neglected, determinant of the development of Arctic oil and gas.
This observation might hold relevance for other areas of the Arctic given the controversy surrounding offshore development in North Norway or in Northwest Russia. However, the Arctic is not the only part of the world facing this influx of commercial interests. Deepwater drilling has boomed in the last decade, and controversial offshore fields west of the Shetland Islands in the UK, off the coast of Brazil, and in ‘iceberg alley’ off Newfoundland in Canada, are currently being explored for recoverable resources. As soaring price levels, new technologies and increased market demands push companies towards new and challenging areas like the Arctic;the role of the regions where these activities take place will only become increasingly important.
The Questionable Arctic Bonanza – Exaggerated Hopes and False Images of the Arctic as "Prime Real Estate"
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| Courtesy of kayak49 on flickr.com |
By Kathrin Keil Analyses, political statements and media stories about the Arctic are full of the high hopes of politicians and industry representatives concerning the economic potential of an increasingly ice-free Arctic. The common story about the changing Arctic is one of the expectation or even assuredness that the region will turn into an ‘economic bonanza,’ with “hungry eyes of economic powerhouses migrat[ing] north towards the lush prospects as the polar ice caps thaw.”[1] The concrete expectations usually stay as vague as this:
“With the ice receding […] opportunities for profit are growing. Estimates of recoverable fossil fuels north of the Arctic Circle total approximately 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas deposits, as well as vast quantities of mineral resources, including rare earth elements, iron ore, and nickel. Establishing sea routes through the Arctic also presents a huge economic boon as it effectively cuts travel time between Europe and East Asia by over a week. Other industries such as tourism and commercial fishing likewise have immeasurable potential.”[2]
The author is right by claiming that the economic potential is indeed immeasurable. It is highly uncertain if significant benefits can be reached and if they can, one must wonder exactly who will benefit and to what extent. What the article generally conveys, however, is the image of a highly lucrative Arctic with extraordinary gains to make.
A more detailed summary of the various economic expectations that many authors, researchers and decision-makers have been formulating for the last couple of years now is given in a recent Foreign Affairs article,[3] which in agreement with the presented expectations is called ‘The Coming Arctic Boom.’ While the article, like so many others, does not provide a balanced analysis concerning the opportunities, risks and problems attached to Arctic economic activities, it does augment the existing expectations for the allegedly global importance of Arctic commodities.
The article refers to the Arctic as “a region of riches”, where global warming “is turning what has traditionally been an impassible (sic!) body of water ringed by remote wilderness into something dramatically different: an emerging epicenter of industry and trade akin to the Mediterranean Sea” (p. 2, 4). After outlining the many areas where Arctic benefits could be made – ranging from hydrocarbons, shipping, fishing, mining, wood, and water to telecommunications, satellites, hydropower, geothermal energy, and data storage – the author concludes that we witness an “Arctic awakening” (p. 9). The Arctic is thus “open for business” and even China has already started “bounty hunting” in the Arctic (p. 3, 7).
These mentioned articles are just two examples of the never-ending glut of stories about the Arctic ‘treasure chamber.’ Interestingly, these many analyses are somehow at odds with Arctic reality given that we still have not seen the tremendous economic Arctic coming-of-age that so many have been forecasting over the last few years. Rather, when looking at the recent developments concerning Arctic energy development, usage of Arctic shipping routes and prospects for fishing in the high Arctic Ocean, there is little reason to expect huge short- to mid-term benefits with impacts on global oil and gas supply, international maritime trading routes and traditional fishing regions. While perhaps some benefits can be expected locally and nationally, the picture of an Arctic as ‘prime real estate’ of global significance is exaggerated.
Oil and Gas
Oil and gas is usually perceived as “the main reason the [Arctic] region is so economically promising.”[4] However, we need to get our expectations of the actual potential especially of Arctic oil straight. Remember what Donald L. Gautier, the lead author of the 2008 USGS Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal[5] emphasised at a conference[6] at the University of California, Irvine back in 2010. According to the USGS findings, the largest yet-to-be discovered oil field in the Arctic is expected to contain between 1.3 and 6.6 billion barrels, which is significantly smaller than the Prudhoe Bay oil field on Alaska’s North Slope, the largest of the Arctic’s oil fields. To quote Dr. Gautier, “there is not another Prudhoe Bay field anywhere in the Arctic. So there is not some bonanza sitting out on the Lomonosov Ridge, which will change the world compared to what is going on in the Middle East.”
Also, despite the expectations that the USGS raised, there has been an increasing emphasis on the fact that Arctic oil resources will only have a local effect in terms of revenues, employment and export opportunities, and supply. Additionally, the benefits that the local population could enjoy are certainly not given. Considering the often highly dispersed population, lacking specific skill sets, the temporary nature of many exploitation projects, and highly mobile workforces elsewhere, these benefits are indeed rather doubtful. Internationally, Arctic oil will not be able to compete with that found in the Middle East. As Lindholt and Glomsrød clarified in numbers, the Arctic’s future share of global petroleum production will only be 8–10%, thus the Arctic will be ‘no big bonanza for the global petroleum industry.’[7]
On the implementation side, Royal Dutch Shell’s exploration and drilling achievements during the summer season of 2012 in the Chukchi Sea – the Arctic area where the USGS sees the highest likelihood for a large oil discovery – remained far behind the company’s plans and expectations.[8] The whole endeavour was plagued with delays due to missing permits, unfit equipment, failed resilience tests, and culminated in the grounding of the drilling rig Kulluk in inclement weather on Sitkalidak Island in the Gulf of Alaska in December 2012. In the face of all these difficulties, Shell called off its offshore drilling programme for summer 2013.[9]
Shell is not the only company having trouble realising expected hydrocarbon benefits. Despite Scottish Cairn Energy’s high investments and multiple exploratory wells drilled since 2010 in the waters off Greenland’s coast, no commercial discovery has been made yet in Greenland’s offshore areas.[10]
Although the Arctic is expected to be very rich in undiscovered natural gas resources (the USGS expects a mean amount of 1670 trillion cubic feet, or 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas[11]), which are most likely concentrated in just a few specific areas, actual production increases beyond the current production levels also face great difficulties. The biggest natural gas field discovered so far in the Arctic, the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, has lost its key market due to the shale gas boom in the US. In combination with the difficult operation environment in the Barents Sea and the uncertainties about returns on huge necessary investments, the development of the field was postponed until at least 2025.[12]
Shipping
Concerning Arctic shipping, many expect the number of ships transiting the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which was 46 in the summer of 2012, to be outpaced by a multitude of that in summer 2013. Although 476 permits[13] (as of 29 August 2013) have already been granted for sailing in the waters of the NSR during the 2013 shipping season, these will by far not all be actual full transits of the route. Rather they will predominantly be destinational shipping on the well-developed western part of the route between Murmansk and Salekhard on the Ob River and Dudinka on the Yenisei River where shipping has already been happening for a long time already. This is also why the (English-translated) homepage reads ‘permits for sailing in the waters of the NSR’, and not for ‘transiting’ the route. Further, Russian flagged ships carry out most of these shipments (out of the 476 permits, only 100 are non-Russian flagged, or about one-fifth), indicating a higher amount of local and destinational shipping in comparison to transit. As of late July 2013, only 18% of the permits granted were for full transits and 45% for shipping limited to the southwestern Kara Sea.[14] The Northern Sea Route Information Office expects “some growth in the total number of vessels pass[ing] the NSR in transit [this year, but this] does not necessarily mean an increase in total cargo volume”.[15]
Also surprisingly, although the main driver of Chinese interest in the Arctic region is said to be the possibility of using northern sea routes, as of August 13th 2013 only one Chinese ship has received a permit to sail the NSR this summer. Three ships under Hong Kong flags have received a total of six permits.
Assuming all permits given so far to non-Russian flagged ships would transit the full route, this would mean that transits have doubled in comparison to 2012. While this may sound impressive, on a global scale NSR transits are nowhere near competing with established routes, given that the Suez Canal has around 18,000 transits per year and the Panama Canal 13,000.[16]
Generally, one also has to keep in mind the multitude of problems and hindrances to Arctic routes becoming major maritime routes, ranging from still difficult weather and ice conditions, the seasonality of the route, and reliability problems, to the broader development of global trade patterns.[17]
Fishing
Concerning the prospect of new fishing opportunities in now ice-free waters in the Arctic Ocean, recent developments dampen hopes for any significant short-term gains. In a meeting in Washington in April 2013, government representatives of the five Arctic coastal states comprised of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US renewed a debate about the possibility of a new agreement for regulating commercial fishing activities in the high Arctic Ocean, including the possibility of installing a moratorium on commercial fishing activities.[18]
This, together with the 2009 US moratorium on commercial fishing in US federal waters off the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas,[19] is sensible long-term policy. But this also means that in the short- to medium-term the call is for more investments in research to find out if fishing in these so far inaccessible areas can be conducted sustainably, long before (if ever) anyone can hope to make any long-term profits. This example exemplifies most vividly the significant level of uncertainty as to how much there is to gain from the changing Arctic.
Challenges vs. Problems
As the foregoing examples illustrate, the stories about grandiloquent opportunities to the benefit of Arctic residents, the Arctic states, and the whole world, are more often than not greatly exaggerated and obstruct the actual relevant questions and problems striking the region. Moreover, these stories often transfer a faulty picture of a region that has ‘awakened’ from a frozen state of nature to a potentially lively economic playground for powerful players from the West and the rising Asian East, as well as being inhabited by a generally underdeveloped and needy population.
Also, such a take on the Arctic region imposes a focus on Arctic challenges instead of actual and serious problems. ‘Challenges’ transfer the image of something that can be overcome and is more of a hurdle or hindrance towards a bigger undertaking. This promises substantial advantages (usually in form of economic profits) if we all work together to overcome and solve these ‘challenges,’ such as technological challenges to ship-design for ice-infested waters or better weather and ice forecasts for hydrocarbon and shipping activities.
But what about the actual problems? How do we solve the paradox that the digging out and combusting of Arctic hydrocarbon resources will only reinforce (as part of the global hydrocarbon extraction and combustion) the climatic changes with all its bleak and probably catastrophic consequences for the region itself and especially the low-lying parts of the globe?
How secure is our food supply if changed weather conditions due to the warming Arctic will lead to more weather extremes also in the temperate zones of Europe and North America, including changing precipitation patterns with more droughts and floods and much colder and longer winters?[20]
How do we improve the difficult lives of many northern residents, whose lives have already been difficult, and in many cases undeserving in comparison to their fellow citizens living in the temperate zone of their country, before the climate has started to warm up in the north?
What about the ‘Arctic treasure trove’ in the sense of the unique ecosystems, flora, fauna, habitats and biological diversity in the region, and not in relation to the deep pockets of multinational companies coming to invest in the region? Even without the added burden of increased economic activities on the region’s fragile ecosystems, how can we preserve this unique region in the face of the changing climatic and thus environmental conditions?
And when talking about economic benefits to be reaped from a warming Arctic, where are the debates about who exactly is to gain what and who will lose out? How are the Arctic ‘riches’, if they are really to be gained, to be distributed? Where are comparisons to other regions that came to the attention of international business interests (especially in the oil and gas business!)? What about an ‘Arctic resource curse’? Has history (and the present still does) not shown in many instances how local and regional concerns and demands are sacrificed for the sake of maximising benefits on a global, capitalist market, run by powerful multinational players?
Depicting the Arctic as an economic treasure trove of global importance is not only exaggerated given the outlooks as to which business options and scales become available in a warming Arctic, but also, it importantly sidetracks the really pressing and difficult problems and questions concerning the future of the region.
[1] Albert Troszczynski, “The Thawing Geopolitics of the Arctic,” Emory Journal of International Affairs (2013): 2, http://emoryjia.org/2013/08/08/the-thawing-geopolitics-of-the-arctic/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Scott G. Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom - As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up,” Foreign Affairs no. July/August 2013 (2013): 1–16, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139456/scott-g-borgerson/the-coming-arctic-boom.
On shipping potential, see e.g. also Nong Hong, “The Melting Arctic and Its Impact on China’s Maritime Transport,” Research in Transportation Economics 35, no. 1 (May 2012): 50–57.
[4] Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom - As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up,” 4.
[5] Kenneth J. Bird et al., “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey (Washington, DC, 2008), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf.
[6] Donald. L. Gautier, “Petroleum Resource Potential of the Arctic Region”, conference presentation, conference theme: Towards a Sustainable 21st Century, Preserving the Environment of the Arctic, University of California Irvine, 2010, the presentations is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U86JYXghoVw.
[7] Lars Lindholt and Solveig Glomsrød, “The Arctic: No Big Bonanza for the Global Petroleum Industry,” Energy Economics 34, no. 5 (September 2012): 1465–1474.
[8] Steven Mufson, “Shell’s Alaska Drilling Season Falls Short,” The Washington Post, November 01, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/shells-alaska-drilling-season-falls-short/2012/10/31/db0bd9ca-2386-11e2-8448-81b1ce7d6978_story.html.
[9] Suzanne Goldenberg, “Shell to Suspend Arctic Offshore Drilling Program over Safety Fears,” The Guardian, February 27, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/feb/27/shell-oil-suspend-arctic-drilling.
RepRisk, “Special Report: Arctic Drilling” (Zürich, 2013), 3, http://www.reprisk.com/downloads/specialreports/32/Arctic Drilling Special Report.pdf.
[10] Cairn Energy, “Greenland Activity” (Edinburgh, 2012), http://www.cairnenergy.com/index.asp?pageid=80.
[11] Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science 324 (2009): 1178.
[12] Terry Macalister, “Russia Halts Gas Project in Arctic,” Mail&Guardian, August 31, 2012, http://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-31-00-russia-halts-gas-project-in-arctic; Barentsnova, “Sakhalin over Shtokman,” June 03, 2013, http://barentsnova.com/node/2364.
[13] See homepage of The Northern Sea Route Administration “Permissions for navigation on the water area of the Northern sea route”, http://asmp.morflot.ru/en/razresheniya/, accessed 29 August 2013.
[14] Northern Sea Route Information Office, “Brief statistical analysis on the Permissions issued by the NSR Administration as of 31 July 2013”, http://www.arctic-lio.com/node/190, accessed 29 August 2013.
[15] Ibid.
[16] See homepage of the Suez Canal Authority, “Traffic Statistics, Brief Yearly Statistics”, http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=4, and the Panama Canal Authority, “Transit Statistics, Panama Canal Traffic”, http://www.pancanal.com/eng/op/transit-stats/2012-Table01.pdf, accessed 13 August 2013.
[17] Stephen M. Carmel, “The Cold, Hard Realities of Arctic Shipping,” U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) 139/7/1, no. 325 (2013): 1–4, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-07/cold-hard-realities-arctic-shipping.
[18] Andrew E. Kramer, “Accord Would Regulate Fishing in Arctic Waters,” The New York Times, April 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/world/agreement-would-regulate-fishing-in-arctic-waters.html?_r=0; Fiskeri- og Kystdepartementet, “Constructive Meeting on Fisheries Issues in the Arctic Ocean” (Oslo, 2013), http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fkd/aktuelt/nyheter/2013/konstruktivt-mote-om-fiskerisporsmal-i-p.html?id=725597.
[19] North Pacific Fishery Management Council, “Fishery Management Plan for Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area” (Anchorage, 2009), http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/PDFdocuments/fmp/Arctic/ArcticFMP.pdf. See map on http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/images/arctic_fmp_area.jpg, accessed 13 August 2013.
[20] Jennifer A. Francis and Stephen J. Vavrus, “Evidence Linking Arctic Amplification to Extreme Weather in Mid-latitudes,” Geophysical Research Letters 39, no. 6 (March 17, 2012): 1–6, http://www.homerdixon.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Evidence-linking-Arctic-amplification-to-extreme-weather-in-mid-latitudes.pdf.
Stefan Rahmstorf, “Melting Ice and Cold Weather”, blog post dealing with recent current research about the debate if the decrease in Arctic ice is related to the 2012/13 cold winter in Germany, 29 March 2013, http://rabett.blogspot.de/2013/03/melting-ice-and-cold-weather.html.
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