Deficiency of Cultural Sensitivity in The Economist's Special Report on the Arctic (Op-Ed)

By Alison Weisburger I commend the excellent reporting and well-informed perspectives put forth in most of The Economist's Special Report on the Arctic published on June 16th. The majority of the work constitutes the type of reasonable and nuanced press coverage of current developments in the Arctic that is generally wanting in the ever-increasing media attention towards the region. However, I must express my dismay with the gross cultural insensitivity displayed in the piece on Inuit in Greenland titled "One man and his dogs". I recognize that The Economist does not purport to be an anthropologically centered publication, nor can its reporting staff necessarily become cultural experts on every group of people and region of the world for which they provide news coverage.  Nevertheless, the appalling use of cliché and dearth of basic knowledge about Inuit culture and history are unacceptable, even if unintentional, in a publication of The Economist's caliber. 

First, in an attempt to portray the gravity of the impact of climate change on Inuit culture, the article points out that "no sea ice means no seal hunt, which can mean no meat for sled-dogs."  In doing so, it both eclipses the heart of issue at hand, while at the same time insulting indigenous traditions. Indeed, no sea ice means no seal hunt - but it's certainly not the welfare of sled-dogs that is the most concerning consequence of that possibly tragic situation. Rather, it is the potential loss for the many Inuit men, women and children who continue to include seal as a core component of their diet, for both nutritional and cultural reasons, that is most alarming. To highlight how the declining ability to hunt seals impacts sled-dogs rather than people illustrates either a lack of understanding of a typical traditional food based Inuit diet, or an outsized, but not uncommon, concern with the plight of Arctic animals over Arctic human beings. 

Later on in the article the author declares that, apart from in Russia, "the Inuit—by the admittedly miserable standards of indigenous peoples—are pretty well off."  This statement misses an opportunity to illuminate the major disparities in standard of living between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in the Arctic even outside of Russia, and rather perpetuates the mainstream attitude of ignorance. It is time that the non-indigenous, Western world, particularly authors in well-regarded, "enlightened" publications,  stop measuring the well-being of indigenous people by a different set of standards. That one indigenous group is marginally better off than another is not a legitimate reason for classifying them as "pretty well off" while ignoring the blatant truth that their standard of living is by and large unjustly misaligned with the standards of developed nation-states in which they reside. 

The author then claims that "Because Europeans came late to the Arctic, the Inuit got rights, not smallpox-infected blankets." Even disregarding the juvenile "smallpox-infected blanket" cliché  that the author uses to sum up the relationship between Europeans and Native people, the implication that Inuit simply "got rights" and somehow escaped the devastation brought by Europeans in myriad ways is outrageous. I would urge the author, or anyone who is unfamiliar with Inuit history, to look into the history of Inuit who were made into traveling entertainment displays by Europeans, who were sent away to horrific residential schools, or who were forced to relocate by their federal governments in more than one instance, just to name a few of the trials that Inuit have endured at the hands of Europeans.  Unfortunately, many instances of these deplorable events happened even after the Inuit had so-called "rights".

Ironically, one cultural element that the author does include in this article is his/her comment that Inuit "are also suffering a wider cultural decline that shows up in a high incidence of alcoholism, obesity and suicide".  Yet, it seems that he or she is unable to understand, or at the very least fails to portray, the connection between this cultural decline and the difficulties and suffering that Inuit have withstood first through unsought contact with Europeans, then through the resulting monumental and expedited changes in lifestyle because of this contact, and finally through the widespread treatment (whether official or inadvertent) of Indigenous people as second-class citizens. 

Finally, the author ends the article with a quote from an Inuk man on a point regarding a potential influx of immigrant workers to Greenland: “Chinese people are not the same as us,” concedes London Mining’s Nuuk representative, Kaj Kleist, “even though they look like us.”  To include the classic base stereotype that Inuit look like Chinese people in this article, even if it is in the words of a native man, is to simply reinforce an ignorant judgement for no apparent purpose. Not to mention, the fact that Kleist "concedes" that Chinese people look like Inuit, and moreover has to explicitly state that they are not the same, leads one to believe that he was prompted by a tasteless inquiry from the aloof author.

Surely the author of this article did not explicitly intend to insult Inuit or to undermine their heritage and their current struggles. On the contrary, at surface level it seems the author thought that he or she was presenting a sympathetic, well-rounded cultural exposé as a part of the larger Special Report on the Arctic. Unfortunately, a non-indigenous, Western perspective appears to be so deeply ingrained into the author that he or she could not escape the use of cultural stereotypes and was unable to consider the subject from a perspective other than his or her own worldview. I again extend my admiration to The Economist for an excellent report on the whole, however I would strongly urge them to strive for a higher degree of cultural sensitivity in the future.

Planned Undersea Fiber-Optic Cable Projects in Arctic as Allegory for Changing Region

By Alison Weisburger With all that’s going on in the High North these days, it’s easy to get fixated on one issue or another as the defining concern for the region: militarization, climate change, shipping routes, the list goes on.  Sometimes, however, it behooves us to take a step back and clarify the basic issues at stake – particularly for the sake of the average person, who, unlike some of us, has not yet re-drawn his or her mental map of the globe to include the North Pole at center. 

It’s often the seemingly benign, overlooked news stories that most effectively illuminate the multifaceted and complex nature of a changing Arctic. I submit to you here one such example. In the past few years, at least three companies have outlined plans for projects to lay undersea fiber-optic cables through the Arctic:

  

Canadian company Arctic Fibre, Inc. plans to start construction in 2013 on a $640 million Canadian dollar project to lay 15,600km fiber-optic cable from London to Tokyo via the Southern part of the Northwest Passage.

Russian firm Polarnet, which plans to build the Russian Optical Trans-Arctic Submarine Cable System, will be the first to begin work on laying fiber-optic cables starting this August. The cables will span approximately 14,700km through the Northern Sea Route, connecting London to Japan, with various connection branches including to Murmansk and Beijing. TeleGeography reports the communications cables will be worth nearly two billion U.S. dollars.

A third project, the Arctic Link, proposed by Alaskan-based Arctic Cable Company, was announced in January 2010 but has faced numerous hurdles, including a $1.2 billion U.S. dollar price tag. The 15,840km Arctic Link is also slated to connect Japan to London, although it will do so through the Northern portion of the Northwest Passage, and have a greater focus on connectivity in rural communities in Alaska rather than Canada. Construction will supposedly begin in 2014. 

I would argue that these fiber-optic cable projects are not only the concrete embodiment of a rapidly changing region, but also serve as a very useful metaphor through which one can understand the broader changes happening in the Arctic, and the implications of those changes.

First, the trend of reduced sea ice in the Arctic Ocean in recent years is what prompted the cable project proposals. Previously impracticable because of the characteristics of the frozen Arctic Ocean, ice conditions between the months of August and October are expected to be favorable for laying cables going forward. This exemplifies the fundamental driving factor of increased activity in the Arctic, be it shipping, tourism, military, resource development, or some other type. Changes in the Arctic environment, namely reduced ice, have expanded accessibility and thus possibility in a region that was once largely inhospitable.

In terms of communication lines, the Arctic Ocean floor is an ideal location for cables because the waters aren’t as heavily trafficked as those in warmer climates, and therefore the chances of being hit by a dropping anchor or being damaged by a fishing trawler are greatly diminished. More generally, the more accessible Arctic is enticing to commercial entities precisely because its space and resources have remained largely underutilized until now. It is, in the minds of many, a fresh slate on which to draw, not yet crowded by development and competition.

Ironically, the unique circumstances in the Arctic that attract companies interested in commercial pursuits also present many operating challenges. To lay the new fiber-optic cables, icebreakers will be needed and polar-class ships will have to be specially outfitted – effective transport through icy waters being a key capacity that will necessarily need to expand with increased activity in the future. Just as it is with all commercial pursuits in the Arctic, anticipated costs for the fiber-optic cable projects are significantly higher than for similar work in other regions of the world.  In addition, environmental conditions still remain risky: fiber-optic cables will have to be placed up to 600 meters below the surface in some places to avoid icebergs that penetrate beneath the ocean floor. Not to mention, the relative lack of activity that makes the region attractive as a quiet arena in which to operate may no longer be the reality in the near future.

There is also the hot button issue of environmental impact. While proponents of the fiber-optic cables describe the projects as environmentally benign, there is bound to be disagreement from groups who believe the Arctic should be off limits to commercial activity in order to protect the fragile environment from further damage. Just as with all other planned activities in the Arctic, the cable projects will have to obtain approval from various governmental impact review boards. This process has itself become somewhat controversial, however, with the definition of acceptable environmental impact and appropriate mitigation plans still widely debated.

The extension of a fiber-optic network through the Arctic will significantly enhance global connectivity, which holds particular import for the high-speed data exchange that global business and financial markets now rely on. Not only does a changing Arctic region mean enhanced virtual connectivity, but it may also mean increased physical connectivity, should the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route develop into the viable shipping lanes that many predict could transform global trade routes. Furthermore, a changing Arctic may mean more for financial markets and businesses than merely faster communications. It is possible that the economic opportunities the region presents could drive investors and companies to take advantage of this new market and integrate it more thoroughly into the global economy.

The fiber-optic cable networks will also improve connectivity for communities in the Far North. Unprecedented change in local communities is a hallmark of the changing Arctic, ever-increased connection to the “Southern” world bringing both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand the modernization of communications in remote Northern communities as a byproduct of the internationally focused cable networks can be seen as a positive force – local communities should rightly benefit from activity that takes place in and near their homeland. However, there is the great challenge of determining what the concept of “benefit” entails, and whether or not the “benefits” from certain commercial activities outweigh what is gained, or simply maintained, by rejecting them.

Finally, the fiber-optic cable projects predictably connect to the vital issues of sovereignty and cooperation in the Arctic. The president of Arctic Fibre, Doug Cunningham, has publicly stated that the Canadian government is pushing along the project because enhanced communications capacity at their Department of National Defense in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut as well as the Canadian High Arctic Research Station translates into stronger Canadian sovereignty in the North. At the same time, the inevitable cross-border nature of the fiber-optic cables drive home the paramount theme in the changing Arctic region: interconnection.

Arctic Winter Games 2012 Continue in Whitehorse, Canada

by Alison Weisburger The Arctic Winter Games (AWG) began this past Sunday in the City of Whitehorse, Yukon Territory, Canada, and will continue March 4th -10th. The AWG, which have taken place every two years since 1970, include the participation of teams from Alaska, Yukon, Northwest Territories, Northern Alberta, Nunavik, Quebec, Nunavut, Greenland, Yamal (Russia), and Sapmi (traditional Saami lands in Norway, Sweden, and Finland). This year, more than 2,000 athletes from across Northern regions will compete in over 20 different sports. 

As the official AWG 2012 website states, “The Arctic Winter Games are a celebration of athletic competition, culture, friendship and cooperation between northern contingents.” The AWG athletic competition includes both classic international sports such as hockey, soccer, and skating, as well as traditional Arctic sports and Dene games such as the high kick, snowsnake, and head pull. There is also a substantial cultural component of the AWG that includes performing and visual arts, ceremonies, and exhibitions representing all nine cultural contingents. 

To some readers, the Arctic Winter Games may seem a trivial event to report on in the face of all of the other more “serious” issues in the Arctic region that The Arctic Institute typically concerns itself with. However, I would argue that what occurs at the Arctic Winter Games is, in fact, closely intertwined with the notion of circumpolar security. 

The stated mission and values of the AWG extend far beyond encouraging athletic competition. The AWG bring the circumpolar world closer together by promoting cultural exhibition and social interchange along with the occasion to celebrate sport. The packed week of events presents many opportunities to strengthen the connections between Arctic communities from different regions and countries and build partnerships. Shared security in the Arctic for all Nations necessarily depends upon the stability and confidence that stems from circumpolar connections, and the AWG present a forum in which these can be built.
 

The AWG also validate indigenous Arctic cultures in a unique way. Indigenous Arctic sports and Dene games are featured in the athletic competition with equal legitimacy and attraction as other international sports. The medals that winning athletes take home are in the shape of an ulu, a type of traditional Inuit knife. The AWG showcase the diversity and vitality of cultures in the far North, and celebrate some traditional elements of Arctic cultures while keeping them relevant in a modern context. The cultural awareness, understanding, and respect that is promoted through the AWG inevitably feed into a broader sense of cooperation and trust among indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, distant regions, and different Nationalities. 

Much like the International Olympics, The Arctic Winter Games promote goodwill and implicitly influence the backdrop against which more imperative political affairs are conducted. In an Arctic where International tensions are poised to flare, the AWG are a reassuring reminder of the underlying cultural connections and ongoing cooperation that uphold a sense of circumpolar security for all.

Pictures courtesy of http://www.arcticwintergames.org, the official website of The Arctic Winter Games. More information about AGW 2012 and the latest results can be found at http://awg2012.org.

A “Science-Based Policy” on Arctic Ocean Oil Drilling in the United States

by Alison Weisburger On January 30th, 2012, the PEW Environment Group and the Ocean Conservancy published a joint full-page advertisement in the New York Times urging President Obama to “Base Arctic Ocean Drilling Decisions on Science, not Politics.” They cite an open letter sent to the President on January 23^rdand signed by over 500 scientists that argues for delaying new oil and gas activity in the U.S. Arctic Ocean until more scientific research is completed. The ad and letter implore the President and his administration to “stand by your commitment to scientific integrity”.

Just over two weeks after the PEW advertisement, on February 17^th 2012, the U.S. Department of the Interior published a press release heralding “Obama Administration Announces Major Steps toward Science-Based Energy Exploration in the Arctic”.  The Obama Administration insists that the decision to move forward with development is “informed by the latest science”. At the press conference, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar highlighted the various initiatives that his Department had to ensure they would bring “the best available science to energy-related decisions in the Arctic”.

Both the environmental advocacy groups as well as the U.S. government assert that their stance on whether or not to proceed with drilling for oil in the Arctic Ocean at this time is based on science. Yet, their views continue to be diametrically opposed despite their public affirmations that scientific information validates each of their positions. If the “science” that both of these groups speak of is truly the systematic, disimpassioned study of facts and truths, how is it possible that their arguments and conclusions are conflicting? I would argue that neither the U.S. government nor environmental advocacy groups can avoid politics in their supposedly “science-based” recommendations for Arctic Ocean oil drilling. Both the environmental groups and the government have value-based priorities that inevitably influence their construal of the body of scientific research.

On the one hand, the Obama administration has displayed a commitment to scientific work and exhaustive review process of plans presented by companies for Arctic Ocean drilling. They have several programs aimed toward expanding scientific research in the Arctic, sharing data, and evaluating further science needs, such as a report on the state of Arctic marine science completed by the U.S. Geological Survey in June of 2011. However, it cannot be denied that the U.S. government has an inherent interest in pursuing Arctic Ocean oil drilling for the economic opportunity it presents for Alaska, and the impact it could have on domestic oil production. Thus, whilst they do not claim that the existing scientific research is fully comprehensive, they argue that there is enough scientific knowledge to support safe and responsible development. Hence, they avow that they embrace “science-based” policy.

Pew: Arctic Ocean Energy Development, February 24, 2012

Edward Itta, Vice Adm. Roger T. Rufe, Marilyn Heiman,
Fran Ulmer, Michael R. Bromwich

In contrast, PEW contends that more time is needed for further research in order to truly formulate a policy that is based on science. As Marilyn Heiman, director of the Arctic program at PEW stated in an interview, “This decision is premature. We need an additional two or three years study to get the science right, to ensure proper monitoring and to protect wildlife.” In other words, in their interpretation the science (or rather, the lack thereof) dictates that the most sound policy decision would be to delay any Arctic Ocean oil drilling. While they are certainly accurate in their assertion that certain gaps in scientific knowledge remain, it is also clear that Pew’s mandate as an environmental advocacy group shapes their conclusion about the level of scientific knowledge needed to proceed safely. Moreover, their arguments conflate a call for “science-based” decisions with advocating the precautionary principle, the latter being their actual point of disagreement with the Obama administration. 

In this case, both environmental advocacy groups like PEW and the U.S. government have demonstrated a serious and sound commitment to scientific research in the Arctic and making decisions based on that science. Nevertheless, they still come to opposing conclusions because  their application of scientific knowledge in decision-making is inevitably shaped by their underlying interests. Perhaps a more productive discussion would rest on the basis that their differing stances on Arctic Ocean oil drilling stem not from some use or misuse of scientific fact in their estimation of the situation, but rather from conflicting overarching philosophies that both find a legitimate way to draw upon science for support. 

There is a need for more transparency about the political stance on BOTH sides of this argument, rather than the current attempts to eclipse the opinionated stances on Arctic Ocean oil drilling with claims that one position or another is “science-based”.  Public campaigns like that of Pew’s Arctic program should certainly be lauded for their illumination of the multifaceted nature of a difficult issue, and their promotion of a counterbalancing stance. However, the parties on both sides of this argument need to act more cautiously in using science as a sword or shield in a battle that is fundamentally about values. 

Channeling Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Knowledge Into an Arctic Region Security Architecture

by Olin Strader and Alison Weisburger Recently one of my colleagues aptly suggested that an Arctic Coast Guard Forum is needed to enhance Arctic security and cooperation. Her comment was made in response to my article calling for an Arctic Council Security Agreement. I couldn’t agree with her more. But I would also suggest that both of these concepts must leverage Arctic indigenous peoples’, indigenous knowledge. This article will focus on channeling indigenous knowledge and political organization into a comprehensive security architecture.

In Tasmaniaʼs capital city Hobart, a plaque in the town square memorializes Sir John Franklin in a poem written by Lord Alfred Tennyson. The poem reads:

Not here! The white north hath thy bones and thou 
Heroic sailor soul 
Art passing on thine happier voyage now 
Toward no earthly pole

What caused the 1846 Franklin expedition to fail and the 1903-1906 Amundsen expedition to succeed? While it is true Amundsen utilized a unique ship design, the primary answer was a reliance on indigenous knowledge. Sir John Franklin’s 1846 Arctic expedition ended in disaster.[1] Arctic archeologists and historians continue to scour the Arctic for clues to the disappearance of Sir John Franklin’s expedition. However, Roald Amundsen is lauded as the man who conquered the North.[2] Both men had extensive Arctic experience. Franklin had taken part in three previous Arctic expeditions, while Amundsen had wintered over in Antarctica prior to successfully navigating the Northwest Passage. Today, those who live below the Arctic Circle are generally ill-equipped to operate and survive in the Arctic without leveraging expertise of Arctic indigenous peoples.

Canada has a model for incorporating Arctic indigenous peoples’ knowledge into their Arctic operations. The Canadian Rangers are a locally and regionally based, Arctic indigenous peoples’ security force who “provide patrols and detachments for employment on national-security and public-safety missions in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which can not conveniently or economically be covered by other elements or components of the Canadian Forces.”[3] The importance of the Canadian Rangers capability is their potential to access areas not conveniently or economically covered by southern-based Canadian Forces. It is the Canadian Rangers ability to employ traditional and modern means in one of the planets harshest environments to provide safety and security in Canada’s North that makes them invaluable.

The authors of this article believe the Canadian Rangers represent a model that should be replicated around the Arctic basin; a model that could serve to strengthen political and ancestral bonds of nations such as the Inuit, Aleuts, Yupiks, the Samii, Laplanders, the Kalaallit and others around the region, while providing forward security for a rapidly changing Arctic. By encouraging Arctic indigenous peoples to take the lead in securing their traditional lands as partners with their Arctic state security services, they can have a stake in how security is provided. Alternately, as the Arctic changes, Arctic indigenous peoples can assist southerners in making sense of changes in the environment and the accompanying hazards. All around the Arctic Circle indigenous peoples, employing indigenous knowledge could provide forward security and safety from Russia, to the United States, Canada to Greenland, Norway to Sweden and Finland and back to Russia.

The means by which Arctic indigenous peoples’ voices are heard today in international affairs is through political organization. Indigenous peoples of the Arctic have self-organized politically as the Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Samii Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and other circumpolar organizations. Today, these same politically-empowered, Arctic indigenous people account for one-eighth of the Arctic’s population of approximately 4 million, a sizable population by any calculation.[5]

The Arctic indigenous peoples of the region have over generations acquired specific traditional knowledge that allows them, despite the harsh climate of the Arctic, to call the region home. This same knowledge, knowledge that helped Amundsen and his crew survive the Arctic’s harsh winters and helps the Canadian Forces today, could be useful to Arctic states’ Coast Guards and defense establishments. As an Alaska-based Coast Guard colleague once suggested to this author, the North Slope Inupaiq could be organized into a Coast Guard auxiliary in support of the Coast Guard’s maritime security and safety missions. A North Slope Coast Guard Auxiliary could then link in with the Canadian Rangers, and the Rangers could link in with the Kalaallit of Greenland. The North Slope Coast Guard Auxiliary could theoretically link in with their Serbian Yupik and Aleut relatives, were they to be employed by the Federal Security Bureau’s, Border Guards. The whole Arctic could, in theory, be ringed by Arctic indigenous peoples providing forward security and safety in the Arctic.

The essential point of all this is leveraging the power of the personal, familial and political ties of Arctic indigenous peoples. Arctic indigenous peoples could represent a critical component of Arctic security because of their personal and political investment in its future. The key component to this arrangement is the benefit it represents to Arctic indigenous communities, providing a meaningful way for them to strengthen their own communities and protect the natural habitat. It provides more positive leadership and role modeling opportunities at home for the next generation of indigenous leaders.

The presence of an indigenous circumpolar security force would foster a much greater sense of cooperation in the Arctic than the ever-present sense that there is the potential for conflict (whether realistic or not) that seems to plague nation-state cooperation in the region. It is worth bearing out that Arctic indigenous peoples are not subject to many of the political pressures, complex patterns of interaction, complicated multi-faceted relationships faced by Arctic states. Organizationally, it is much easier for the ICC and RAIPON to cooperate than it is for, say, Arctic states.

It is a logical next step for the Arctic Council to serve as a vehicle to foster indigenous knowledge and address security challenges. Search and rescue could be something an indigenous peoples' force could excel at, given the right parameters and resources. It would seem logical to combine Arctic Council priorities of indigenous peoples’ participation and search & rescue into one very effective program. Additionally, Arctic indigenous peoples could also play a key role in spill response. Indigenous communities along the coast of Alaska are reported to be regularly trained and equipped by the US Coast Guard to employ spill response capabilities. Would it not be advisable to equip all Arctic indigenous communities with this type of capability?

In conclusion, Arctic indigenous peoples are best suited to serve as forward security and safety in the Arctic. When connected by their political and ancestral ties they represent a powerfully connected community of interest. Because of these powerful bonds, Arctic Council member states should strongly consider ways to leverage Arctic indigenous peoples’ indigenous knowledge and channel it into a comprehensive Arctic security and safety architecture.

Sources:

[1] Wikipedia, “John Franklin”, accessed at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Franklin

[2] Wikipedia, “Roald Amundsen”, accessed at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roald_Amundsen

[3] Canadian National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Canadian Rangers”, accessed at: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/cr-rc/index-eng.asp

[4] Norwegian Polar Institute, “Permanent Representatives of the Arctic Council Map”, accessed at: http://www.polarconservation.org/education/arctic-peoples/arctic-council/permanent-representatives-of-the- arctic-council-map/image_view_fullscreen

[5] The Arctic Council, “Permanent Representatives”, access at: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/ about-us/permanentparticipants

[6] National Defence, “Canadian Rangers Photos”, accessed at: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/ images/reserve/rangers/gallery/intigloo_b.jpg

Cruise Tourism in the Arctic: Recipe for Disaster?

by Alison Weisburger The sinking of the cruise ship Costa Concordia off the coast of Italy has both cruise industry specialists as well as the general public scrutinizing the safety of this form of travel, and contemplating the gravity of the unforeseen environmental consequences of an accident. The catastrophe was certainly keenly sensed even at the furthest ends of the globe - there is perhaps nowhere else on earth where the image of a ship’s crisis situation hits so close to home as the icy, remote, and often unnavigable waters within the polar regions.  

Indeed, the nightmare scenario of a comparable disaster occurring in the North is not far from reality. There have already been several notable accidents in the Arctic: 

The luxury liner Prinsendam, built in 1973, was transiting through Gulf of Alaska waters in 1980 when a fire broke out in the engine room. Eventually, the fire became out of control, and the vessel’s master sent a distress call for immediate assistance and ordered an evacuation. Fortuitously, the supertanker Williamsburgh as well as the United States Coast Guard Cutter Mellon were nearby to assist with the rescue, along with Coast Guard aircraft. In the end there were no serious injuries and all passengers and crew were brought to safety, although one full lifeboat was missing for some 18 hours.

More recently, in 2010, the MV Clipper Adventurer ran aground of a rock in Coronation Gulf, Nunavut in the Canadian Arctic during a cruise. While the ship’s operator originally claimed they had hit an uncharted rock, it was later determined that the hazard was already reported and documented by the Canadian Hydrographic Service.  All passengers and crew were brought to safety.

Also in 2010, the cruise ship Clelia II evacuated all 100 passengers and crew after a strong current pushed it toward a rocky shoreline, disabling the vessel.  Again, with luck, there was another ship nearby to provide assistance. 

While these accidents all had miraculously effective rescues, the case may not always be so. Tourism in the Arctic is heavily on the rise, in large part because of the effects of global climate change that make formerly remote areas accessible to cruise vessels.  Ironically, as a 2007 article in the journal Arctic pointed out, the warming climate may lead to a false sense of optimism about the ease of tourism in Arctic waters, which in fact may become more dangerous to navigate as the character and distribution of ice change. Not to mention, The Explorer, Clipper, and Clelia II were all ice-capable ships – which is not true of all cruise vessels that now venture into Polar waters for tours. 

The potential for cruise ship disasters in the Polar Regions is a serious concern not only for cruise operators interested in the safety of their passengers and crew, but also has broader implications for environmental safety.  There is fear about the damaging pollution resulting from a potential accident should it cause fuel to leak from a ship or, worse, for a ship to submerge entirely in Polar waters. There is also the baseline concern about the environmental effects of increased ship traffic even without incident.

All of that being said, it is unreasonable to ONLY focus on the worse case scenario aspects of Cruise tourism, as did a recent article in Popular Mechanics. Yes, at worst cruise tourism in the Arctic can mean serious safety and security risks and potential environmental degradation. However, the vast majority of the time cruise tourism in the Arctic means a thrilling experience for passengers, an appreciation for the Arctic region, and a boon for the economy of remote areas. 

I suggest that when considering cruise tourism in the Arctic we need to look objectively at the whole picture. It’s easy to descend into alarmist rhetoric about the dangers of passenger vessels that operate in the Arctic, particularly in the shadow of a tragedy like that of the Costa Concordia.  In spite of that, the facts tell a different story – despite accidents, there have been no deaths related to cruise tourism in the Arctic. 

Furthermore, the capability to deal with a disaster involving a ship in the Arctic is of such recognized importance that it is the first issue-area in which cooperation through Arctic Council has produced binding law.  At the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Nuuk in May 2011, the “Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic” treaty became the first international agreement written exclusively for the Arctic region. 

While there certainly is a need to remain attentive to the very serious potential dangers associated with cruise tourism in the Arctic, theorizing about catastrophe should not scare us away from recognizing an industry that could be a boon to the region. In all likelihood, we will see far more benefits from cruise tourism in the Arctic in the next few decades than damaging disasters. Chances are that far more tourists will enjoy an eye-opening and educational experience in the North, while at the same time injecting much-needed capital into remote communities, than will end up shipwrecked. 

Lessons From the Russian Fuel Tanker Resupply of Nome, Alaska

by Alison Weisburger Anyone following Alaskan news in the past few weeks has undoubtedly heard about the saga of the Russian fuel tanker Renda and its journey to deliver fuel to ice-bound Nome. For those who are not up to date on the story, it began back in November when a massive storm prevented Nome from receiving its last barge delivery of home heating fuel, diesel and gasoline for the winter.  By the time the weather calmed down, Nome was already iced-in and it was confirmed that there would be no final fall delivery. At that time, it looked certain that the community would run out of fuel in the spring.  

The only proven method to deliver fuel to Western Alaska in the winter is with aircraft hauling the fuel one airplane load at a time, consuming a vast amount of time and money. In response to the impending crisis, Sitnasuak Native Corporation, the native village corporation of Nome, was able to negotiate a deal with Vitus Marine LLC, an Alaskan-based shipping company, to secure the double hulled Russian tanker Renda to pick up and deliver the fuel.  This will be the first-ever winter fuel delivery from the water in Western Alaska. The tanker will be accompanied by a U.S. Coast Guard’s icebreaker, the Healy.

After traveling around 250 miles a day from a diesel fuel pickup in South Korea, then stopping in Dutch Harbor, Alaska to collect gasoline, the Renda is now on its way to Nome with the cutter Healy. Although the fuel delivery mission is not yet complete, there are already several lessons to take away from this incident about the realities of the Arctic environment, the necessity for advanced Arctic shipping capabilities, and the importance of multi-level cooperation. 

First, the storm in November that prevented a routine barge delivery to Nome serves as a reminder that the Arctic environment continues to be not only harsh, but also extremely volatile. The Arctic remains a place where weather patterns can have a severe impact on commercial activities and ultimately the fate of remote communities, and where there may not always be the technological capability to overcome these hardships. Even if adequate solutions are found to manage the consequences of unpredictable weather, as in this case, they are by no means straightforward or easy. The path through the Bering Sea to Nome will be dictated by day-to-day decision-making based on weather patterns and ice conditions, either of which can change on a dime and complicate the mission. That’s not to mention that any ship operating in the region must have a contingency plan in case of a fuel spill in ice-covered waters – which, if it occurred, would likely involve a complex clean-up operation and potentially devastating impacts on the fragile Arctic ecosystem. 

Another glaring lesson from this event, already commented on by Jason Evans and Alex DeMarban in the Alaska Dispatch and Mike Ahlers for CNN, is that it highlights the limitations of the current U.S. icebreaking capability. The U.S. Coastguard has three icebreakers, however the two Polar class icebreakers are currently out of commission.  The third, the Healy, while a larger and more modern design, is without the full capabilities of the others and does not have the space required for carrying fuel deliveries. Furthermore, its draft is too deep to get within one mile of Nome’s shore. Although the cutter was coincidentally on hand and able to help accompany the Renda, its home port is in Seattle and not in Alaska. The Nome mission has lengthened the deployment of the U.S. Coast Guard crew aboard the Healy, and delayed scheduled repairs to the ship – possibly affecting its scheduled missions for next summer. In contrast to the limited U.S. fleet, Russia has twenty-five icebreakers, Finland and Sweden have seven each, and Canada has six. 

Perhaps the most important lesson from this story, although subtle, is the successful cooperation that occurred between private and public entities, internationally, and intergovernmentally, that enabled the mission to go forward. It was largely the collaborative efforts of two private entities, Sitnasuak and Vitus Marine, to find a solution for the impending fuel shortage in Nome. They were able to collaborate across international borders in Russia, and then proceeded to get the U.S. government involved. Both the state government of Alaska and the federal government have a role in the mission through multiple departments including the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Alaska Department of Conservation. This event has highlighted that the Arctic region consists of a web of interconnected actors that often function on vastly different levels for diverse purposes, but nevertheless need to effectively collaborate when there is an urgent situation.

If the Renda reaches Nome and delivers the fuel successfully, as is planned by late Sunday or early Monday, it will be a cause for celebration.  Not only is this delivery critical for the community of Nome, but it also marks an historic accomplishment of winter shipping in Alaska. However, it should also serve as a time of reflection on the lessons that can be taken away from the mission and a reminder of what factors need to be taken into consideration in the future as activities in the Arctic region intensify. 

The Shadow of Historic Polar Exploration on Contemporary Arctic Affairs

by Alison Weisburger As December 14th marked the hundredth anniversary of Roald Amundsen’s achievement as the first man to reach the South Pole, there have been many articles in various popular news sources  for example in The New York Times and in The Independent, about this accomplishment in the context of the “heroic age” of polar exploration. This period, ranging from around the middle of the 19th century until the early 1920s, encompasses not only the first successful expeditions to both the South and North Poles, but also a litany of famous explorers alongside Amundsen whose stories have lived on in the public imagination: Robert Falcon Scott, Robert E. Peary, Frederick A. Cook, Ernest Shackleton, Knud Rasmussen, Adolphus Greely, and many more too numerous to name. 

The extent of the South Pole centenary recognition in the press, and similar coverage during the centenary of Peary’s claimed successful North Pole expedition two years ago, seems to present evidence of the public’s continuing fascination with exciting tales from the age of heroic polar exploration. In turn, this has prompted me to consider the connections between historic polar exploration and contemporary polar politics. As the governance system of Antarctica was largely resolved in the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, I am going to focus my attention on how the legacy of the age of heroic polar exploration has greatly influenced the current perceptions, and therefore to some extent the current state of political affairs, in the Arctic.
While Kathrin Keil has already pointed out in a previous article for The Arctic Institute that the Arctic and Antarctic regions are quite distinct when it comes to “political, economic, military, institutional, social and cultural characteristics”, it is safe to say that an area in which they do share many similarities is in their stories of heroic age polar exploration that have emerged and flourished in collective memory. 

I would suggest that these historic expeditions are not only important as the concrete predecessors to further activities in the Polar Regions, but are also significant because they propagate a certain narrative about the Polar Regions that has actual implications for how the regions are understood and consequently utilized and governed today. In other words, when decision-makers, scholars, and the general public are unavoidably exposed to the pervasive history of heroic age of exploration, this influences the way that they construe contemporary politics in the Arctic.

Perhaps the most obvious specter of the heroic age of polar exploration on current perceptions of the Arctic is seen in the often repeated, although not necessarily substantiated, warning of a contemporary “race” for Arctic resources. It was during the heroic age of exploration that this notion of a race in the Polar Regions germinated: Would it be Scott or Amundsen to the South Pole first? Who really made it to the North Pole first – Peary, Cook, or neither man? 

Competition is so deeply ingrained in the Western history of the Polar Regions, that it is difficult for most people to comprehend activities in the Arctic without envisioning some sort of antagonism between the actors. Moreover, competition seems to be what makes stories about the Polar Regions appealing to the public – you rarely read a story about Amundsen without hearing about Scott, or Peary without Cook. The consequence of this, however, is that we will continue to see the now common characterizations of the contemporary situation in the Arctic as a “race” rather than as the generally cooperative, stable region that it has thus far proven to be.

Another depiction of the Polar Regions that has seemed to carry over from the heroic age of exploration is that of the Arctic and Antarctic as somehow beyond the limits and limitations of civilization. This notion is upheld by both historic and contemporary assertions that the Arctic landscape is blank, empty, null, and devoid. Paradoxically, this characterization has led to divergent movements in contemporary Arctic affairs. On the one hand, staunch environmentalists make the case that the “pristine” Arctic landscape should remain protected from the infringement of “civilization” (i.e. resource development, shipping, and the associated infrastructure). In contrast, proponents of development argue that the Arctic is the last great empty frontier for expansion and growth of “civilization”.

Building upon this characterization of the Arctic and Antarctic as uniquely undefined regions distinct from the rest of the globe, during the heroic age of Polar exploration explorers treated the Polar Regions as blank white stages on which they could prove something – be it their nation’s strength, their masculinity, or their personal pride. Today, it seems that the Arctic still plays this role of a stage on which nations try to prove themselves. Just as historic expeditions to the Polar Regions are interpreted as illustrations of the true character of various explorers, the contemporary activities of actors in the Arctic are likewise rendered as performances that reveal some underlying strength or weakness. Thus, each Arctic nation must validate its presence in the region through public displays or verbal testaments of their power.

In conclusion, I am not trying to argue that the legacy of the heroic age of polar exploration dominates everyone’s perceptions of the Arctic or the direction of Arctic politics. Still, I am convinced that it is critical to recognize the ways in which history casts its shadow on the present. While I did not have the space in this article to thoroughly elaborate on all of the connections between historic exploration and the contemporary Arctic, I hope I have made it clear that there are indeed linkages between the two that deserve further attention.

It is fantastic that the thrilling stories of Amundsen and other Polar explorers remain entertaining and popular even one hundred years later. However, the danger to contemporary Arctic affairs is that we like the narratives from the heroic age of polar exploration so well that we just keep telling ourselves the same old stories without looking more closely at the contemporary reality. 

Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. Approves New Resource Revenue Policy

By Alison Weisburger Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI), the birthright corporation to which all Nunavut Inuit belong as dictated by the Nunavut constitution, approved a new resource revenue policy that has been two years in the making.  As is stated in the official document, “the objective of the policy is to establish a clear, efficient and consensus-based policy to govern the use of a portion of the economic benefits derived from mineral resource development in Nunavut.”  

The policy applies to royalties from all mines on Inuit Owned Lands (IOLs), the domain of which were apportioned during the Nunavut land claims agreement. The primary feature of the policy is the requirement for a minimum 12 per cent Net Profit Interest Royalty.  The policy has been deemed applicable for all resource revenue since April 1, 2011. 

The revenue is to be paid into a Resource Revenue Trust that will be managed by seven trustees consisting of the president of NTI, the presidents of the three Regional Inuit Associations (RIA) in Nunavut, and three independent trustees. Fifty percent of revenue collected will go to an operating fund, while the other half of revenue will go to an endowment fund.  Income from the operating fund, after deducting operating costs, will be distributed annually based on a distribution formula of 30% to NTI, 10% for each RIA, and 40% to the RIAs split on a per capita basis. Income from the endowment fund will be distributed annually on the same distribution formula after the value of the fund exceeds $100 million.

The NTI press release on the policy summarizes how the income of the trust fund is to be spent after it is distributed: “Expenditures shall be for the purpose of providing both near-term and long-term sustainable benefits, and may be for economic, social, cultural, environmental or other purposes. Unless approved by NTI membership in exceptional circumstances, expenditures will not be made by NTI or an RIA in areas where government has primary responsibility.” Each RIA will be the primary decision-maker on the expenditure of the portion of trust funds that it receives, although any form of direct monetary distribution will need approval from at least 75% of NTI members. 

While this resource revenue policy was ostensibly created by NTI with the best interests of Nunavut Inuit in mind, and was approved by the representative members of NTI, there remains widespread disagreement within the wider Inuit community surrounding natural resource development on their lands.  Natural resource development and the corresponding resource revenue agreements on Inuit owned lands are controversial precisely because there are a wide variety of positions when it comes to defining the “best interests” of Inuit and the most effective ways to pursue these interests.

On the one hand, NTI has a strong case that the economic benefits derived from mineral development on IOLs through this resource revenue policy will bolster Inuit economy in Nunavut as never before. The mining industry has already spent $2.44 billion in Nunavut since 1999. There are now 82 active mining properties in Nunavut that contain gold, iron, silver, uranium, and other minerals. 

At least ten of these mines are very large properties expected to go into go into production within this decade. NTI President Cathy Towtongie has stated that NTI’s conservative predictions estimate that the policy will bring in around $2 billion in royalties over the next several decades. Towtongie has publicly asserted her confidence that resource revenue sharing is the right way forward for Inuit: “One of the last frontiers in the world is Nunavut and this is the way to plan for it — to create economic certainty for future generations.”

Nevertheless, even some Inuit who find natural resource development on IOLs acceptable still have reasons to criticize the structure of NTI’s revenue sharing policy. First, there is disappointment that the policy only applies to net profits, which are determined by the internal accounting of the mining companies. Net profits can differ greatly from gross profits depending on how much revenue is allotted to cover operating costs, salaries and wages, and various other expenses. 

Furthermore, there is a certain level of mistrust among some Inuit not only regarding the transparency and fairness of royalties calculated by resource development corporations, but also surrounding how NTI itself will manage and distribute money in the trust fund. The trustees of the resource revenue fund reserve the right to remove funds to cover operating expenses as they deem fit – a dangerous loophole in the eyes of those who are worried about the abuse of power for personal monetary gain that they have perceived in the past by the leaders of other native-run institutions.
Moreover, resource development has historically contributed little to sustainable economic development in the North.  A major concern is that even with a significant amount of revenue flowing into the trust and being distributed fairly, any investments made from this money will be worthless without the basis of a sustainable Northern economy and strong, healthy communities to build upon. 

Even more critical of NTI’s policy are Inuit who outright oppose natural resource development, arguing that the extraction of non-renewable resources is unsustainable by definition.  As precedent has suggested, “royalty regimes can promote development that can negatively affect the social, cultural, and environmental well being not only of their immediate areas, but in neighboring jurisdictions.”

Thus, while at face value the approval of this resource revenue policy by NTI may appear to represent consensus among Inuit about their position and expectations regarding mineral development on IOLs, this belies a much more nuanced truth.  Both outsiders and Inuit themselves need to keep in mind the myriad perspectives on the most advantageous way to go about natural resource development on Inuit Owned Lands in Nunavut, if at all. 

This is not to deny that there is potentially enormous economic profitability for Inuit in Nunavut as a result of this prudent policy that secures revenue just when mineral development on IOLs in Nunavut is on the cusp of substantial growth. However, it is important to acknowledge that while the passage of this resource revenue policy attempts to ensure benefits to Inuit, it does not unconditionally guarantee a beneficial outcome from mineral development. 

Coca-Cola and World Wildlife Fund Launch “Arctic Home” Campaign for Polar Bear Protection

by Alison Weisburger On October 25th the Coca-Cola Company announced a new campaign in partnership with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) to raise money to protect the polar bear’s Arctic habitat. From November to February 2012, 1.4 billion Coke cans in the U.S. and Canada will for the first time be colored white with a polar bear graphic, rather than the classic red, to raise awareness and funds for the campaign.

Coca-Cola has pledged $2 million dollars to WWF’s polar bear habitat conservation efforts in the Arctic, and is asking others to join the cause by donating $1 to WWF through a text message including a Coke product package code. Coca-Cola has committed to match all text donations up to an additional $1 million dollars.

The partnership between Coke and WWF is unsurprising, given their collaboration on other environmental campaigns in the past. Additionally, the polar bear has served as one of Coca-Cola’s holiday icons since 1922, and more recently has emerged as a symbol of climate change.  The “Arctic Home” campaign leverages Coca-Cola’s pervasive brand image and WWF’s well-established conservation legacy to raise awareness of the climate-related challenges that polar bears are facing.

As the President and CEO of WWF, Carter Roberts, explained in a press release, "polar bears inspire the imagination. They're massive, powerful, beautiful and they live nowhere else except the Arctic. Their lives are intimately bound up with sea ice, which is now melting at an alarming rate.” There is strong evidence from the scientific community that global climate change is causing significant physical changes in the Arctic that seriously threaten polar bear habitat and survival. Polar bears are already listed as threatened under the U.S. Endangered Species Act.

WWF’s stated vision for protecting the polar bear’s habitat includes a proposal to “work with local indigenous people and governments to create the most appropriate management plan for an area in Canada and Greenland that is home to a natural ‘safety net’ of ice which scientists believe may persist longer than the ice anywhere else.”  They refer to this area in the high Arctic where the summer sea ice will likely persist the longest as the “Last Ice Area”, and it could potentially cover 500,000 square miles.

WWF has highlighted in its literature that preserving a home for the ice-dependent polar bear could also help protect the cultural and economic needs of local people. Gerald Butts, the President and CEO of WWF Canada, recently remarked in an article in the Vancouver Sun that “it is important to not only help the iconic wildlife, but also the people and communities that have been in the Canadian Arctic for 8,000 years in some cases.”

Of course, there continue to be climate change skeptics who write off Coca-cola and WWF’s campaign as alarmist and call it “a hoax”. While denying that global climate change is real and refusing to accept that polar bear populations are indeed in danger are rather radical stances, there are nevertheless other reasons to assess the “Arctic Home” campaign critically.

First, while Coca-Cola may claim that it is their commitment to a sustainable environment that drives their partnership with WWF, it must be acknowledged that the underlying force is business.  The company hopes that the campaign will boost fall and winter sales, enticing people to purchase their product by promoting doing so as a charitable and environmentally conscious act.

Furthermore, despite WWF’s stated commitment to local populations, environmental campaigns to protect animal species in the Arctic do not have a great track record of positive outcomes for indigenous peoples. For example, the “Save the Seals” campaign that first began in the late1960s eventually spelled disaster for a large share of local economy in Canada and consequently negatively impacted other aspects of Inuit life.

Finally, while centering an environmental campaign on a charismatic species like the polar bear certainly capitalizes on the emotional responses of the public, doing so unfortunately eclipses many other important Arctic issues.  Moreover, the campaign name “Arctic Home” and the corresponding website further perpetuate flawed stereotypes about the Arctic region as an inherently valuable, “pristine” home to wildlife where human communities and their activities are only of secondary importance.

Coca-Cola and WWF should certainly be lauded for their well-meaning efforts to protect a threatened Arctic species through funding quality scientific research and collaborating with local communities.  However, both those organizations and the general population should be wary of the motivations and the unintended consequences of such a prominent public environmental campaign.