Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts





Ukraine Crisis and the Arctic: Penalties or Reconciliation?
By Andreas Østhagen, April 30, 2014



Canada’s recent decision to boycott an Arctic Council task force meeting held in Moscow is a direct example of how the Ukraine conflict is starting to impact Arctic cooperation. Given its prominent position in the Arctic, however, Russia is integral to most schemes for the region’s future development. As vocalized by both former US Secretary of State, Clinton, and the current Prime Minister of Iceland, Gunnlaugsson, the Ukraine crisis might have a severe and unintended impact on Arctic cooperation [1].

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The impact of the events in Ukraine for Arctic cooperation will be neither straight forward nor harmonized across the region. Instead it will vary according to the interests of the different Arctic states. They could decide to use the Arctic as an arena for penalizing Russia further or use it to engage Russia in dialogue. Currently, officials dealing with Arctic affairs are asking themselves what exactly these consequences will be, deciding whether to take further action (like Canada) or issue warnings (like Iceland).

Economic Development

First, the immediate and direct impact of decisions taken outside of an Arctic context could hamper Russia’s strongest interest in the Arctic, namely economic development. Sanctions put in place by the European Union and the United States have the potential to affect the multitude of European and American companies engaged in developing the vast resource potential in the Yamal, Nenets and Kara Sea regions. Highlighting this, on April 28 sanctions were put in place by the US on Rosneft’s president, Igor Sechin [2].

This summer ExxonMobil alone is scheduled to conduct some of the most expensive exploratory drillings in the history of offshore oil and gas development in the Kara Sea through its joint venture with Rosneft [3]. BP is similarly dependent on Rosneft after TNK-BP was incorporated into the Russian oil giant in 2013, leaving BP with 19.5 percent of Rosneft’s shares [4]. Should further sanctions be put in place limiting western companies dealings with Russian energy companies, from either the Russian or the EU/US side, Arctic economic development in Russia will take a hit.

Cancelling Cooperation

In terms of direct cooperation in the Arctic sphere, exclusion of Russia or the boycotting of various Arctic meetings by one or several of the Arctic states have the potential to derail the relatively well-established modes of collaboration that have developed in the Arctic. Canada’s decision not to attend the Arctic Council task force meeting in Moscow last week is a minor, but still significant symbol of how Arctic cooperation is affected by the international crisis further south [5].

Similarly, Russian officials were not invited to take part in a pre-meeting to the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum in Sydney, Novia Scotia on March 31, where the establishment of an Arctic Coast Guard Forum was discussed. The planned Northern Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) meeting scheduled for June in Iceland seems likely to be postponed as well, as could be expected. The Northern CHODs forum is one of the few arenas, in addition to the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, where all the Arctic states convene to discuss hard security matters. Consequently several of the informal and formal arenas where civilian and military issues in the Arctic are discussed are put on hold.

Various Interests
Yet, Russia’s participation in the high level Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) meeting under the Canadian chairmanship in Yellowknife on March 25-27 proceeded as planned. In the Arctic Coast Guard Forum meeting it was also pointed out that any coast guard forum for the Arctic without the Russians present would prove futile, given Russia’s predominant role in Arctic maritime matters. For the United States and the Scandinavian countries such an approach seems only logical, given adjacent maritime borders that involve shared fish stocks and natural resource deposits. This highlights the importance of maintaining a working relationship with Russia on specific issues for some of the Arctic states, albeit these interests vary amongst the Arctic countries.

For decades Norway’s collaboration with Russia on the joint management of fish stocks in the Barents Sea has been promoted as a model for dealing with Russia on a sensitive topic that entails both a civilian and a military dimension [6]. Similarly, the 2010 maritime delimitation agreement was highly motivated by a desire in both countries to develop potential petroleum resources in the former disputed maritime area. Related cooperation between Russia and Norway has expanded since [7].

Although Sweden and Finland do not share a maritime border with Russia, Finland in particular has an extensive land boundary and is dependent on a rational working relationship with its larger neighbor. Just in terms of border crossings, Finland issued 1.3 million visas to Russia in 2013, a third of all Schengen entry visas going to Russia, according to the BarentsObserver [8]. As argued by Finland’s Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, Stubb, Finland is heavily dependent on Russia’s economic trajectory and the consequences of the Ukraine crisis might be severe for the Finnish economy [9].

In the Bering Sea the US and Russia have a long standing collaboration on research and management of fish stocks, in particular with regards to the Alaskan Pollock [10]. For the last 19 years Russia and the US have worked together in this maritime area, and as ship traffic is increasing, the need for collaboration is only set to increase [11]. Combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the area has already been stated as one of the main goals in the US’ Arctic Implementation Plan from January 2014 [12]. Also, as most vessels frequenting the Bering Sea are fishing boats, the potential northern movement of fish stocks due to temperature increases as seen in the North Atlantic will force the vessels to move further north and demand even greater coordination and collaboration between Russian and US coast guards, similar to what has developed in the Barents Sea.

Russia’s Primacy in the Arctic

The different Arctic states all have their own «special» relationships with Russia, with varying degrees of interdependency and collaboration. Related, it is less counterproductive to Canada’s Arctic interests to take a strong stance towards Russia than it is for some of the Scandinavian countries. The seven Arctic states excluding Russia also do not form any cohesive block against Russia, in part due to the fact that membership in international organizations vary between NATO and the EU (5 NATO members and 3 EU members – only Denmark overlaps).

Yet, coordinated efforts to exclude Russia from specific Arctic forums have been – and will probably continue to be – put in place. We should, however, not forget that Russia is the largest of all the Arctic actors, measured in everything from population to economic activity and resource potential. Efforts to deal with environmental pollution, search and rescue, and common standards in the Arctic have also been developed with a lowest common denominator approach, depending on all the Arctic states engaging and signing up to the agreements. Therefore, having Russia onboard on Arctic-related agreements is not only preferable, but also essential to ensure a responsible development in the Arctic.

Conclusion – An Arena for Penalties or Reconciliation?

In sum, Russia is dependent on a positive Arctic development, while the country is also integral to most of the development in the region. The other Arctic states undoubtedly have an obligation to act on proceedings in Ukraine, yet on a lower working level many of them are heavily dependent on continuing business as usual in various areas where Russia constitutes an essential partner. Therefore, the somewhat inconsistent responses with regards to various Arctic domains are likely set to continue.

In previous periods of high tension between Russia and the west, the Arctic has actually served as a theatre for continued cooperation. A good example of this is the 2008 Georgia crisis where collaboration in the Arctic was almost unscathed, arguably also serving as an arena for normalizing relationships as the crisis ended. What role will the Arctic have this time around? That depends on the extent to which Russia will continue to paint itself into a corner, and whether the other Arctic states choose to use the region as an arena for penalties or reconciliation.




[6] See for example Hønneland, Geir (2007), “International Cooperation and Arctic Governance: Regime Effectiveness and Arctic Governance”, London & New York: Routledge.



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Conference Report: “The Arctic: Region of Cooperation and Development”




Courtesy of RIAC
By Elizaveta Kozlova On 2-3rd December 2013, “The Arctic: Region of Cooperation and Development” international conference took place in Moscow, Russia. The conference was organized by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and its partners – the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations (RAS IMEMO), International Maritime Law Association, The Pew Charitable Trusts, and The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The conference enjoyed a high-level opening ceremony which featured the Russian President’s Special Representative for International Cooperation in The Arctic and Antarctic Arthur Chilingarov, Senior Arctic Official for Russia Anton Vasilyev, RIAC Director Andrey Kortunov, RAS IMEMO Director Alexander Dynkin, followed by Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program Andrew Kuchins, Director of The Pew Charitable Trusts International Arctic Programme Scott Highleyman, President of International Maritime Law Association Vladimir Mednikov, and Leonid Kalashnikov of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The proceedings were organized in six consecutive panels on shipping, fisheries, environmental legislation, regional development in the Russian Arctic, resource exploitation, and potential for further Russian-U.S. cooperation in the Arctic. The conference delivered informative and detailed perspectives from the Russian Arctic stakeholders, thus addressing what Mr. Kuchins referred to as “deficit of understanding how Russia perceives the Arctic”.

The “Regulation of International Navigation in the Arctic” section discussed the increase in shipping along the Northern Sear Route (NSR) and the prospects for its further development from a practical, infrastructural point of view. 

Timur Mukhametyanov of the Department of International Cooperation in the Russian Ministry of Transport gave an overview of the relevant recent legislative developments: the clear definition of the NSR water area, the adoption of the new ‘Rules of Navigation in the Northern Sea Route water area’ in January 2013, and the establishment of the Northern Sea Route Administration in March 2013.

Sovcomflot Deputy Director General Mikhail Suslin highlighted the potential for further shipping development in polar waters against the backdrop of offshore oil and gas projects in the Russian Arctic. In 2010-2013, hydrocarbons made up 70% of NSR cargo flows, while bulk cargo amounted to 24%. The recent increase in the number of ships transiting the NSR may lead to its transit cargo reaching as much as 70 million tons, Mr. Suslin said. Sovcomflot has also explored the deepwater section of the route, which is an alternative to the passage via the Sannikova Strait.

Deputy Director General of Rosatomflot Stanislav Golovinskiy described the main functions of Rosatomflot icebreakers, which are not limited to icebreaker support to cargo vessels but provide service to military vessels in the Northern Navy Fleet and assist in disembarkation and evacuation of scientific research stations as well. He pointed out how unpredictable the changing climate and sea ice conditions can be, referring to the vast area that was covered by one-year sea ice floes in the East Siberian Sea in September 2013 as opposed to the record sea ice minimum one year before. Appealing to the voyage by Tor Viking II in December 2010,Mr. Golovinskiy said that navigation along the Northern Sea Route is also possible in December, therefore the navigation period may be prolonged. Finally, he presented the Russian nuclear icebreaker capacity, which is currently comprised of five vessels: three “Arktika” and two “Taimyr” type icebreakers, with three IB-60 type universal nuclear icebreakers planned to start operations in 2017-2021.

In concordance with the conference title, cooperation was indeed the main theme of the conference, which  concerned governmental, civil, scientific, and business interactions both within and across borders.

During the opening ceremony, RAS IMEMO Director Alexander Dynkin stated that there isno conflict potential in the Arctic, while Ambassador Vasilyev referred to the region as “stable and predictable”. The dissonance between mass media speculation and real Arctic diplomacy was accurately reflected in a comment by Ambassador David Balton who said,“I wish I had a ruble for each story that I read about conflict in the Arctic”. In his turn, Andrey Zagorsky of RAS IMEMO complimented the U.S. Department of Defense’s Arctic Strategy because it aims at ensuring security in the region by means of cooperation rather than military deployment.

Business can play a significant role in regional development through participation in various forms of business or public-private partnerships with federal and regional authorities, research centers, or companies from the same or another industrial sector. As announced by Lukoil representative Alexander Abashin, Lukoil and Gazpromneft were on the brink of signing a partnership agreement between their flagship Arctic projects in the Pechora Sea, namely the Varandey Oil Export Terminal and Prirazlomnaya Oil Platform, respectively. The agreement would entail joint training sessions and exchange of experience and information. After a brief review of the company’s main operations, Vladimir Zhukov of Norilsk Nickel made a rather impressive presentation of the corporate citizenship strategy, which takes up as much as 4% of Norilsk Nickel profits spent on investment in regional infrastructure in Taimyr and the High North generally. This includes two relocation programs for inhabitants of areas suffering from industrial pollution in Norilsk and Dudinka, a partnership with the regional Taimyr Airline to modernize its fleet, and contribution to the development of the Northern Sea Route by virtue of investment into Dudinka port infrastructure. The presentation of Vladimir Bagreev of the Norwegian-Russian Chamber of Commerce (NRCC) provided a good example of how comprehensive cross-border business interactions can be. With a membership of some 140 companies, NRCC promotes networking among both government agencies and large and medium size enterprises in the form of, among others, high-level business forums, market information seminars, and business-to-business (B2B) and Young Entrepreneurship matchmaking programs.

Andrey Krivorotov of the Shtokman Development AG claimed that the government-business-science triangle would be the most effective model for the sustainable exploitation of the Arctic resource base. However, he noted, social and economic development in the Arctic cannot be compatible with a liberal economy. The Arctic is competing for investment flows with other regions, such as Africa, Brazil, Australia; the government is therefore responsible for establishing favorable “rules of the game” to attract investment, as well as for providing the necessary infrastructure.

The human dimension of international cooperation in the Arctic was represented by the “Human in the Arctic” project which was announced by Permanent Representative of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) to the President of the Russian Federation Alexey Struchkov. The project, aimed to deliver a comprehensive evaluation of life quality and human development in northern regions, has been recently launched by the Northern Forum, founded in 1991, an international organization which brings together nine regional governments across Russia, Canada, Iceland, South Korea, and Japan.

Saint Petersburg State University (SPBU) Professor Georgiy Cherkashyov introduced several case studies of international scientific and educational cooperation in the Arctic: University of the Arctic coalition of higher education institutions, and bilateral university cooperation programs: POMOR polar and marine sciences cooperation between Russian and German universities, SPBU cooperation with a number of Norwegian universities; and scientific workshops and expeditions under the auspices of the joint Russian-American Long-Term Census of the Arctic (RUSALCA) project.

A separate panel was devoted to U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. The panel participants seemed to have a shared vision of the two states’ relations in the polar dimension as that of a committed and effective working relationship.

The two states cooperate within the framework of the Arctic Council, where the United States and Russia co-chaired the negotiations of the Search-and-Rescue agreement, which was the first legally binding document negotiated under the auspices of  the Arctic Council in 2011; together with Norway, Russia and the United States also co-chaired the Arctic Council negotiations of the second legally binding agreement – Oil Spill Preparedness and Response – which was finalized in 2013. Head of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission David Benton suggested that together the United States and Russia could lead the way to improve the Arctic Council.

The main areas of bilateral cooperation include numerous joint scientific projects, coast guard cooperation and joint trainings, and fisheries management in the Bering Sea. Mr. Zagorsky called for more cooperation in regulating shipping in the Bering Strait, which may soon turn into a “bottleneck” due to increased shipping activities in polar waters.

Mr. Benton argued in favor of extending fisheries cooperation to the Chukchi Sea, part of which lies beyond the 200-mile zones of Russia and the United States and may therefore fall prey to unregulated fishing, for these high seas areas are becoming very attractive to third-party fishing nations due to the retreat of polar sea ice. The need for future fisheries regulation in the Chukchi Sea and the central parts of the Arctic Ocean was prominently featured across several panels and was supported by many conference speakers, among them Ambassador Balton, Commissioner Benton, Mr. Highleyman, former Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture Trevor Taylor, and Chairman of  “Sevryba” Coordinating Council Vyacheslav Zilanov.

The conference made a valuable contribution in terms of demythologization of some popular themes frequently discussed in Arctic forums.

Oleg Kozlov of the Russian Ministry of Transport provided a detailed explanation of the main issues, which are behind the slow progress of the Polar Code negotiations. There are differing opinions among negotiating parties in a number of issues, which include ice strengthening categorization for vessels, determination of the minimum acceptable temperatures, the applicability of the Polar Code to different kind of vessels, and environmental regulations for shipping in polar waters. He acknowledged that the Polar Code negotiations are proceeding more slowly than expected and still have a long way to go before the agreement can be finalized.

Saint Petersburg State University Professor Valery Konyshev explained the internal political struggle and some national legislation issues, which constitute the major impediments to ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the U.S. Senate. He made it clear that the problem stems from a domestic issue rather than geopolitical motivation.

The issue of charging fees for using the Northern Sea Route came up in discussions several times. A key objective of the Russian government’s transport policy in the Arctic region is to attract shipping traffic to the NSR in order to ensure its commercial development. For this purpose, the federal law "On Amendments to Certain Russian Federation Legislative Acts for Commercial Shipping in the Arctic Ocean", adopted in July 2012, lifted the polar shipping charge for vessels taking the route, leaving only icebreaker escort and pilotage charges. In other words, the Russian government does not charge foreign vessels for traveling along the route per se. Icebreaker escort is no longer mandatory, [1] but it is widely agreed among members of the Russian shipping community that provision of icebreaker and pilotage services to vessels traveling along the route is crucial to its navigation safety. Mr. Golovinskiy remarked that the current tariffs are marginal, which means that service providers such as Rosatomflot may negotiate lower transit fees with shipowners, which would bridge the tariff gap between the Northern Sea Route and the Suez Canal and enhance the NSR’s  commercial viability. At the same time, during the plenary session a representative of “Transport of Russia” newspaper voiced the concern that the elimination of the polar shipping charges might be regarded as an infringement on the Russian transport industry’s interest, as these charges could otherwise be a source of transport revenue. Mr. Zagorsky and Deputy Secretary of Security Council of the Russian Federation Vladimir Nazarov, however, explained that the NSR is already subsidized by the Russian government, and in case of its full self-sufficiency the costs for shipowners would be so high that none of them would consider using the route.


[1] For a more detailed discussion of recent developments in the Northern Sea Route navigation regulations, and economic factors which are relevant to the prospective development of shipping in the Russian polar waters, see this article by The Arctic Institute’s Kathrin Keil and Andreas Raspotnik, available here - http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/09/the-myth-of-arctic-shipping-why_8.html




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The Arctic Council: Underpinning Stability in the Arctic




By Matthew Willis At first glance, it may seem odd that a once-obscure organisation devoted to environmental preservation and sustainable development should now be among the Arctic’s most prominent actors. To experienced observers, however, the Arctic Council’s growing stature is no more surprising than the fact that the regional ‘meltdown’ many political scientists forecast has never occurred. Today, the council is effectively presiding over an emerging ‘stability architecture’ based not on military strength, but on the multilateral pursuit of common interests. This does not imply the exclusion of the military, simply its deployment in novel and unconventional ways. This article looks back briefly on the crisis that never was, before scanning the current Arctic security horizon and evaluating the developing role of the Arctic Council. 

Except in the minds of a few headline writers perhaps, none of the semi-apocalyptic conflict scenarios envisaged for the Arctic has developed. Instead, the eight Arctic states – Canada, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland and the US – have established ever-closer relations. Certainly, Norway and Denmark have modernised their surface fleets and Russia has bolstered its shrunken postCold War capabilities, but the region has not been militarised. Boundary tiffs have never flared into open conflict: they have either been settled, in the case of the Russo-Norwegian Barents Sea dispute, or allowed to fall dormant once again, as in the case of Hans Island. The rush for energy resources never occurred either: companies have secured licences and, in some cases, drilled exploratory wells, but their behaviour has been cautious. 

The one thing the alarmists were correct about was the magnitude of the changes the Arctic environment would experience. In fact, they underestimated it. The average annual temperature in the Arctic is rising faster than predicted and the rate of ice-melt is accelerating similarly, with global sea levels projected to rise by a metre by 2100. Unusual weather patterns across Europe are lending weight to warnings that these and other developments could contribute, by altering the path of the jet stream, to more frequent extreme weather across the hemisphere. 

The wrong conclusion to draw would be that if the current effects of climate change have not yet triggered a resource ‘scramble’ or drawn countries into confrontation, the Arctic can be written off as a key strategic theatre. On the contrary, foreign and defence ministries across the region – and beyond – are more focused on it than ever.

The trends they are watching – drifting fish stocks, increasing shipping and expanding hydrocarbon exploration – are not conventional military concerns. Indeed, they are overwhelmingly civilian, but their unifying theme is growing human activity, and thus unpredictability. The armed forces, beyond their responsibility for handling all contingencies, are also the only agencies with both the requisite monitoring instruments and the physical capabilities to operate in such a vast and inhospitable region. Canada, for instance, must treat potential search and rescue (SAR) missions as expeditionary: its armed forces are experimenting with a ‘hub’ concept that involves prepositioning equipment in depots across the north to lengthen their reach and shorten their reaction time.

Exercise Cold Response
courtesy of soldatnytt on flickr.com
It is no surprise, therefore, that the ‘Arctic militaries’ are increasingly working together. Annual joint exercises help them to develop the necessary skills and co-ordination: Exercise Cold Response 2012 – held in Norway last March and simulating action under NATO leadership – involved over 16,000 personnel from a dozen countries.

New partnership structures are gradually emerging, too. One is the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), a semi-annual gathering of senior military officers from the Arctic Eight and selected allies, which looks at how to improve co-operation, particularly in terms of SAR and domain awareness. Highly informal at present, the ASFR could gradually develop into a more structured forum for international co-ordination.

Nonetheless, reasoning that the regional security architecture needs revamping to accommodate the Arctic’s transformation is probably going too far. For one, attempts to ‘secure’ the region could well achieve the opposite. For example, as Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper told Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary-general, in 2010, a NATO presence would only antagonise Russia.

Moreover, hard power frameworks are not the only way to maintain peace. In the Arctic, the coastal states’ reverence for the existing international legal regime is a crucial part of the region’s stability. Another part is these states’ common belief in the economic benefits that stability brings. With international law as the basic foundation, and economic profit (balanced with environmental custodianship) as the organising principle, therefore, the most effective ‘security’ architecture may develop out of the aggregation of government policies geared towards facilitating and regulating healthy commercial activity. The result would be less a security than a stability architecture. 

It therefore seems fitting that the Arctic Council, whose key characteristic is its sustained refusal to consider matters touching on ‘hard’ security, should now be considered the central actor on the region’s political stage. Formed in 1996 to promote co-operation and interaction among its members, predominantly in relation to environmental protection and sustainable development, the council has a number of unique features. One is the status it accords indigenous groups: in their position as ‘Permanent Participants’, these groups are able to work on unusually even terms with governments and shape the council’s research agenda.

Another is the council’s lack of decision-making power: it is a forum, or clearing-house, for Arctic research, not an executive organisation. Its output – like the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment – is meant to provide not just its member states, but all relevant stakeholders in the international community, with reliable data and analysis. Nevertheless, because the resulting reports tend to be exhaustive and draw on expertise from around the world, the recommendations produced carry considerable weight. 

This quiet authority, coupled with the 2011 signing of a binding SAR agreement and the current elaboration of an oil-spill prevention protocol, has prompted suggestions that the organisation is changing. But this is only partly right: the SAR agreement, although negotiated ‘under the auspices’ of the Arctic Council, was not in fact a product of the council itself but of its eight permanent members. The same will apply to the oil-spill prevention document. 

What is true is that the ‘dual identity’ of the Arctic Eight as both council members and ‘free-standing’ states gives the council an executive aura, particularly when they – or even just the five states with Arctic coastlines – sign agreements regulating their own behaviour. A good illustration is the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, in which the ‘Arctic Five’ pledged to resolve any jurisdictional disagreements between them peacefully, and pointedly affirmed that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) obviated the need for new regional governance structures. (Admittedly, this announcement also created the impression that the three non-coastal states had been excluded.)

Such statements have both shielded the council from overt politicisation and implied that the political heart of the region beats within it. There could thus be said to be a symbiotic dynamic at work here. On the one hand, the ‘executive’ power of the member states is projected onto the Arctic Council. On the other, the legitimating power of the council, largely derived from the centrality of the Permanent Participants and the presence of observers, imbues the Arctic Eight with additional authority. 

This legitimacy-cum-authority helps explain why fourteen different countries and organisations wish to be admitted as observers this May. Whatever the eventual decision on these applications, the demand is in itself remarkable: at least on paper, the Arctic Council requires more from observers than it offers in return. It is hard to imagine a set-up more contrary to the zero-sum logic of traditional security politics. 

This deluge of applications is a golden opportunity. Openness would be a shrewd move, at a stroke enhancing the council’s legitimacy and the quality of its deliberations, and reducing the risk of being bypassed by countries acting unilaterally. Some of the council’s recent applicants could also represent a financial boon: China, South Korea, India and Japan have the fastest-growing stable of Arctic scientists, while the EU last year proposed devoting €80 billion to Arctic research. 

Meanwhile, the risks of admitting new members, even heavy-hitters like China, are low. First, observers’ powers are limited: they may engage with the forum’s working groups, propose projects and state their views (all with permission), but they have no vote. Secondly, observer status does not alter international law: under UNCLOS, extra-regional actors have no jurisdiction in Arctic waters, and no applicant disputes this. Thirdly, the council is still fundamentally devoted to promoting research and knowledgesharing, and new observers could contribute greatly in this regard. 

Some Permanent Participants also fear being marginalised if new observers are admitted, but the same countries could still engage bilaterally with Arctic states from outside of the council, and there is no difference in power between permanent and ad hoc observer status. The main danger of admitting too many new observers is therefore likely to be confined to a diminished capacity for reaching swift consensus. 

By all accounts, the Arctic states have not yet agreed on how to proceed with these applications. It is inconceivable that they will reject all of the applicants, but unclear how many they will approve – those garnering the most speculation being China and the EU. The Nordic countries have stated their preference for more openness than less, and look set to accept both. The US, having previously rebuked Canada for not being more inclusive, will likely go the same way. 

That leaves the two Arctic giants. Despite its once-bellicose rhetoric, Canada has lately appeared sanguine. Indeed, it has just signed a free trade agreement with China and is negotiating an equivalent with the EU, so a snub would be counter-intuitive. Russia, meanwhile, is deeply distrustful of China, but China is already an ad hoc observer and security remains Russia’s main concern. Given the council’s purpose and the prescribed limits on observer status, the odds are that the balance will tip in China’s favour, just. 

It can therefore be said that while security remains an important element of the Arctic strategic picture, standard definitions are unhelpful; indeed, the region’s ‘securitisation’ would be counter-productive. Stability – the end goal of security – is already present, underpinned by the heft of the Arctic Council – a forum tight enough to take influential positions but loose enough to protect the agency of its core membership. 

As development intensifies and the interests of the many legitimate stakeholders – both state and nonstate – come into sharper focus, this collegial atmosphere may be challenged. Nonetheless, the Arctic is a vast space, with room enough for everyone. Do not expect great sparks to fly.

This article was originally published in RUSI Newsbrief (Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2013), http://www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ref:A513A129282486/#.UUmZwTfFk6I

Matthew Willis is a research analyst in RUSI’s International Security Studies Department.




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Taking Stock of the “Race(s) for the Arctic”




By Kathrin Keil Despite ever more frequent acknowledgement that violent conflict in the Arctic over its increasingly accessible resources is rather unlikely, there is still frequent talk about the ‘race for the Arctic’. This metaphor is more than a bit superficial; the following tries to shed some light on the ‘race’ going on in the Arctic.

First, ‘race’ implies competition about something; someone is trying to achieve something before anyone else. In this case, one must ask who is competing or racing against whom. Who is running, and who is leading?

In the media, one regularly comes across at least two interlinked Arctic ‘races’. One is the race for the right to determine certain sovereign rights in the Arctic, the other the race for Arctic resource development, predominantly the extraction of hydrocarbon resources.

Race for sovereign rights

The race to determine sovereign rights in the Arctic concerns mostly overlapping areas for jurisdiction over the Arctic coastal states’ extended continental shelves.[i] The US, Canada, Russia and Denmark have such overlapping claims in Arctic waters. But in fact, countries are not racing against each other but rather against institutional deadlines set by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The crucial provision is to be found in Art. 4 of Annex II to the Law of the Sea Convention, which says that:

Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State.

Canada has to submit its evidence for the outer limits of its continental shelf by 2013, Denmark by 2014.  Russia ratified the Convention in 1997 and submitted its claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2001. However, the submission was returned with the request for further information and evidence. Russia aims to resubmit in 2013 or 2014.

Norway had its deadline in 2006 and the country did submit that year. With minor adjustments, the CLCS in 2009 included Norway’s request into its recommendations, adding three new areas to the Norwegian continental shelf.[ii] The US has not (yet) ratified UNCLOS and thus cannot submit to the CLCS.

So while there is a certain race here to meet the deadline, the 18th Meeting of the State Parties to UNCLOS in 2008 made sure to take some speed and urgency out of the race. They decided that

the time period referred to in article 4 of annex II to the Convention […] may be satisfied by submitting to the Secretary-General preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and a description of the status of preparation and intended date of making a submission in accordance with the requirements of article 76 of the Convention.[iii]

While this was adopted first and foremost to release pressure from developing countries with limited financial and technological resources and capacities, one could understand this rule to say, in essence, that no formal deadline for a full submission exists anymore.[iv]

Additionally, the boundaries that are still disputed in Arctic waters are not relevant for the ‘race’ to complete the procedure set out in Art. 76 of UNCLOS. The CLCS will not rule on any area of overlap between countries. In other words, if zones of jurisdictional entitlement overlap, the states in question need to agree on a maritime boundary. The determination of the boundary is not achieved by submitting first or before someone else to the CLCS.

There is further the question of whether a state might realistically be denied a submission to the CLCS after the 10-year deadline has passed. Given that the Convention remains silent on this issue, one could argue that there would be no legal consequences for a state which failed to make a submission to the CLCS. This is also supported by Art. 77 UNCLOS according to which

[the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf] are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State [and t]he rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.

In this view, the coastal state’s rights over its continental shelf are inherent; non-compliance with the 10-year deadline does not affect these rights.[v]

That there is indeed little evidence of any kind of ‘race’ when it comes to the determination of sovereign rights over continental shelf areas is supported by the fact that the Arctic coastal states all appear to have taken their full allotment of 10 years (except Russia, who takes even more in total) to complete their submissions to the CLCS. Nor does there seem to be much hurry to solve outstanding disputes, although some movement has been discernable recently. It took Russia and Norway 40 years to come to an agreement on their maritime boundary in the Barents Sea; some movement has been reported as well on the US-Canada Beaufort Sea dispute and the Hans Island issue between Denmark and Canada.[vi]

Race for Arctic resource development

Many also talk about the ‘race for the Arctic’s resources’, mostly its oil and gas. But also here, it is difficult to assemble substantial evidence which might indicate an ongoing “race”. The example of Shell’s activities in the Alaskan Arctic in 2012 show that racing to develop offshore hydrocarbon resources is no sure bet; the project has been plagued by postponements, technological issues and the recent debacle in which the drilling rig Kulluk grounded off of an Alaskan island in rough weather. These are but some of many indications that that industry has far to go before it is ready to successfully and safely conduct Arctic offshore development in areas where development experience and infrastructure is scarce.

Here, too, one must also ask: Who is racing against whom? When it comes to actual extraction activities in relatively unexplored areas like the waters off of Alaska and Greenland, companies are not exactly queuing for offshore projects or hurrying to develop their licences first. Statoil and Total are carefully watching Shell’s endeavours in Alaska and make the commencement of activities in their own Alaskan license areas dependent on the evaluation of the costs, risks and benefits and the overall success or failure of Shell’s development projects. Statoil has already postponed exploration for oil off the Alaskan coast until at least 2015.[vii]

In sum, the use of the ‘race’ metaphor to describe Arctic developments is shallow and has little empirical basis. The continuing use of this metaphor is problematic. It encourages people to believe that there is a potentially dangerous and violent competition going on, and it distracts from much more acute questions and problems that face the Arctic’s inhabitants under rapidly changing conditions in the Arctic.


[i] Article 76 UNCLOS gives countries the possibility to submit claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for extended jurisdiction over their continental shelves.
[ii] Nilsen, Thomas (16 April 2009). Limits of Norway’s Arctic seabed agreed. BarentsObserver. Kirkenes. Retrieved from http://www.barentsobserver.com/limits-of-norways-arctic-seabed-agreed.4580729-16149.html.
[iii] UNCLOS (20 June 2008). SPLOS/183 Decision regarding the workload of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the ability of States, particularly developing States, to fulfil the requirements of article 4 of annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. New York. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/398/76/PDF/N0839876.pdf?OpenElement.
[iv] Pratt, M. (2008). The Arctic Ocean belongs to whom. Paris. Retrieved from http://www.lecerclepolaire.com/En/articles_archives/Pratt_maritime_Arctic.html.
[v] United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2012). Issues with respect to article 4 of Annex II to the Convention (ten-year time limit for submissions). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/issues_ten_years.htm.
[vi] Ibbitson, J. (2011). Dispute over Hans Island nears resolution. Now for the Beaufort Sea. The Globe and Mail. Toronto. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/dispute-over-hans-island-nears-resolution-now-for-the-beaufort-sea/article1884187/.
[vii] CBC News, “French Oil Company Warns Against Arctic Oil Drilling” (Toronto, September 26, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2012/09/26/total-arctic-drilling.html; Lisa Demer, “Oil Company Delays Exploration in Arctic Waters Off Alaska,” Anchorage Daily News (Anchorage, September 6, 2012), http://www.adn.com/2012/09/06/2614308/oil-company-delays-arctic-exploration.html.


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Opening Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic - A Conflict and Risk Assessment







This post is a short excerpt from an article, which was published in Tvergastein Interdisciplinary Journal of the Environment, 2nd issue, November 2012, pp. 36-43. To read the full article please click here.

By Kathrin Keil The recent reopening of Alaskan Arctic waters to hydrocarbon development has sparked a remarkable interest in the increasing economic utilisation of Arctic resources. This has also led to predictions about possible conflict over Arctic resources because of rising stakes and insufficient institutional regulations. Analysts contemplate the possibility of violent conflict over natural resources in the Arctic, forecasting a “new scramble for territory and resources” and a race “to carve up the region.” [1] However, such statements use simplistic underlying assumptions, taking a one-size-fits-all approach to a very complex issue like the increasing economic development of the Arctic region. In fact, activities such as increasing oil and gas development, usage of new shipping lanes, and utilisation of new fishing grounds all have different underlying interest constellations about diverse goods or resources. They thus demand different institutional responses in order to guarantee sustainable development of the North.

Oil and gas have often been depicted as the Arctic commodities most likely to be the cause of eventual conflict, given the combination of rising demand for hydrocarbon resources worldwide and their increasing scarcity, as well as political tension in traditional extraction regions such as the Middle East and North Africa. To get a coherent picture of the likelihood of possible confrontation over Arctic oil and gas resources, the Arctic littoral states’ actual stakes and interests in Arctic energy resources [2] have to be closely analysed along with the commodity character of Arctic energy resources and the interdependence of the actors involved. A survey of the existing institutions providing rules for Arctic oil and gas development and their suitability to contain possible conflicting interests completes the picture.


Commodity Character and Interdependence

The commodity character [3] of Arctic oil and gas is an important indicator for its conflict potential. The kind of commodity that is typically assumed to be the most conflictive is the common pool resource type. Ownership of these resources is usually impossible to establish, it is difficult to exclude actors from utilising these resources, and the consumption of these goods by one actor precludes consumption by another. In contrast, the vast majority of discovered and expected Arctic oil and gas resources are private goods, i.e. their ownership is undisputed and the owners of the goods exhibit private property rights and thus control access to the goods. However, the natural environment as affected by oil and gas extraction can be considered a common pool resource because it is difficult to exclude actors from utilising the environment, and consumption, in the sense of potentially polluting a formerly clean environment, prevents other actors from utilising the environment, for example for fishing. Especially in the case of offshore activities, accidents such as oil spills could easily have transboundary impacts affecting other issue areas as well.

A second important indicator of conflict potential is the interdependence or the expectation of future interaction of the relevant actors during the process of oil and gas exploration and extraction. Indeed, oil and gas exploration and extraction in the Arctic is necessarily a highly iterative and interactive process. The technological and financial efforts are so enormous that future projects, which will move into ever more northern and challenging offshore areas, will not be manageable for one company alone. For example, it takes decades to get investment returns, and required infrastructure cannot be used for anything else but oil and gas transport. Also, considerable uncertainty as to the details of future discoveries and developments in the Arctic requires iterative cooperation over a longer period of time.

The Stakes

The US and Canada have for the foreseeable future only a weak economic interest in the large-scale development of their Arctic hydrocarbon base. This has largely to do with the low competiveness of US and Canadian Arctic oil and gas resources with resources further south that are already much better explored and connected to infrastructure systems. Additional hindering factors are the shale gas revolution in the lower 48 states, the predominant role of the Gulf of Mexico for US oil production, the vast Canadian hydrocarbon concentration especially in Alberta, and limited northern infrastructure.

courtesy of Nordregio, Johanna Roto & José Sterling
http://goo.gl/bQrTA
The picture looks very different for Russia, which has substantial gas and oil reserves, the majority of which are located in the Russian North, and which are of high importance to the overall Russian economy. The government is eager to foster exploration and production of offshore fields. However, many problems remain, such as the dilemma of having to involve foreign companies in continental shelf production because of the limited technology and capital capacities, while keeping a tight state grip on the strategically important resources. In addition, the unconventional gas revolution in the US creates an oversupplied global gas market. Similarly, the petroleum industry is of vital importance to the overall Norwegian economy. While the majority of Norwegian hydrocarbon development is still taking place outside the Arctic, the Barents Sea in particular will play a dominant role in Norway’s future hydrocarbon production. Recent field discoveries as well as the upcoming licensing round highlight the increasing importance of these waters.

Greenland is a special case when it comes to Arctic oil and gas interests. While no proven oil or gas resources and no accompanying industry exist yet, the importance of these resources to Greenland lies in the potential of future development. Revenues from the hydrocarbon sector could provide the financial means needed to reduce the still substantial financial dependence on Denmark.

The Conflict Potential

Given that the US and Canada show little interest in Arctic hydrocarbons and Norway and Greenland focus on their own national hydrocarbon base, this leaves Russia as the most prevalent location of Arctic oil and gas development, which requires the involvement of foreign actors. In other words, if any conflict over Arctic hydrocarbon development were to arise, it would most likely concern business relationships between Russian (state) and foreign companies over access to Russia’s resources and the cost-and-benefit sharing of joint ventures. Importantly, the interests of all actors involved point in the same direction: Russia wants to develop its resource base and sell it to high-price-paying Europeans, while foreign energy companies want a share in this profitable endeavour. 

What remains is a coordination problem: cooperation increases the benefit for all parties involved, but the distribution of those benefits and the sharing of the investment costs necessary to reap them is problematic as the players’ preferences diverge on the distribution of costs and benefits. The crucial point is that foreign and Russian energy companies are able to agree on business cooperation (compare the recent deals between Rosneft and Exxon, Statoil and Eni), and Russian oil and gas development is thus unlikely to provide an incentive for conflict thanks to existing mutual interests. However, a number of hazard problems remain, mostly in form of Russia’s generally challenging and demanding legal and political environment for foreign investors.

The picture looks different for environmental consequences of Arctic oil and gas development. The institutions setting up rules for the development of oil and gas resources to minimise the risks of environmental degradation must be very robust, given that they are usually directed against the short-term interests of the affected actors. Relevant institutions for Arctic oil and gas development are often not entirely adequate for various reasons. While the United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS) provides binding rules for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (Part XII), it does not sufficiently provide for Arctic-specific rules and dispute-settlement competencies. The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC), while providing binding provisions, only calls for minimum standards for national systems for preparedness and response. 

The Arctic Council Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines provide highly precise but no binding rules for marine environmental protection. The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) in contrast provides binding and highly precise rules together with strong monitoring and verification competencies. However, the regional scope of the Convention is limited to the Northeast Atlantic and of the A5 only Denmark and Norway are members. In sum, it is not the extraction of the resources themselves that contain a high conflict potential but rather their side effects, first and foremost the environmental dangers they entail.

In addition to the absence of adequate institutional arrangements for the development of Arctic oil and gas resources, an additional challenge is the linkage between various Arctic economic activities as well as the linkage with the broader social and ecological circumstances of the specific region in which they occur. In other words, institutions for the sustainable development of the Arctic have to take account of the complexity of the Arctic region as a system of various dynamic internal and external relationships that change over time. Importantly, such institutions would take account of the fact that many potential victims of extraction-induced pollution do not have their interests adequately represented in the existing institutions. These are especially residents with no, or only weak, representation options and especially the flora and fauna of Arctic lands and waters. The appropriate institutional device could be an ecosystem-based management (EBM) approach, which leaves out none of the links in the ecosystem and which is flexible enough to take into account new knowledge about affected actors and their concerns and interests. These are the actual challenges ahead and not the often-stated likelihood of possibly violent conflicts over Arctic resources.



[1] Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008): 63 f..

[2] For a detailed analysis of the Arctic littoral states’ interests in Arctic oil and gas resources, cf. Kathrin Keil, “The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas”, Cooperation and Conflict (forthcoming 2013).

[3] Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 6 f.; Elinor Ostrom, “The Challenge of Common-pool Resources,” Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 50, no. 4 (2008): 11.



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