Showing posts with label nato. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nato. Show all posts





Ukraine Crisis and the Arctic: Penalties or Reconciliation?
By Andreas Østhagen, April 30, 2014



Canada’s recent decision to boycott an Arctic Council task force meeting held in Moscow is a direct example of how the Ukraine conflict is starting to impact Arctic cooperation. Given its prominent position in the Arctic, however, Russia is integral to most schemes for the region’s future development. As vocalized by both former US Secretary of State, Clinton, and the current Prime Minister of Iceland, Gunnlaugsson, the Ukraine crisis might have a severe and unintended impact on Arctic cooperation [1].

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The impact of the events in Ukraine for Arctic cooperation will be neither straight forward nor harmonized across the region. Instead it will vary according to the interests of the different Arctic states. They could decide to use the Arctic as an arena for penalizing Russia further or use it to engage Russia in dialogue. Currently, officials dealing with Arctic affairs are asking themselves what exactly these consequences will be, deciding whether to take further action (like Canada) or issue warnings (like Iceland).

Economic Development

First, the immediate and direct impact of decisions taken outside of an Arctic context could hamper Russia’s strongest interest in the Arctic, namely economic development. Sanctions put in place by the European Union and the United States have the potential to affect the multitude of European and American companies engaged in developing the vast resource potential in the Yamal, Nenets and Kara Sea regions. Highlighting this, on April 28 sanctions were put in place by the US on Rosneft’s president, Igor Sechin [2].

This summer ExxonMobil alone is scheduled to conduct some of the most expensive exploratory drillings in the history of offshore oil and gas development in the Kara Sea through its joint venture with Rosneft [3]. BP is similarly dependent on Rosneft after TNK-BP was incorporated into the Russian oil giant in 2013, leaving BP with 19.5 percent of Rosneft’s shares [4]. Should further sanctions be put in place limiting western companies dealings with Russian energy companies, from either the Russian or the EU/US side, Arctic economic development in Russia will take a hit.

Cancelling Cooperation

In terms of direct cooperation in the Arctic sphere, exclusion of Russia or the boycotting of various Arctic meetings by one or several of the Arctic states have the potential to derail the relatively well-established modes of collaboration that have developed in the Arctic. Canada’s decision not to attend the Arctic Council task force meeting in Moscow last week is a minor, but still significant symbol of how Arctic cooperation is affected by the international crisis further south [5].

Similarly, Russian officials were not invited to take part in a pre-meeting to the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum in Sydney, Novia Scotia on March 31, where the establishment of an Arctic Coast Guard Forum was discussed. The planned Northern Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) meeting scheduled for June in Iceland seems likely to be postponed as well, as could be expected. The Northern CHODs forum is one of the few arenas, in addition to the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, where all the Arctic states convene to discuss hard security matters. Consequently several of the informal and formal arenas where civilian and military issues in the Arctic are discussed are put on hold.

Various Interests
Yet, Russia’s participation in the high level Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) meeting under the Canadian chairmanship in Yellowknife on March 25-27 proceeded as planned. In the Arctic Coast Guard Forum meeting it was also pointed out that any coast guard forum for the Arctic without the Russians present would prove futile, given Russia’s predominant role in Arctic maritime matters. For the United States and the Scandinavian countries such an approach seems only logical, given adjacent maritime borders that involve shared fish stocks and natural resource deposits. This highlights the importance of maintaining a working relationship with Russia on specific issues for some of the Arctic states, albeit these interests vary amongst the Arctic countries.

For decades Norway’s collaboration with Russia on the joint management of fish stocks in the Barents Sea has been promoted as a model for dealing with Russia on a sensitive topic that entails both a civilian and a military dimension [6]. Similarly, the 2010 maritime delimitation agreement was highly motivated by a desire in both countries to develop potential petroleum resources in the former disputed maritime area. Related cooperation between Russia and Norway has expanded since [7].

Although Sweden and Finland do not share a maritime border with Russia, Finland in particular has an extensive land boundary and is dependent on a rational working relationship with its larger neighbor. Just in terms of border crossings, Finland issued 1.3 million visas to Russia in 2013, a third of all Schengen entry visas going to Russia, according to the BarentsObserver [8]. As argued by Finland’s Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, Stubb, Finland is heavily dependent on Russia’s economic trajectory and the consequences of the Ukraine crisis might be severe for the Finnish economy [9].

In the Bering Sea the US and Russia have a long standing collaboration on research and management of fish stocks, in particular with regards to the Alaskan Pollock [10]. For the last 19 years Russia and the US have worked together in this maritime area, and as ship traffic is increasing, the need for collaboration is only set to increase [11]. Combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the area has already been stated as one of the main goals in the US’ Arctic Implementation Plan from January 2014 [12]. Also, as most vessels frequenting the Bering Sea are fishing boats, the potential northern movement of fish stocks due to temperature increases as seen in the North Atlantic will force the vessels to move further north and demand even greater coordination and collaboration between Russian and US coast guards, similar to what has developed in the Barents Sea.

Russia’s Primacy in the Arctic

The different Arctic states all have their own «special» relationships with Russia, with varying degrees of interdependency and collaboration. Related, it is less counterproductive to Canada’s Arctic interests to take a strong stance towards Russia than it is for some of the Scandinavian countries. The seven Arctic states excluding Russia also do not form any cohesive block against Russia, in part due to the fact that membership in international organizations vary between NATO and the EU (5 NATO members and 3 EU members – only Denmark overlaps).

Yet, coordinated efforts to exclude Russia from specific Arctic forums have been – and will probably continue to be – put in place. We should, however, not forget that Russia is the largest of all the Arctic actors, measured in everything from population to economic activity and resource potential. Efforts to deal with environmental pollution, search and rescue, and common standards in the Arctic have also been developed with a lowest common denominator approach, depending on all the Arctic states engaging and signing up to the agreements. Therefore, having Russia onboard on Arctic-related agreements is not only preferable, but also essential to ensure a responsible development in the Arctic.

Conclusion – An Arena for Penalties or Reconciliation?

In sum, Russia is dependent on a positive Arctic development, while the country is also integral to most of the development in the region. The other Arctic states undoubtedly have an obligation to act on proceedings in Ukraine, yet on a lower working level many of them are heavily dependent on continuing business as usual in various areas where Russia constitutes an essential partner. Therefore, the somewhat inconsistent responses with regards to various Arctic domains are likely set to continue.

In previous periods of high tension between Russia and the west, the Arctic has actually served as a theatre for continued cooperation. A good example of this is the 2008 Georgia crisis where collaboration in the Arctic was almost unscathed, arguably also serving as an arena for normalizing relationships as the crisis ended. What role will the Arctic have this time around? That depends on the extent to which Russia will continue to paint itself into a corner, and whether the other Arctic states choose to use the region as an arena for penalties or reconciliation.




[6] See for example Hønneland, Geir (2007), “International Cooperation and Arctic Governance: Regime Effectiveness and Arctic Governance”, London & New York: Routledge.



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Perspective Correction: How We Misinterpret Arctic Conflict




By Tom Fries War and conflict sell papers -- the prospect of war, current wars, remembrance of wars past. Accordingly, a growing cottage industry devotes itself to writing about the prospect of conflict among the Arctic nations and between those nations and non-Arctic states, which is mostly code for “China.” As a follower of Arctic news, I see this every day, all the time: eight articles last week, five more already this week from the Moscow Times, Scientific American or what-have-you. Sometimes this future conflict is portrayed as a political battle, sometimes military, but the portrayals of the states involved are cartoonish, Cold-War-ish...it’s all good guys and bad guys.

I’m convinced that this is nonsense, and I feel vindicated when I see the extent to which these countries' militaries collaborate in the high North. From last week's meeting of all eight Arctic nations' military top brass (excepting only the US; we were represented by General Charles Jacoby, head of NORAD and USNORTHCOM) to Russia-Norway collaboration on search & rescue; from US-Canada joint military exercises to US-Russia shared research in the Barents...no matter where you look, the arc of this relationship bends towards cooperation.

But there's a bigger misconception that underlies the predictions of future Arctic conflict that we read every week. This is the (usually) unspoken assumption that the governments of these states are capable of acting quickly, unilaterally and secretly to pursue their interests in the Arctic. False.

This idea that some state might manage a political or military smash-and-grab while the rest of us are busy clipping our fingernails or walking the dog is ridiculous. The overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that the governments of the Arctic states are, like most massive organizations, bureaucratic messes. Infighting between federal agencies is rampant all around, as are political shoving matches between federal and state/provincial/regional governments. Money is still scarce, and chatter about military activism isn’t backed up by much: Canada is engaged in a sad debate over the downgrading of the proposed Nanisivik port; the United States’ icebreaker fleet is barely worth mentioning and shows little sign of new life in the near-term future; US Air Force assets are being moved 300+ miles south from Fairbanks to Anchorage; and Russia’s talk about a greater Arctic presence has been greatly inflated for the sake of the recent elections. In a more general sense, we have viciously polarized governments in the US and, to a lesser extent, Canada, as well as numerous “hotter” wars elsewhere that will take the lion’s share of our blood and treasure before the Arctic gets a drop of either.

The smaller states might be able to act more nimbly, but Norway and Denmark are successful Scandinavian social-market economies with modestly-sized militaries who aren’t likely to put military adventurism in the Arctic at the top of their to-do lists. They’re also patient decision-makers who are making apparently sincere (if not always successful) efforts to incorporate their resident indigenous communities into national politics. This makes fast, unilateral, secret action unlikely.

And then there is Russia. From the outside, it can often seem as though the Russian government rules by fiat. This reasonably leads to the concern that someone might take it into his head to assert Russia’s military might or otherwise extend the country’s sovereignty in the Arctic. But it is fairly clear that Russia’s success is currently, and for the near-term future, dependent on its position within the constellation of global hydrocarbon suppliers. To continue to develop its supply base, Russia needs the assistance of the oil majors of neighboring states, and indeed it is showing signs of warming up to foreign engagement with its Arctic hydrocarbons in significant ways. Its political relationships with its regular customers are also critical to its future success. Russia isn’t likely to wantonly sour those relationships by acting aggressively against all four of its wealthy, well-networked littoral brothers in Europe and North America. 

It’s not only the handcuffs of many colors worn by the Arctic states that will keep them from getting aggressive, it is also the good precedents that exist for cooperation here. Russia and Norway recently resolved a forty year-old dispute over territory in the Barents. There are regular examples of military cooperation among the four littoral NATO states and between Norway and Russia. Even the US and Russia are finding opportunities to work together. Meanwhile, the need to develop search-and-rescue capabilities is making cross-border cooperation a necessity for all Arctic actors. There are numerous international research and private-sector ventures, even in areas other than hydrocarbons. These will only grow in importance with time. In fact, it would seem that for many of these countries, the Arctic is a welcome relief - a site where international collaboration is comparatively amicable.

But there is indeed a competition underway in the Arctic. It isn’t between states; it is the competition between categories of actors to set norms and precedents that, though unwritten, will guide the development of the region. We see this competition in the complicated jockeying between states, indigenous organizations, the Arctic Council itself, academia, military coalitions (e.g. NATO), extractive industries and environmental groups, among others. The central prize is neither oil, nor data, nor pristine wilderness but instead the privilege of deciding which issues enjoy the sunlight of attention and which are dealt with quietly in the shadows. Many venues exist already for debate and conflict resolution, but who will decide which issues make it onto the docket in these venues? Perhaps more importantly, who will get to decide what the public hears and learns to care about? It may be that, for the moment, the hydrocarbon industry is doing a good job of pressing its suit. Its victories set precedents for elsewhere in the Arctic, but they also imply suboptimal outcomes for other classes of actors, who will be adapting and innovating to better press their cases in different venues and through different channels.

There are many Arctic issues already settled by UNCLOS and other legal regimes. But there are also numerous issues yet to be resolved, and the letter of existing law is rarely so iron-clad that there is no room for interpretation. As the North becomes the focus of increasing interest, which category of actor will be writing the rules? Time will tell.



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Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff Conference - An Opportunity to Formalize Arctic Security





By Olin Strader Canadaʼs hosting of the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHOD) at Goose Bay, April 12-13, is an auspicious occasion in the evolution of 21st century Polar Affairs. Itʼs a step toward asserting Canadian leadership as Prime Minister Harperʼs government is set to assume the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2013. Canada has a number of interests that are served by promoting such a forum. Canada, next to the Russian Federation, has the largest claim to Arctic territory and the second most to safeguard. Canada has several Arctic territorial disputes it wants to resolve with the United States and Denmark, two NATO allies. Canada is also the only nation with an indigenous population that compromises a territory on a vector to become a co-sovereign province. 

Furthermore, Canada, Russia and Denmark are all set to submit their seabed claims to the International Seabed Authority. Establishing dialogue and trust among the CHODs could prevent misunderstandings resulting from competing seabed claims. But beyond hosting the meeting Canada could achieve something even more lasting. How well this meeting goes may determine the future of this body. The question is, what should we expect from this inaugural Arctic CHODʼs Conference?

General Walter Natynczykʼs spokesperson has suggested the agenda will include search and rescue, northern environmental challenges and military-aboriginal relations. Ironically, these issues parallel the current agenda of the Arctic Council, the body Canadaʼs government played a leading role in creating. It stands to reason that Canada recognizes an opportunity to create an Arctic security forum. By creating sufficient consensus among Arctic CHODs, General Natynczyk could create something that endures, something that will contribute to a peaceful opening of the Arctic and cement cooperative security relationships among the Arctic eight. 

To ensure this forum endures, a declaration of security cooperation should be agreed upon by the Arctic CHODs that outlines foundational principles, an overarching purpose and objectives, and agrees to the maintenance of a dialogue through recurrent meetings. This will require CHODs to engage their governments beforehand so they can provide substance to a potential declaration. Hopefully, Arctic Defence staffs see the opportunities in the same light and will prepare their CHODs appropriately.

Beyond a formal declaration, and outside the confines of regularly agreed CHODs meetings, a more robust dialogue should be opened between staffs designed to hammer out the more mundane, but critically important details such as meeting frequency, guidelines for hosting, secretarial responsibilities, a chair rotation schedule, instruments for recording decisions, means of communication, etc. But there will be more substantial issues that must be addressed in later CHOD forums. 

For example, what will the relationship be both now and in the future between the CHODs forum and the Arctic Council member states, the Permanent Participants and Observers? What are the identifiable threats to Arctic states mutual interests and how might they be cooperatively and constructively countered? How can Arctic states better cooperate, be it through exercises, combined operations, communications, exchanges, information sharing and other such cooperative mechanisms? What should the role of indigenous populations and Coast Guards be in Arctic security? More specifically what should be the role of Coast Guard Commandants in the CHODʼs forum? Furthermore, what should be the limitations of the forum? For instance, what should be the limits of the relationship with other international organizations like the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Ultimately the work of the combined staffs should generate a draft security agreement that can be approved by Arctic states, with the goal being inauguration of enduring Arctic cooperative security.

Canadaʼs initiative to host a CHODs conference represents a hope for a new chapter in Arctic security. A chapter defined by security cooperation based on mutual interests. The world will be watching this meeting. If Canadaʼs role in the formation of the Arctic Council is any indicator this CHODs forum should not disappoint. 


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Looking North: Britain’s Revitalised Interest in the Northern Areas of Europe




By Duncan Depledge On 6 March British Defence Secretary Philip Hammond and his Norwegian counterpart Espen Barth Eide signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) ‘On the Enhancement of Bilateral Defence Co-operation’. The MoU provides a political framework for developing and furthering bilateral cooperation and relations in defence and security matters ‘in order to achieve more cost-efficient, more available and more useable capabilities for Norway and the UK and for the [NATO] Alliance’. This agreement with Norway is the surest sign yet of revitalised British interest in the northern areas of Europe. 

As the UK defence community reflects on a decade of “war on terror”, the long-term effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the implications of substantial cuts to defence capabilities, the British government is faced with issues that cut right to the heart of questions about what kind of international presence the UK should have for the purposes of defence. Frustrated by what appears to be a lack of commitment from European partners [1], anxious about whether the US will continue to support NATO [2], and aware that it simply cannot sustain levels of defence expenditure seen during the Blair years [3], the Coalition government has sought defence assurances in bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

While engagement with the Nordic and Baltic countries has been stepped up, it is the relationship with close ally (and Arctic coastal state) Norway which is showing the most tangible signs of progress. The UK’s defence agreement with Norway comes after similar Memoranda of Understandings struck in the last two years on oil and gas exploration, the development of offshore wind farms, a North Sea power grid, biotechnology and scientific/cultural cooperation in the polar regions.  However, it is the latest MoU on defence co-operation which is perhaps the most significant, confirming that Britain’s relationship with Norway and northern Europe more broadly matters to defence and security policy. 


Renewed attention to the so-called Northern Flank is not just about joint capabilities and interoperability. It is also about the increasing relevance of northern (including Arctic) areas to Britain, both politically and economically, themes reflected in the latest MoU. Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has not been a particularly northward-looking nation, as conflicts and interests in other parts of the world have taken precedence.  However, at least three considerations appear to have inspired a shift in thinking.

The first concerns purely defence collaboration. As Britain contends with on-going uncertainty in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, alongside defence cuts, co-operation with Norway and other northern countries addresses security concerns closer to home, offering new possibilities for so-called ‘Smart Defence’. Secondly, as Britain’s economic strength has faltered, the current government has increasingly looked to Nordic countries in particular for routes to the economic prosperity deemed central to UK Grand Strategy.[4]

The third consideration is more long-term. It concerns the strategic significance of sea ice in the Arctic region. The rise in average global temperature which is being driven largely by sustained emissions of greenhouse gases over the past two centuries is forcing considerable changes to take place in the Arctic. The sea ice is melting, both in terms of its extent and its thickness. Sea ice in the summer could disappear almost completely in the coming decade depending on which projections we rely on.[5]Combined with technological development, willing investors and political determination (all of which abounded at the recent Arctic Frontiersconference in Tromsø, Norway) the opening up of new energy provinces and shipping lanes seems increasingly likely, although not necessarily in the form of a ‘scramble’ as some in the media might imagine.

While the Arctic was not mentioned in the SDSR or the most recent National Security Strategy (NSS), concerns about climate change and resource competition were, and continue to be, indicative of the way in which broader defence and security issues already reach into the region.[6]The potential risks identified in the NSS Risk Register associated with an international crisis, disruption to trade, and concerns about energy could all be relevant in the High North.[7] It is an issue which former Defence Secretary Liam Fox attached a firm importance to, and as this latest MoU indicates with explicit reference to ‘strategic surveillance and situational awareness in the High North’, part of the rationale for closer defence cooperation between the UK and Norway. As things stand, the Ministry of Defence’s interest in the northern areas ‘has never been greater’, a trend reflected more broadly across Whitehall, especially in the range of issues being actively contemplated.[8]

However, we must not conflate interest with alarm. At present, and we must hope this remains, there are very few problems for the defence community to solve in the Arctic.[9]For the time-being, activities in the North are most likely to be confined to energy development, scientific research and tourism, none of which represents novelty per se. The level of shipping is growing, but from a virtually non-existent base. The attention of the defence community is therefore demanded for other reasons; reasons which now have an added edge to them if Britain is to be a credible partner for her northern allies.

The first reason is a need to map out detailed knowledge of the changes underway in the Arctic, whether physical, political, social or economic. Contrary to what many people in the UK seem to think, the Arctic is not an empty space relevant only to science and economic interests. There are social, political and legal issues to resolve in the region and as the ice melts, it seems inevitable that more and more actors will wish to be involved. There is consequently a need for experts to find out as much as possible about how such change is likely to pan out and to make future-facing judgements about risk and opportunity.

The second reason is the need for British policy planners to appreciate the significance of the changes taking place and the strategic consequences they will have for the United Kingdom. As the recent SDSR demonstrated, much will still have to change before this becomes instinctive. There is a strategic gap as well as a knowledge gap.[10]If we do not know why the Arctic matters to Britain (i.e., what Britain’s interests are in the region), how can we possibly engage with it in any meaningful, let alone justifiable, way?

The third reason is about having relevance in the region: for Britain and for Britain’s defence partners in the North. It is difficult to see how Britain can make a credible contribution to the defence of the northern areas of Europe without detailed knowledge and awareness of the changes taking place there. Moreover, hard questions need to be asked about whether Britain has the physical capability to be relevant in the northern areas, while at the same time maintaining its commitment to other pressing defence issues.

In light of this, recent moves by the current government to demonstrate increased attention to the northern areas of Europe are being received positively, particularly in Norway. The government’s various initiatives to strengthen cooperation through the Northern Group of Defence Ministers and various MoUs is an important step along the way towards knowing your counterparts, developing joint capabilities and interoperability, and appearing as a credible partner. It is clear that there will be regular contact between the UK Defence Secretary and his opposite numbers in northern Europe over the foreseeable future, and this will be an important part of efforts to retain Britain’s relevance in the northern areas of Europe.

While this latest MoU is laden with intent, how closer cooperation between Britain and Norway is to be implemented remains open and will depend on ‘supplementary arrangements’. As such it is fair to ask whether the MoU will prove to be simply discourse, or made to last? The same question can be asked of Britain’s broader efforts to engage with northern Europe and the Arctic region. Unless concrete arrangements are put in place, the intent is likely to slip away.

In the meantime it is worth echoing the calls for renewed attention to Britain’s ‘backyard’ including those areas lying close to or actually north of the Arctic Circle. The future strategic significance of the Arctic remains unclear and with more pressing concerns in Iran, Somalia and the Indian Ocean, it is to an extent understandable that some will treat it as an unwanted distraction. But it is not and the government should be devoting resources to build knowledge and situational awareness of what is happening on Britain’s northern flank, and to establish firm relationships and diplomatic channels with potential partners. Momentum for this is slowly building through the Northern Group and the multiple MoU’s with Norway. However, these efforts must be sustained through active engagement if Britain is to have a credible presence, and more importantly, future relevance in the northern areas of Europe. 

Duncan Depledge is a research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute and a PhD student in the Department of Geography at Royal Holloway (University of London). The article appears in abridged form. It was originally published on RUSI.org.


[1] Clara Marina O’Donnell, ‘EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests’, International Affairs(Vol. 87, No. 2, 2011) pp. 419-433.
[2] François Heisbourg, ‘The defence of Europe: Towards a new transatlantic division of responsibilities’, in All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO, ed. Tomas Valasek, (London: Centre for European Reform, 2012) pp. 27-44. 
[3] Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Keeping our powder dry? UK defence policy beyond Afghanistan’, The RUSI Journal (Vol. 156, No. 1, 2011) pp. 20-28.
[4] Sir David Richards, ‘Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture 2011’, RUSI, 14 December 2011, http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4EA01B5272990/
[5] Steve Cole and Patrick Lynch, ‘Arctic Sea Ice Continues Decline, Hits Second-Lowest Level, NASA, 4 October 2011, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2011/oct/HQ_11-337_Arctic_Sea_Ice_Decline.html
[6] Duncan Depledge, ‘Arctic Assembly: The Polar Policies of the United Kingdom’ in Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes: The New Geopolitics of the Polar Regions, eds. Richard Powell and Klaus Dodds (forthcoming).
[7] Used here to denote the Eurasian side of the Arctic region.
[8] Private interviews with staff at the UK Ministry of Defence, September-December 2011. 
[9] For a recent audit of UK Arctic interests see Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds, ‘The UK and the Arctic: The Strategic Gap’, The RUSI Journal (Vol. 156, No. 3, 2011) pp. 72-79..
[10] Depledge and Dodds, op cit.


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An Arctic Council Security Agreement: Preventing Militarization and Ensuring Stability and Security of the Arctic (Part II)




by Olin Strader Arctic nations like Canada, Denmark and Norway are in varying stages of building a fleet of armed Arctic patrol ships. What will happen when these nations, and perhaps other Arctic nations, commit to armed, ice-capable ship building programs? Will this lead to a militarization the Arctic? Will a nation or nations feel threatened and jeopardize the stability and security of the region? One might ask what would jeopardize stability and security? The answer is economic interests. Where economic interests proceed, security must follow. There should be little need to highlight the reported natural resources of the Arctic, not to mention its cost-saving routes to high latitude ports. There was a war in the name of the Cod fish in the last century, lest we forget. If that is not persuasive enough, consider the recent rhetoric of China’s Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo: "The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it...China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world's population.”[7]

To avoid misperceptions and an Arctic ship building race, in addition to an Arctic Council Security Agreement, nations should also commit themselves to a multilateral Arctic Response Force. The idea of an Arctic Response Force is not new. Denmark, according to their Arctic strategy, has proposed creation of a national Arctic Response Force, designed to provide security for its Arctic waters.[8] The concept put forward in this article is simply a regionalization of the Danish model. Collectivized security by its very nature is intended to be a guarantor of transparency, cooperation, collaboration and trust. 

Some Arctic member states inherently realize collective security is the right idea. What may concerned them is surrender of their sovereignty. The ideas put forward in this article seek to preserve the integrity of each nations sovereignty, but link together national efforts under a single agreement that provides security for the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas. Furthermore, the notion of an Arctic security agreement and an Arctic Response Force is not expected to pool resources or levy a membership fee. Rather, it seeks to link, in a coherent way, each nations territory into a regional security architecture.

Assuming for a moment Arctic nations were willing to collectively secure the Arctic region, what is it an Arctic Response Force would be expected to do? Possible missions might include assisting in Search & Rescue efforts, environmental response assistance, maritime security, prevent illegal fishing, poaching and whaling, ensure the freedom of navigation, prevent eco-terrorism, just to name a few. The Arctic today consists of two primary shipping routes, the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. 


While the preponderance of these two routes lie within the Russian Federation’s and the Government Canada’s territorial waters, the approaches and exits are adjacent to other Arctic states. Consequently, Arctic risks are assumed by all the Arctic states and their indigenous populations, whether it’s a vessel originating in the Baltic destined to transit the Northern Sea Route or an Asian-based vessel intending to transit the Northwest Passage. If originating in the Baltic, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Russia and the United States all have an interest in this vessel’s safe passage in or near their territorial waters. If originating in Asia, the United States, Russia and Norway have a direct interest, but so might Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Denmark. The point is the challenge associated with an opening Arctic is one that should be undertaken by all and codified in an agreement.

Before discussing the content of an Arctic Council Security Agreement, it is worth mentioning that leadership is a key component of this agreement. Arctic challenges are shared by governments and by national defense and security organizations. Therefore, to sustain security and stability of the region, defense and security leadership should form an Arctic Council Chiefs of Defense and Chiefs of Coast Guard forum. The regularity of their meetings should be in keeping with standard Arctic Council procedures. The nation who holds the chairmanship of the Arctic Council should host the aforementioned forums. It maybe necessary to form sub-committees, but these should be limited. So, what should an Arctic Council Security Agreement contain? What are its essential parts?

Arctic Council Security Agreement

An Arctic Council Security Agreement should comprise at least eight elements: 1) shared interests, 2) sovereign responsibilities, 3) shared challenges, 4) shared missions, 5) state resources, 6) organization of Defense and Coast Guard Chiefs Council, 7) exercises and conferences, and 8) specific instructions. Governing states willingness to commit to such an arrangement is their shared interests. Chief among states interests should be a peaceful opening of the Arctic. This high ideal should serve as the preamble to the Arctic Council Security Agreement. Next, a clear statement of sovereign responsibility should be articulated at this point. Following a statement of shared interests and sovereign responsibility, states should outline their shared challenges. 

Challenges may include Search & Rescue, Environmental Response, Fisheries Management, etc. Framed by a comprehensive list of defined challenges, Arctic states should outline agreed missions to meet the challenges. Both challenges and missions should be framed in time-horizons, because not all challenges will be realized today. Challenges and missions should also be informed by the permanent representatives to the Arctic Council. To gain consensus on the challenges and missions it will be necessary to look for the common challenges resident in Arctic states’ strategic documents. 

Furthermore, states should frame their commitment of resources to preserve Arctic security and ensure a peaceful opening of the Arctic. Resourcing should attempt to link indigenous efforts such as the Canadian Rangers and other analogous indigenous security forces. Ideally, Arctic states should look to their indigenous populations to serve as the backbone of their Arctic Response Force, structuring them as first responders and guides. And as discussed previously, organization of a Chiefs of Defense and Coast Guards forum and necessary sub- committees should be expressed. Sub-committees might include Maritime Domain Awareness, aids to navigation and other security and defense related matters. Additionally, guidance as to the regularity of regional exercises and conferences should be communicated. Finally, states should draft specific instructions to cover remaining issues that do not fit neatly into previous mentioned categories. For example, there are invariably nature seams in the transition zones between state’s boundaries that should be addressed to promote cooperation and collaboration.

The Arctic is changing rapidly; more rapidly perhaps than Arctic nations are preparing to meet the challenges associated with an opening Arctic. Therefore, it is paramount that Arctic Council nations codify an Arctic Council Security Agreement that can serve to govern safety and security in a changing Arctic. Additionally, they should create an Arctic Response Force as a means to address safety and security challenges. Without such an agreement, militarization, increased defense spending, heightened national security risks and other concerns may lead where Arctic nations do not seek to go. Therefore, shared security interests are an essential starting point to ensure a peaceful opening of the Arctic. 

Sources:
[7] The Diplomat, “Chinaʼs Arctic Play”, accessed at http://thediplomat.com/2010/03/09/china %E2%80%99s-arctic-play/
[8] Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011), 20.
[9] United National Environmental Program, “Arctic sea routes-Northern Sea Route and Northwest Page”, accessed at http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/arctic-sea-routes-northern-sea-route-and-northwest-passage
[10] Arctic Council," Arctic Council Logo", accessed at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/



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An Arctic Council Security Agreement: Preventing Militarization and Ensuring Stability and Security of the Arctic (Part I)





by Olin Strader Imagine in 2040 the Arctic Ocean is navigable for an extended period each summer. Then imagine Arctic states navies going to war, head to head, in the Arctic Ocean over natural resources. A computer game set to be released in the second quarters of 2012 called Naval War: Arctic Circle, imagines just such an environment. According to CPU Gamer, “In the future, civilization is still reliant on petroleum, but the easily accessible land-based oil reserves are dwindling rapidly. The nations of the far north struggle to harness the rich untapped wells of the Arctic Circle and will go to war to guarantee control of the black gold.”[2] The irony of the scenario Naval War: Arctic Circle projects is exactly why an international mechanism is needed to preclude such a scenario. 

So it isn’t to hard to imagine an Arctic where every Arctic nation has its own fleet of armed Arctic patrol ships like the one pictured above. What would that kind of Arctic be like? Would it constitute a militarization of the Arctic? Would such a development encourage conflict? The more important question is how can Arctic states undertake Arctic Patrol Ship construction programs without jeopardizing the stability of the Arctic? The answer is to commit to an Arctic Council Security Agreement centered around the creation of a multi-national Arctic Response Force that recognizes and respects states, and their indigenous populations sovereignty.

Arctic states are actively undertaking major Arctic shipbuilding programs. The latest pronouncement came from the Russian Federation, who on 20 December 2011 announced the Zvezdochka yard in Severodvinsk will begin construction of ice-class vessels crewed by a complement of sixty and designed to transport military hardware.[3] By the same token, on 19 October 2011 Canada’s National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) Secretariat announced Irving Shipbuilding, Inc. had been selected to build the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship.[4] Norway and Denmark currently possess armed Arctic patrol ships. The Norwegian Svalbard class and the Danish Thetis-class ice- capable patrol ships current operate in Arctic waters.[5] Despite the projected proliferation of ice-capable Arctic patrol ships, this does not currently constitutes a threat to Arctic security.

To avoid jeopardizing the current stability of the Arctic, brokering an Arctic Council Security Agreement is perhaps the best way to avoid militarization of the Arctic in the longer-term. Long-term stability in a region could be jeopardized by misunderstandings and further exacerbated by a general lack of a shared vision. The Arctic region comprised of five littoral states, eight Arctic Council member states and several indigenous nations all have a vested interest in a stable Arctic today for economic and security reasons. However, a regional security agreement should be put in place as the Arctic opens to increased exploitation to guarantee stability and security. Without one, events are left to chance and chance is a fickle partner.

But under which international body should a regional security agreement be brokered? Preliminarily, there are significant obstacles to creating an Arctic Council agreement because the council’s charter precludes it from dealing with matter related to military security.[6] But the obstacles associated with an Arctic Council Security Agreement aside, let’s consider possible options. Possible candidates include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Arctic Council (AC) and perhaps an ad hoc organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization cannot be considered a likely candidate because some of the Arctic Council nations are not member states and Russia would interpret the Alliance’s presence in the Arctic as tantamount to encirclement. The EU is not a likely candidate because not all Arctic Council nations are part of the EU and some of these countries overtures to join the EU have been spurned. The UN could be likely a candidate, however, were the United States inclined to join, Congress would likely interpret participation under the UN as an encroachment on its sovereignty. One has only to look at opposition within the U.S. Senate to accession to the Law of the Sea Treaty to understand the challenge associated with this option. That leaves either the Arctic Council or an ad hoc organization.

One way of looking at these options is to ask oneself which organization represents the best guarantor of Arctic nation’s, and their indigenous population’s, security? Success being defined as all Arctic nations agree to collectivized security and the Arctic opens in a peaceful manner consistent with international norms.

In short, the logical answer is a fundamental change to the Arctic Council’s charter. Caution is strongly recommended when amending international treaties or agreements. That is why this author recommends a more nuanced approach. The question then is what kind of challenges would encourage Arctic littoral nations to collectivize security? The immediate challenge facing Arctic nations and their indigenous populations are safety and security related. The recent Arctic Council Search & Rescue Agreement highlights a principle concern of its member states. Discussions about environmental response and fisheries protection are further examples of contemporary safety and security needs. And these challenges will mainly come on the periphery, along the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage for the immediate future. But, if the satellite record data continues to reveal a receding ice cap, one can only assume that in twenty years time much more of the Arctic Ocean will be navigable. Therefore, it is vital to plan today for tomorrow’s safety and security challenges. Part II of this article was published on Wednesday, January 18th and can be found here.

Sources:
[1] National Defense and Canadian Forces, “Arctic Offshore Patrol Photo Gallery”, accessed at: http://www.materiel.forces.gc.ca/en/aops-pg.page?
[2] CPU Gamer: PC Gaming, Naval War: Arctic Circle Developer Diary Video, accessed at http://www.cpugamer.com/news/naval-war-arctic-circle-developer-diary-video
[3] Barents Observer, “Navy gets new Arctic transport vessel”, accessed at: http://www.barentsobserver.com/navy-gets-new-arctic-transport-vessel.5000753-116321.html
[4] CG Blog, “Canadian Icebreaker, Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, Shipyard “Rationalization”, accessed at: http://cgblog.org/2011/10/19/canadian-icebreaker-arctic-offshore-patrol-ship-shipyard- rationalization/
[5] Canadian American Strategic Review, “Background--Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) Naval Icebreaker”, accessed by: http://www.casr.ca/bg-navy-aops-icebreaker.htm
[6] Declaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council: The Ottawa Declaration - 1996, (Ottawa: Arctic Council, 1996), 2.


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